THE GROUPING OF THE POWERS. T HE Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, we
believe, had a serious reflex influence in Europe. It has made the grouping of the Powers much more definite, and probably wider in its scope. Its first result, as we all know, has been to bind France and Russia closer together. It is not only that the two Governments have agreed to act together in the Far East, thus creating the very situation against which the Alliance was intended to guard, by rendering it certain that Japan if attacked at all will be attacked by more Powers than one, but they have become more cordial. They were partners, they are now partners and friends. Before, Russia was protecting France against invasion, and on the strength of that position assuming an attitude which rather tried French forbearance; but now she wants help from France—naval help, not Bourse help—and the contracting parties are restored to their equality. When M. Loubet, therefore, returns the Czar's visit, he will be re- ceived in St. Petersburg as if he were a King, and France, flattered and pleased, will believe that the Alliance which makes her safe implies also an acknowledgment of the position which she holds in her on eyes. She is seen, like Russia, to be an effective force in every corner of the world. That is an important change, if only because it renders the sacrifices which would in any case be made willing sacrifices instead of reluctant. The Dual Alliance being thus strengthened, the Triple Alliance, which is its counterpoise, is necessarily rebound. That Alliance was almost dropping to pieces. The Italians, suffering heavily from economic pressure, were swerving slowly but distinctly towards the side of France, and in spite of the Court and the old Conservatives, might next ' year have proclaimed themselves neutral, thus relieving France of all fear of a southern attack, and enabling her to concentrate all her force upon her north-eastern border. The Austrians, greatly irritated by the attitude of the Pan-Germans within their own border, by the threats of the German Agrarians, who propose to keep out their • grain, and by their own exclusion from all hope of a world-wide commerce, Were inclining towards Russia, and doubting whether the Triple Alliance did not bring them more annoyance than advantage. True, they were safe from Italy ; but then Germany played so relentlessly the part of the big brother. Germany herself was a little doubtful, indisposed to make concessions, and more than half inclined to say, as Count von Billow in a moment either of incaution or of oversubtle finesse actually said, that the Triple Alliance had become in the new circumstances less absolutely indispensable to peace. That mood has disappeared. If France and Russia are so closely bound, Central Europe, which lies squeezed between the two huge enemies, must be closely bound too. The Pan- Germans have been energetically snubbed, the Agrarians have been warned that treaty-making is an Imperial preroga- tive, and Count von Billow, face to face with Signor Prinetti, has convinced. him, and therefore his master, that Italy, to be safe, must renew her Treaty without substantial alterations. The Triple Alliance is to be recemented, possibly for five, but more probably for another ten, years, and thus the active forces of the world are divided into three groups,—France with Russia, Germany with Austria and Italy, and Great Britain with Japan. The eighth Power, which without alliances is probably as strong as any Alliance, stands detached, expresses no sympathy, formulates no decision, and is to all appearance determined only that whatever happens American commerce shall not be interfered. with.
Now is that, for Great Britain, a hopeful position of affairs or not ? We presume Lord Salisbury thinks it is, or he would not have allowed. it to come about, and. we have not only great respect for his judgment as a reflec- tive statesman with an unusually detached mind, but we are free to admit that many of the immediate conse- quences of the position tend to justify his view. The interest of Great Britain is peace, and the first guarantee for peace, the fears entertained by all statesmen of the consequences of war, is decidedly strengthened. The great machines formed. by these combinations are of a potency far greater than any in the history of the world, and. to put them in motion is to run risks and incur respon- sibilities from which even daring statesmen shrink. Napoleon did. it ; but the callousness of Napoleon is rare, and. was immensely exaggerated by his belief in his "star," that is, his destined fortune. He thought himself certain to win, and the statesmen do not. The combinations, too, are very evenly balanced, and. no Power has at disposal a general of whose genius for the direction of huge movements it is absolutely assured, and who might increase the effectiveness of its army to an unknown degree. The German Staff is the most trusted, and probably the most efficient ; but the German Staff with von Moltke at its head and the German Staff without him are forces of very different degrees of energy. And then the danger from the personal equation is greatly diminished. The vast armies are, under the system of alliances, at the disposal not of individuals, however highly placed, but of committees. Even the Czar could not set his millions in motion without consulting M. Loubet, and. consultations between equals with different interests, different kinds of tenure, and different trains of thought are not likely to lead to very rash decisions. All these considerations make for what we now call peace, that is, quiescence under the burden, in most States the almost crushing burden, of continuous and constantly improving preparations for war.
On the other hand, the chance that a people stirred by some sudden impulse begotten either of suspicion or of wounded amour propre may demand war is in no degree lessened, rather it is increased; for the peoples will be conscious of greatly increased strength. They will feel protected by affiances from the subjuga- tion which is the most terrible result of war. The statesmen, too, will fret 'under their comparative want of freedom, the effect of alliances, and. especially strict alliances, being to produce a comparative immobility of the world which is very gaffing to the active and the ambitious. Above all, the domain of what we may call political accident is in no way reduced by the alliances. A breakdown of government in China, a sudden outburst of Wahabee fanaticism in Arabia, an insurrection in Mace- donia, a Palace revolution in Constantinople, none of which occurrences would be even surprising, and the last of which is expected by acute observers, besides the hundred unanticipated events which always happen, might force the awful machines into motion, with consequences which, whether disastrous or not, must at least be greater, and involve more bloodshed, than any war between isolated Powers. Supposing any such accident to occur, and the walls against war to be swept away by a political earthquake, how would Great Britain find herself ? Probably stronger than of old, the South African Cam- paign having given her an army, but terribly isolated nevertheless Japan is a well-organised Power for her own defence, but except in the Far East how could she help us ? No Japanese regiments will be cantoned at Quetta, nor will Japanese ironclads make their appearance in the Channel or the Mediterranean. We should be alone in almost any actual conflict; and though we have been lonely before, it has never been in presence of forces so incalculably great. That is no reason for panic, but it is a reason for taking every precaution and losing no time in the effort to make these islands practically invulnerable. While they are safe all, whavever else is lost, may be regained; but that is the imperative condition.
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