Cautious Friends

OUR MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT writes:

On February 2 Russia and India celebrated the tenth anniversary of Indo-Soviet eco- nomic co-operation. It has been a momentous decade for both countries and at the end of it the two architects of Indo-Soviet friendship, Nehru and Khrushchev, have disappeared from the public scene. The fear that Khrushchevite Policies will change has proved to be groundless and gradually the non-aligned countries have regained their confidence in Soviet friendship. Khrushchev took good care to befriend the new team in Delhi after Nehru's death and Kosygin has carried on in the same way.

Yet the Indians had every reason to be ner- vous when Khrushchev fell from power. India is directly involved in the Sino-Soviet discord. The Sino-Indian border dispute is at once a cause and a consequence of estrangement between Peking and Moscow. If a rapprochement were to take Place immediately, it could be at the expense of India. This was the fear which haunted Indian Policy-makers. It still does.

But looked at from a different angle, the fear is unjustified. Soviet policy towards India has evolved over a decade since Stalin was carried to the mausoleum. Undoubtedly, from the very beginning there was an element of ,the need to find a counterpoise to China, but primarily the Soviet attitude was determined in the context of its global policy: the need to prevent the spread of western influence. During Stalin's time this Policy was conceived in the coldest cold-war terms and Nehru was no less a stooge of the

imperialists than he was to be for those eager to take over Stalin's mantle. After Stalin, however, the policy became more flexible.

India's role in preventing consolidation of Western alliances in South and South-East Asia gradually came to be appreciated by Soviet Policy-makers. The hostility of the cold war has Yielded to increasingly peaceful co-existence with America. But it still remains the objective of Soviet foreign policy to prevent new alliances and in geo-political terms India occupies a key Position. Russia grasped this fact well.

There is another Soviet interest in India. In her role as the mentor of newly-independent countries, she had to befriend them. But in the

beginning this was done cautiously, and not all the new nations were eager to open their doors to Communist countries. India proved to be an early exception to this rule and the Soviet Union lavished its friendship on her. Other countries like Indonesia, Egypt and Ghana came later and the bond with India was already strong when they joined in the expanding Soviet circle of friendship. As an example, the Soviet Union

Mound friendship with India not only expedient, but also 'useful and valuable. Not a small part

in this was played by the comparatively sound use to which India put Soviet aid, which went a 1011g way to convince the Russians that aiding new nations was neither a waste of money nor Without political returns.

To all this, first the emergence of China as a power and later her estrangement from the Soviet Union added another factor. Russia had to find a counterpoise to China in order to protect her interests in Asia, and India filled this role ad- mirably. It is a role which India will continue to play for a long time to come.

On the Indian side, too, there were correspond- ing and compelling reasons. Soviet friendship— at one stage Chinese, too—provided the raison d'etre of her non-alignment. It established her independence of western tutelage and gave her a leadership rule which was wrested only partially by China in later years. From the Indian view- point, however, the most concrete benefit was the generous flow of Soviet aid. Its importance lay not merely in the amount, but in its appli- cation. It is largely Soviet aid which has created the nucleus of heavy industry in India.

Of course, both the British and the Germans have built a steel plant in India, but what is remembered is that each proposal to build the steel plant was greeted with howls of protest from the western experts. Only recently the Indians had to withdraw their request for Bokaro steel plant from the United States after endless feasi- bility studies had led nowhere. Now, of course, the Russians are building the plant.

From the Indian side, the case for friendship with Russia has been strengthened with the pros- pect of a perpetual conflict with China. Even if Sino-Soviet relations further improve—and the prospects are none too bright--Russia is unlikely to abandon India. She will still need the friend- ship of India to balance against China and to act in sympathy 'with her minimal interests in South-East Asia. India can do so because her own interests coincide with those of the Soviet

'Damn it all, man, it's only ankle deep.'

Union. They are to restrain China as well as to keep the western influence to the minimum.

The Soviet commitment to India, therefore, stands. The level of trade between the two countries is already planned to double during the current year and increase about fourfold within five years. Recently a despatch from the Delhi correspondent of the government news- paper lzvestia clearly recognised the Indian pre- rogatives in defence and foreign affairs of Bhutan: a small but not insignificant gesture. India apart, it is a telling detail in the complex of Sino-Soviet relations considering the Chinese designs on the Himalayan kingdoms.

There is, however, also a shadow. Speaking at a meeting held under Soviet auspices on January 25 to celebrate the Indian Republic Day, the Indian Ambassador to the USSR remarked: 'Even friends may sometimes mistake each other. Let me assure you that whatever our short- comings and failures, the government and people of India are led by patriots who have spent the prime of their youth in British gaols. They are not people who can be influenced by moneybags or monopolists—Indian or foreign.'

This was a warning note and reservations on both sides remain. Yet barring some sudden and unforeseen developments, there appears to be no real danger to Indo-Soviet friendship.