Eden, Dulles and Collusion

By IAN GILMOUR

Li AD the Americans considered,' Sir Anthony rlasked Admiral Radford, 'the effect [of using force] on world opinion?' Sir Anthony was refer- ring to the Dulles policy over Indo-China in 1954; Mr. Dulles might easily have asked Sir Anthony the same question two years later, over Suez (possibly he did). There is, in fact, an obvious similarity between the two crises; and it has been strikingly illustrated in the Eden memoirs which have been appearing as a serial in The Times.

Eden was against war over Indo-China, Dulles was against war over Suez. Over Indo-China Eden was solidly backed by British opinion and by a large segment of American opinion; over Suez Dulles was solidly backed by American opinion and by a large segment of British opinion —in both crises, in other words, the man working for a peaceful solution led a coalition composed of his own country and a substantial part of the other country. On both occasions the 'falling domino' argument was used in favour of .military action—i.e.; if the Chinese (Egyptians). got away with it over Indo-China (Suez) then the whole Far East (Middle East) would fall to the Chinese (Egyptians). The language and arguments used by Dulles over Indo-China were similar to those used by Eden over Suez; and the arguments Eden used over Indo-China refute -those he was later to use over Suez.

Here are some examples :

There is a distinction between warning China that some specified further .action will.entail. retaliation, which might be an effective deterrent.' and calling upon her to desist from action in which she is already engaged. . . .

It was doubtful whether the situation in Indo- China could be solved by purely military means. . . .

In measuring our chances of success ax Geneva. I felt strongly that the outcome would depend to a considerable extent upon the position taken up by India and the Eastern nations with an interest in the settlement. . . .

If there were such intervention I could not tell where its consequences would stop, we might

find ourselves involved in the wrong war against the wrong man in the wrong place. . . .

I was not convinced by the assertion which Mr. Dulles then made that the situation in Indo- China was analagous to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland. . . .

. 1 was determined that we should not endorse a bad policy for the sake of unity. . . .

Sir Anthony was right, it will be generally agreed, over Indo-China; on that occasion he per- formed an incalculable service to the world. The trouble is that all his arguments in favour of a peaceful solution in 1954 applied at least as strongly over Suez two years later.

One obvious difference between Indo-China and Suez is that whereas Eden was in no way respon- sible for the first crisis, Dulles bears a heavy responsibility for the second. Sir Anthony says that the British Government had, like the Ameri- can Government, decided not to proceed with its offer of help to finance the Aswan Dam, but that he was not consulted on either the timing or the terms of Dulles's announcement of the American refusal. There is little doubt that Dulles's action rankled, and was an important factor in Anglo- American friction throughout the crisis. Dulles, for his part—to judge from the fact that he con- tinued his South American .visit after he heard about the nationalisation of the Canal Company, and only abandoned it after receiving a message from his envoy in London—was less alarmed by what President Nasser had done than by what Britain and France proposed to do in reply.

Sir Anthony says that, to begin with, Dulles and Eisenhower 'did not rule out the use of force . . . but felt that every possibility of peaceful settlement must • be exhausted before this' was done.' This sort of sentiment could be expressed about almost any international dispute; whether Eisenhower and Dulles seriously meant that in the absence of direct provocation by Egypt force might be used is doubtful. Dulles was certainly going through an anti-Nasser phase or he would not have dealt with the Aswan question in the way he did, but it is probable that in August, as in September and October, he: thought force was not a suitable way of resolving the crisis, and that in talking about the use of force he was merely being conciliatory to his allies, never seriously envisaging military action.

Dulles also fell in with his allies' wishes over international control of the Canal, and presented their proposals at the first London Conference. This was probably his only big mistake in the crisis (apart, of course, from having caused it in the first place). There was never more than the thinnest chance that :Nasser would accept these proposals. And if he ;did not, what then? Either Britain and France would use force, to which Dulles was opposed, or they would have to retreat into a possible negotiating position. But by that time Eden had converted the crisis into a prestige contest between himself and Nasser, so that retreat would not be easy. Dulles would have been better advised to have refused to commit himself to the Western proposals, and to have attempted to per- suade the British and French to agree to the Indian plan, which was almost certainly accept- able to Egypt. He made a mistake, therefore; but it lay less in failure to co-operate with his allies than in an excess of co-operation with them.

Once Egypt had turned down the London pro- posals Dulles, who wanted a peaceful settlement, had to think of some other expedient at) avoid force being used. But to Eden, who did not want a peaceful settlement except on his own terms, any such expedient was useless unless it would provide an excuse for war. For Dulles, negotia- tions in the UN and elsewhere were an alternative to force; for Eden they were an obstacle to it.

From as early as September 3, when Presi- dent Eisenhower told him that American opinion was dead against force, Eden had the choice be- tween working for a peaceful settlement in con- junction with America and of going to war without her. Faced with a similar situation over Indo-China Dulles decided to respect the wishes of his ally. Eden decided differently.

In his embarrassed and evasive account of the October 16 meeting between himself, Lloyd, Mol- let and Pineau, with no advisers present, Sir Anthony says 'that unless Israel was prepared just to sit and wait until it suited her enemies to strangle her and finally destroy her, it was clear that before long she would have to take some counter action. . . If this was against Jordan, 'then the position would be terrible for us' because of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty.

Therefore, at this meeting in Paris, we asked the French Ministers to do everything they could to make clear to Israel that an attack on Jordan would have to be resisted by us ... [it is not clear why we had to ask the French Ministers to do this. Britain had an excellent Ambassador there; why could he not be used?]. To fail to carry out our engagement would be the end of our position in the Middle East, to have to carry it out would be disastrous to Western unity. No dilemma could be more difficult. If Israel were to break out against Egypt and not against Jor- dan, this dilemma would not arise. . . . We discussed these matters in all their political and military aspects. In common prudence we had to consider what our action should be. . . .

