THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUDDLE.
TEEnews from South Africa is as usual very dispiriting, and it is not to be wondered at that the cynical immorality which has distinguished the recent proceedings of the Boers should have aroused in this country feelings which, if not properly guided, may easily lead to a dangerous enlargement of our already excessive responsibilities and dangers in that troublesome region. In both the enterprises which are now exciting attention—the " eating-up " of Montsioa, and the absorption of central Zululand—the Boers have shown audacity, cruelty, and faithlessness beyond even the ample measure of their own traditions. Montsioa was a Bechuana chief, living under the protection of the British Government, upon territory which lies outside the boundary of the South African Republic, as defined by the Con- vention signed in London last February, and since rati- fied by the Volksraad at Pretoria. By the Second Article of the Convention, the Government of the Republic declares that it will "strictly adhere to the boundaries defined in the First Article, and will do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making any encroachments upon lands beyond the said boundaries." The same article requires the Transvaal to appoint Commissioners "whose duty it will b3 strictly to guard against all trespassing over the boundaries," while her Majesty's Government is empowered also to appoint 'Commissioners in the native territories "to maintain order and prevent encroachments." In pursuance of this provision, Mr. Mackenzie was despatched to Bechuanaland, and in reli- ance on the terms of his commission he guaranteed the integrity of Montsioa's territory—a guarantee which appears to have been repeated and emphasised by his successor, Mr. Rhodes' The Convention was hardly ratified, when a body of marauding Boers attacked Montsioa, defeated him, seized his lands and forced upon him a treaty, which now only awaits the approval dl the Queen (required by the Fourth Article of the Convention in the case of all treaties between the Transvaal and make tribes), whereby his territory is to be included in, and he is to become subject to, the South-African Republic. The companion adventure—the Boer invasion of Zululand—was conducted in an equally ruthless and more hypocritical fashion. EarV, in May a party of Transvaal Boers, calling themselves " Dini- zulu's Committee," issued a proclamation declaring that they had entered Zululand "to restore and maintain peace and order." As they began at once to make common cause with the Usutus, Sir H. Bulwer's suspicions were aroused, and our Resident at Pretoria was directed to inquire and remonstrate. The Transvaal Government replied that there was nothing afoot beyond the "usual trek of Boers 'for winter pastures," adding that while they were ready to forbid by proclamation any violent encroachments, it was impossible for them "by overt action to prevent armed Boers moving into Zululand." Sir H. Bulwer's apprehenaions were soon justified, for within a month of the arrival in the country +if these messengers of peace and order they had fallen upon ITsibebu, who seems to have given them no provocation, routed his forces with immense slaughter, and driven the chief him- self to take refuge in the British Reserve. Their next step was to appropriate the country, and declare it a Boer Republic ; and at the date of Sir H. Bulwer's last despatch it was gener- ally believed that they were inciting their native allies 'to pursue their vanquished foes beyond the boundaries of the Reserve.
The whole story is so unpleasant, and the indignation which it excites is so natural, that it becomes very difficult, while at the same time it is most important, to distinguish between the deserts of the Boers and the duty of the British Government Of all our large dependencies, South Africa, which is unques- tionably the most worthless, has entailed upon us the heaviest and the worst requited sacrifices. There, if anywhere, we are justified in abstaining from Quixotic crusades, and rigidly con- fining our action to the performance cf admitted and inevit- able obligations. So long as we tolerate the independence Of the Free State and the Transvaal, we cannot regard the esta- blishment of a new Dutch Republic as in itself a cants bells* which requires or permits our interference. The new State which the Boers have carved out of Zululand does not cover an inch of land which is either British territory or under British pro- tection. We are under no obligation, express or implied, to the Zulu tribes outside the Reserve. Usibebu, for whom our sympathy is justly claimed, is not only no protégé of ours, but was mainly responsible for the troubles which led to Cetewayo's death. Sir Henry Bulwer makes no secret of his regret that Central Zululand, where the Boers have now ob- tained a footing, was not included in the British Reserve. Like all good administrators,-he is irritated by the constant proximity of anarchy and bloodshed, which a small expendi, tare of force and money could prevent. It is a sufficient answer that the expenditure, small though it might be, is one which we are tinder no duty to incur; and that the history ol our relations with the natives of South Africa presents so uniform a tale of well-meant injuries and ill-directed kind- nesses that we may reasonably decline to risk the uncertain issue of another humane experiment. We cannot, therefore, doubt the wisdom of Lord Derby's resolution to take no action against the new Republic in Zululand unless and until it is foolish enough to provoke our interference by menacing the integrity of the Reserve.
The case of Montsioa stands on a wholly different footing. The Transvaal Government, if it did not incite, certainly toot no steps to prevent the invasion of his territory, and it is even now seeking to take advantage ofyand to obtain formal sanction for, the incorporation of his lands within its own boundaries. So flagrant a violation of a freshly concluded treaty cannot possibly be overlooked ; and the Pretoria officials ought in any case to be informed that the extension of their boundary-line is a nullity, and that they will be held responsible not oi4y for the restitution of Montsioa, but for the chastisement Of the marauders. Nor can the matter rest there. The most formal assurances of protection and help -were given to Montsioa before and at the time of his disasters by the accredited agents of the British Government. We are thus under a double obligation—to exact satisfaction from the aggressors who have broken faith with us, and to obtain reparation for the victim who relied on our solemn guarantee. No English Ministry could dream of repudiating a duty, how- ever unwelcome and burdensome, which lay so clearly and unmistakably in its path. But that circumstances should have placed us in a position in which it may be necessary for us to despatch 10,000 men to South Africa, in order that a semi-barbarous chieftain and his tribe may be reinstated in their farms, is a fact which calls for serious reflection, not only on the shortcomings of our past policy, but as to the lines of its future development. It suggests the desir- ability of greater caution in listening to the voices and yielding to the influences—religious, humanitarian, commercial—which are always urging us to enter into closer relations and more binding ties with the native neighbours of the Transvaal. It illustrates, not for the first time, the folly when we are dealing with the Boers of relying on paper assurances and verbal guarantees, and the necessity of organising a local border force sufficiently strong and numerous to make the stipulations of the Convention an effective reality. And it raises once again the question which, reluctantly or not, the people of this country will be brought before long to face and to answer,— Whether the Sovereignty of South Africa beyond the Orange River has yielded, or is ever likely to yield, a return adequate to the cost of maintaining its integrity and performing its duties.
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