Arms for Egypt
It is reported that President Sadat of Egypt, having told the Russians to pack their bags and to leave Egypt, has invited Britain to become Egypt's principal supplier of arms. There is a nice irony in the invitation, formally extended to the British ambassador in Cairo, Sir Richard Beaumont, by the Egyptian foreign minister, Mr Ghaleb: for when the nationalisation of the Suez Canal eventually led to collusive Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956, and ended in the blocking of the Canal and the exclusion of British representation from Egypt, it was the Soviet Union which filled the gap left by the departed British. It is almost sixteen years since the Suez fiasco : in this time the Middle East has never looked like achieving stability among its constituent states. It is far from clear whether President Sadat's regime in Egypt is itself secure and stable: there are persistent reports of political manoeuvring by the army chiefs, and it is too early yet to conclude that the Soviet Union has taken Sadat's marching orders lying down. Egypt still maintains the pretence of its federal arrangements with Syria. More to the immediate point, there are negotiations going on at present for the complete integration of Egypt and Libya, a move which makes sense provided President Gadafy and President Sadat can arrange terms acceptable to their countrymen and to their army officers, and can also keep themselves in power.
It is easy to argue that the present state of confusion in the the Middle East provides sufficient reason for Britain to decline the Egyptian invitation. There are other reasons which will doubtless be produced. It will be argued that the business of supplying arms is no longer respectable; that to supply arms to Israel's rival ought, particularly, not to be considered; that, by supplying arms for Egypt we will once again be dabbling where we have no business, and will consequently be asking to have our fingers burned again; and it will be argued that for us to supply Egypt while the United States continues to supply Israel is asking for trouble with our principal ally. There is obviously a strong case to be made for caution: he would be a fool who rushed in at this precise moment. Nevertheless, we trust that the early indications that the British response is going to be stiff, starchy and negative will prove to be misleading.
There is a great deal to be said for Britain seeking to become Egypt's principal arms supplier. It is better that we should be rather than France (which is the most probable alternative), for French diplomacy is frequently of the cowboy variety, and is hostile to the United States. Also, it is better that our armaments industry should benefit, rather than France's. Above these considerations is another: were this country to become Egypt's chief supplier, we would share with Egypt an interest in actively seeking the stability of the area (which, in effect, we already share) and in addition we would gain influence with which to promote that stability. It would be much easier for an accord to be reached between Israel and Egypt were those two countries' suppliers and allies the United States and the United Kingdom, than it has been when the Soviet Union has been the supplier and ally of Egypt or than it would be were France to fill the gap left by the Russians. For these reasons, we hope that the British Government will take the opportunity offered by President Sadat's invitation to get rid of Britain's post-Suez policy of refusing to supply heavy arms to Egypt. An acceptance in principle should be extended to President Sadat's invitation: it is in the British interest to do so.
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