In other words, Mollet and Eden decided that an Israeli attack on Egypt would not be resisted, but would be assisted. Can anybody seriously doubt that the 'French Ministers' were `to make clear to Israel' not only that Britain would come to Jordan's aid, but also that she would not come to Egypt's? (This, of course, was why the British Ambassador could not be used. As few British officials as possible were to be let into the secret.) And can anyone seriously doubt that Eden and Lloyd knew perfectly well that this message was going to be given to Ben-Gurion? It does not matter whether or not Eden and Lloyd consoled themselves with private fantasies that in human affairs nothing is absolutely predictable, that Israel might disregard the message and therefore they did not know that she was going to attack. An anarchist does not know that his bomb will go off. And whether or not they had any direct con- tact with Israel is also irrelevant; it is common enough for conspirators not to have contact with all the other members but to deal with only otie :.central man or body. The essential point is that for all practical purposes Eden and Lloyd, on October 16, conspired to facilitate an attack by Israel on Egypt and then to join in the aggression themselves.

These decisions were in flagrant disregard of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. After the announcement of the Anglo-French ultimatum Sir Anthony attempted to argue that the Declara- tion did not apply because the Egyptian Govern- ment had never accepted it; yet while he was Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister, Britain had reaffirmed it more than thirty times, and a glance at the text of the Declaration reveals Sir Anthony's argument to be one of the most miserable fictions of the whole business. This is how it ends : `The three Governments (US, UK, France), should they find that any of these States (Israel and the Arab States) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines would, consistently with their obligations as members of the UN, immediately take action, both within and without the UN, to prevent such violation.' Egypt was not a party to the Declaration and nothing she said about it could affect our obligations under it. Our obligation was quite plain; if we had any inkling that Israel was about to attack Egypt, our duty was to consult with America to prevent it. Instead we promoted it, and did not consult America.

President Eisenhower said last week that Dulles had told him that for a fortnight after October 16 the State Department received no information from the Foreign Office. This, together with the unusual amount of cable traffic between Paris and Tel Aviv that the American Intelligence Services reported, aroused the suspicions of Dulles. Eisen- hower says that he warned Israel that the Ameri- can Jewish vote would not prevent the US taking firm action if Israel attacked her neighbours, and that both he and Dulles 'went to great pains to show to Britain and to France what we would do in that set of circumstances.' Unfortunately the action that the British and French Governments had decided upon was sufficiently crazy. to be beyond prediction by America or anybody else; and no doubt Dulles imagined that prompt American action under the Tripartite Declaration and in the United Nations would avert disaster-- a view which overestimated both the good sense and the good faith of Eden and Mollet. Eden's deception of the US and of Dulles continued LIP to the last moment. At dinner the night before the Israeli attack the Foreign Secretary gave the American Ambassador reasons for thinking that Israel would not attack Egypt, and when on the morning of October 30, the day of the Anglo- French ultimatum, the Ambassador again saw Mr. Lloyd at the Foreign Office he was told nothing of what was afoot. Eisenhower and Dulles first learned of the Ultimatum from the Associated Press.

Sir Anthony says that 'on October 25 the Cabinet discussed the specific possibility of con- flict between Israel and Egypt and decided in principle how it would react if this occurred.' The decision was that both sides would be ordered to withdraw from the Canal and if either side refused British and French forces would intervene. Sir Anthony explicitly admits, therefore, that the Anglo-French action was decided upon on Octo- ber 25. Yet in his broadcast on November 3 he said, 'Our friends inside the Commonwealth and outside could not in the very nature of things be consulted in time' and, later, Selwyn Lloyd insisted, 'the fact is that there was no consultation because there was no time to have consultation.' Now, we are told that there were in fact five days for consultation. Eisenhower, alarmed by reports of Israel's mobilisation, asked for consultation under the Tripartite Declaration on October 28, and at these talks the Americans were given no hint of the decision that the British Cabinet had taken three days before. Yet Sir Anthony says that 'consultation [with the Commonwealth coun- tries and the US] was not possible within a matter of hours; it must take days at least.' Since, on his own admission, there.had been from October 25 to consult the US and the Commonwealth (in 'fact there had been since October 16), it is difficult to see the purpose of this remark. M. Mollet has put it differently. According to him, there was no consultation because 'we were afraid that if we had let you [the Americans] know, you would have prevented us doing it.'

The essential difference, then, between the two crises is that in the first Eden succeeded in re- straining Dulles; in the second Dulles failed to restrain Eden. Like Eden two years before, Dulles `was determined that [he] should not endorse a , bad policy for the sake of unity.' His tactics were probably mistaken. He tried to gain time by humouring Eden and Mollet, and only suceeded',. in exasperating them. A firm refusal from the start to countenance the Anglo-French idea of using force would have been more effective. Neverthe- less, even from Sir Anthony's account, Dulles, for all his deviousness, emerges as much the more responsible statesman of the two. In the last resort he was prepared to draw back, to contain his frustrations, and to pay attention to the views of his weaker ally. Eden two years later was not prepared to draw back, he allowed his frustrations full rein, and not only did he not heed his much more powerful ally, he double-crossed her. Yet it is Eden, with an exact reversal of the true roles reminiscent of Ahab's accusation of Elijah, who now says of Dulles 'such cynicism between allies destroys true partnership.'