THE RENEWAL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
THE English never attend, in the true sense of atten- tion, to two things at once ; and while there remains an element of danger in the King's illness events on the Continent will make on their minds comparatively slight impression. The renewal of the Triple Alliance, which was formulised on Monday at Berlin by the signatures of all concerned, is, nevertheless, an event of considerable im- portance. It does not merely signify that the present distribution of European power is to continue for another seven years. It means that in the judgment of the Kings and statesmen who control the great armies of Central Europe this Alliance tends so greatly to preserve what they call the " equilibrium " and we call peace, that in order to continue it they disregard objections which, were the issues less serious, might have prevented the renewal. The rulers who sign it, to begin with, are not altogether in love with the "Triple." It interferes a good deal with their independence, with their power to deal with their internal factions, with their freedom to engage in adventures which tempt them, and even with their military arrangements. Those "factions "—the Agrarians, for instance, in Germany, the Slays in Austria, the Republicans in Italy—are very strong, are at heart inimical to the Treaty, and have all to be conciliated if it is to be maintained. Then the popular estimate of the Treaty has undoubtedly grown colder. The Austrians contend, with some justice, that all its advan- tages have been reaped by Germany; the Germans are disposed to believe, now that their numbers run up so fast, that they can do without Austria, and are criticising Austrian military arrangements, and especially the probable loyalty in the field of Austrian Slays, with most indiscreet freedom and contempt of etiquette ; while in Italy more than half the people would prefer an alliance with France and Russia, which, as they think, would bring them economic prosperity. There are many temptations inclining the three Governments to let the Treaty go ; but nevertheless, looking round at all that threatens them, they think that the most serious danger is invasion, they recognise that other precautions as effective as the Treaty would take time and vast expenditure, and they sign it once again as, on the whole, their best defence. Lookers- on can hardly doubt that the Kings and. statesmen are right; that the real danger of each of the three States is the surprise towards which all modern schemes of mobilisation are directed; and that no other arrangement as yet possible could instantly bring such vast defensive armies into the field. An alliance may be invaluable, the alliance of Great Britain, for example, and yet be useless to arrest an anticipated but not expected pouring of armies across land frontiers. The Treaty acts like armour, and can stop an arrow after it has quitted the string.
Politicians who are interested in international affairs often discuss the actual value of a treaty of this kind, and. many of them are disposed to deny that it has much. Treaties, they say, especially treaties embodying a guaran- tee, do not in our day count as they did of old. They are overridden by the interests of the nations, which, as we all see, statesmen plead whenever it is convenient. If Germans, for example, thought that Austria had brought an attack on herself by displaying ambition in the Balkans, they would say so, and make that their excuse for inertia; while if Austria wished Germany to receive a lesson, she would be so slow in gathering up her immense strength that the struggle would be over before she was fairly in the field. As to Italy, if her people were not in the hottest earnest— and half of them are Francophiles.--they could not move rapidly ; and in the best event she has barely a hundred thousand menwho could be mobilised with sufficient sudden- ness. The Treaty, therefore, it is urged, only secures what could be secured without it,—namely, a willingness on the part of the three Powers, if their peoples wished it, to move to the assistance of each other. All that is perfectly true ; but the answer to the sceptics seems nevertheless to be final. Statesmen possessed of the keenest brains in Europe, and loaded with responsibility for the results of their decisions, have considered these objections, have examined the facts, often in the most cynical spirit, and have decided that the Treaty is nevertheless most valuable. They see, we may well imagine, that it prevents other combinations which might be much more dangerous. They know that money is always forthcoming for war, that firing war the Executive rules, and that armies. at least in the beginnings of enterprises, are controlled by their chiefs and not by public opinion. Moreover, they recognise that the Treaty of itself helps to make opinion, that nations are moved first of all by use and wont, and that a people used for half a generation to rely upon a treaty as a protection will not object in any active or irresistible way to see that treaty carried out. This would be true even if the permanent interests of the nations were liable to alteration ; and they are not. Nothing which it is worth while to consider can remove the danger of Germany, wedged in as she is between two military Powers both hostile to herself, and nothing therefore can destroy the value of a million of soldiers pledged to assist her on the South and East. Nothing, again, can modify the permanent danger of the Hapsburgs from the conflict between the two great races under their dominion, and nothing therefore can diminish the value of support from a Power without whose aid one of those races can never be rebellious. And finally, nothing but the Alliance can protect Italy against both France and Austria, both of them Roman Catholic Powers whose rulers would see the restoration of the Popes to their temporal dominion, if not with approval, at least without dismay. The Triple Alliance gives, and. must continue to give, to each of the Powers 'within it needed protection, and the Alliance may therefore be accepted by the most sceptical of diplomatists as a reality. The armies which it promises would move.
We must, however, make one important reservation. The Triple Alliance is intended to protect those who have signed it, and with them all Europe, against one foreseen con- tingency, an effort by France and. Russia to undo the arrangements of 1871, but it does not provide against all contingencies. There might be war between any two Powers without its coming into operation. A Nationalist Dictator in France, for example, might attack Germany without necessarily, if Russia remained quiet, calling Austria into the field. Or Russia and Austria might fight for supremacy in the Balkans without endangering the bones either of Pomeranian or Norman grenadiers. The guarantee, as Europe understands it, is not against war, or even invasion, but against invasion or war by more than a single Power. And there are contingencies possible, though not probable, which would of themselves reduce the Treaty to waste-paper. Any revolution in Russia which temporarily or permanently paralysed he military force would have that effect. So would any revolution in France Red enough to compel Russia to refuse to keep step with so anarchical a Power. And so would the resolution of the Austrian Empire into its elements, which so many observers expect to see on the disappearance of the present Emperor from the scene. .William II. would be bound in that event to protect the south Germans, and Nicholas II. to shelter the South Slays; while the French and Italians could look on or not at their discretion. Statesmen, however, even if far- sighted, do not and cannot protect either themselves or the world against cataclysms of this kind, which are to them what the eruption of a volcano is to geologists. They can only take precautions against events which they believe to be possible in their own day ; and those who renew the Triple Alliance have to the extent of their ability done this, without, so far as we can see, inflicting any damage upon the general interests of mankind. If anybody suffers by the renewal of the Triple Alliance, it is the German Agrarians, and in this country, at all events, a " set-back " for that presumptuous 4nd n.arrow.minded party will be watched without any serious displeasure.
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