THE ZEPPELIN RAID.
T may sound strange to say that the result of the _I Zeppelin raid on Monday night was, on the whole, very satisfactory. Yet that is a perfectly true statement. It is exceedingly satisfactory to know that six, or possibly seven, of these monsters of the air could fly over this country with hostile intent and yet do such little damage. Though these giant engines of destruction were chasing up and down England for four or five hours seeking whom they might destroy, and though they threw over three hundred bombs on six counties, they only managed to kill fifty- nine people and to injure one hundred and one—about the number of people killed and injured in a month in our darkened streets. (We say this merely for comparison, and not iu the least as antagonists of darkened streets. On the contrary, we are wholly convinced that the policy of denying guidance to the Zeppelins by darkening our towns is a wise and essential policy.) It will be seen from the figures just kill that, taking an average, it needed about five bombs to kill a man (and that man as often as not a civilian), or a woman, or a child. As a Zeppelin bomb is a very costly missile, this would be a very extravagant business even if the Zeppelins always killed combatants. When they kill non- combatants the thing is an absurdity. Perhaps it will be said, however, that the Germans have accomplished a good deal more than merely killing fifty-nine people and injuring one hundred and one, because they have done a certain amount of material damage. Here, however, the true story of their achievement is also eminently satisfactory. If we consider what they might have done had luck favoured them, the bill for damages is really negligible. Instead of causing " gigantic explosions and serious conflagrations," as the German official account, for once really gay reading, informs us, they only did con- siderable material damage in one part of Staffordshire, and in no case was any military damage caused. If we may draw the official veil for a moment, this means that the actual loss caused was a good deal less than that which constantly happens from some purely accidental fire or explosion. To sinn up, six or seven of the most formidable aircraft, about as big a fleet as the Germans can manage to produce, were let loose on industrial England for four or five hours on a night when the climatic conditions were peculiarly favourable—when there was no rain, no snow, and no wind. Yet, in spite of all these advantages, they did us, from the combatant point of view, no harm whatever. When one thinks of the unfortunate persons torn to pieces, and of the men, women, and children now in hospital suffering pain from their injuries, this computation of the damage may sound cold-blooded or even brutal. We feel sure, however, that the people who have died, could they know, or if they know, would be satisfied in that the country has not suffered. We are equally sure that this will be the feeling of the wounded. For the vast mass of their fellow- countrymen there remains a sense of burning indignation, and a determination to compel a reckoning with those who have scattered their bombs with an absolutely reckless disregard of all the honourable traditions of war. If this gigantic and long-prepared foray under ideal conditions has been satisfactory to us in its results, it must be pronounced as even more satisfactory in the lessons it has taught us. In the first place, it has shown that the precautions we have taken are effective. The Germans would of course have liked to send their Zeppelins over London, and to shrill their paean of hate over the dockyards and arsenals of the Metropolis, to destroy our public buildings, and to attempt, what they will never accomplish, the subduing of London by terror. They did not send their great Zeppelin fleet over London simply and solely because they are aware that our preparations for meeting them in the London area are so complete that the risks arc greater than they care to run, or at any rate care to run while they have a chance of sowing murder broadcast and unmolested and without appreciable danger in the Midlands. Put into military language, this means that we have been able to deny London to them by our preparations. No doubt they can come over London if they keep some ten or eleven thousand feet up, but on a dark and misty night they would not in the least know where they were, and would be able to do no more substantial damage than they did in the case of Paris. In other words, good anti-aircraft guns and a good organization of aeroplanes and other craft render raids in the protected areas not worth the risk. That is one part of the lesson. The other part— not so agreeable—is that in places where no preparations are made to meet the attacks of Zeppelins—where there are no anti-aircraft guns, and where the enemy have ascertained this fact—their business is far easier. Under these conditions, they feel that they can with perfect safety come quite close enough to the earth to see what they are doing. In a region without guns and without defensive aeroplanes a Zeppelin may come down to within one or two thousand feet, or even nearer, and do its work un- molested. Yet even here, as was proved on Monday night, if all lights are extinguished, it is only by an occasional piece of good luck that a Zeppelin can make anything in the nature of a haul. In other words, if we can deny to Zeppelins that part of the air which is, say, eight or nine thousand feet above the earth, they can do very little damage, or, rather, only do damage by accident. Even if we cannot so deny them, if we keep our lights out the damage they can do is not very formidable. What shall be done in these circumstances ? A hasty answer would probably be " Scatter anti-aircraft guns as thick as blackberries throughout the country." That, we venture to say, would be an altogether crude idea. We should spend a great deal of money, occupy the time of a great many gunners, and sterilize a great many guns that might be sent out to do much better work in Flanders or elsewhere. Besides, the Germans would soon get to know where the anti-aircraft guns were placed, and avoid them. A far better plan, it seems to us, would be to deal with the Germans by mobile guns. Why not increase the number of powerful guns mounted on lorries which can be moved from place to place ? If we did that, there would be an automatic tendency to make the Zeppelins keep to the upper air, and thus to deprive them of the advantages they now possess in the greater part of England in coming low to make good shooting. If there were plenty of mobile guns about, though the raiders did not know where, they would be suspicious of every high road. A fixed gun as soon as it is located is bereft of half its value. A mobile gun creates terror, not merely in regard to the places where it is, but where it might be and where it is supposed to be. Let us, then, make preparation for such mobile guns, and let us take the greatest care to keep absolutely secret the centres from which such guns will move. Another thing we must do is to continue our policy of " lights out " whenever there are favourable Zeppelin conditions, or whenever a raid is known to be going to take place, for in almost all cases we now receive a good many hours' warning. We cannot of course put out our blast-furnaces, but in the case of most workshops, factories, and towns Monday's, raid proves that the policy of obscuration can be followed with excellent results. To conclude, we have had a taste of one of those raids on a great scale which have filled a good many minds with awe, if not panic, and nothing which will help Germany to win the war has happened. On the contrary, we have learnt a good deal as to the line of most protection. Of course there always remains the possibility of a Zeppelin some day making a lucky hit, or shall we say of a random bomb finding its billet in a powder factory ? To counterbalance this, however, there is also always the possibility of an anti-aircraft gunner making a lucky shot and bringing down £300,000 worth of gas, aluminium, and general frightfulness.
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