THE PRINCIPALITIES : WHAT TO DO FIRST?
TIM peace signed at Paris on Sunday, although it stops the war, by no means rounds off the Eastern question. Indeed, the docu- ment which bears the names of the representatives of seven Powers only provides that, Russia making certain concessions, four of them will no longer hammer away at the fifth, the remaining two looking wistfully on and fearing every day that they should be ultimately dragged into the quarrel. That is the state of things put an end to by the treaty of Paris. Also, if the conces- sions obtained from Russia be fairly secured, European Turkey, at least, will be rendered nere difficult to invade, for Russia will be shut out alike from the Danube and the Black Sea : the new Turkish frontier will completely cover the former ; the resuscita- tion of the extinct Russian military marine in the latter is pro- hibited by the treaty. But something more is required to render' Turkey in Europe secure ; and the. obtaining of that something is likely,to.eause a great deal of trouble.
The cessation of the war in favour of Turkey', and the cession of territory, raise the whole question of the Principalities. Nothing could be more unsatisfactory. than their position before the war. For ages they had been nominally independent, with an awkward' confession of inferiority—the payment of a tribute. In our own. day, the introduction of a Russian protectorate complicated the question • and the treaty-right whereby Russia not only secured- the control of the mouths of the Danube, but also the power and sprivilege of occupying the Principalities when she pleased, gave a ct blow to the suzerainty of the Porte, and kept a menace sus- pended over the heads of the Moldo-Wallachians, which, made them more subservient to the Czar than to the Sultan. The war abolished all the treaties between Russia and the Porte, but it did not and could not abolish the relations between the Porte and the Principalities; relations which consist in the abstinence- of interference on one side and the payment of a tribute on the other.
The difficulty that presents itself is twofold—what may be called the constitution of the Principalities, and what may be called the defensive system of the Turkish empire in that fruiter. Perhaps the simplest way of dealing with the Principalities would be to unite and leave them internally free within certain- liberal limits. The suzerainty of the Porte must be retained, but the Porte need have no other rights than those of suzerainty. Latterly the Porte has precluded itself from erecting fortresses anywhere on the left bank of the Danube ; the money payments made by the Principalities might be dispensed with in consider- ation of a legal right to erect and garrison such fortresses as may' be essential to the .proteetion of European Turkey. What Europe is most anxious for, is the creation of a peaceable, well-regulated, agricultural state, in the lower Danubian basin, so that the great water-way may not only be maintained as a free outlet for Germany to the Black Sea, but as a, free outlet for the products of the Principalities themselves. In the prosperity of such a state all would be interested, and one would think that it could scarcely be more difficult to found a neutral state on the Lower Danube than it has proved to found one on the Lower Rhine. Theoretically, the best arrangement would be a sort of United States of the East interposed between Russia and the Bosphorus ; but that, if it ever be accomplished, must be a result of natural growth—the work of time, and the gravitation of the races inhabiting Moldo-Wallachia, Servia, and Bulgaria, to a confederacy. The military portion of the question is by far the more impor- tant at this moment. Of course if the aim of Russia was Con-, stantinople in 1853, it is hardly likely that she has forgotten the directions in Peter the Great's alleged will, and has ceased to re-, solve to "progress as much as possible" in that direction. By the conditions of the treaty of Paris, additional obstacles have been thrown in the way of Muscovite conquest ; the greatest of which are the complete obliteration of the marine of Russia in the Black Sea, and the removal of her frontier from the Danube. This favourable conjuncture offers an opportunity of effectually blocking up the road to Constantinople ; and, whatever may be the political fate of the Principalities, prudence dictates the sein- ing of that opportunity at once to effect the military security of Turkey. Three defensive lines might be constructed between the Pruth and Constantinople : the first, extending from Ismail on the left bank of the Danube, across the narrowest part of Walla- chia to the foot of the Carpathians, would consist of a chain of four or five fortresses ; the second line would be formed by the Danube, with such defensive works on both banks as might be required ; the third would be the Balkan ; and a fourth, as traced by General Macintosh, might cover Constanstinople from any land attack made by an army that had either forced or turned the Balkan. But the frontier fortresses would be of the utmost im- portance, for they would effectually secure Turkey from a repeti- tion of the scenes of 1853, when Prince Gortschakoff overran the Principalities and laid hands on all the supplies they furnished without its being in the power of Omar Pasha to strike a blow in return.
The settlement of the Principalities should therefore intimately depend on the settlement of the frontier defences of Turkey ; and no squeamishness respecting alleged national rights and ancient privileges on the part of the Moldo-Wallachians should be allowed to prevent the establishment of such defences between the Black Sea and the Carpathians as will secure the Danube, and =keit difficult for an enemy to enter Turkey from Bessarabia.
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