THE PRESS.
BLOCKADE OF THE DARDANELLES.
TIMES—Our sentiments on the stupidity of the blockade principle, as a rule of practical policy for this empire, remain entirely unaltered. A fact has been communicated by the last mail front Rio de Janeiro, which illustrates in a striking manner our views upon this question. It is known that the Brazilian blockade of Buenos Ayres has cost Great Britain an immense number of ships, and several millions' worth of merchandise, and England has acquiesced in this provoking loss. But as the spirit of perverseness would have it, the United States would not submit to that blockade—insisting on, and obtaining, the restitution of their merchantmen captured under it. France, likewise, the other great maritime power, has disdainfully refused to acknow ledge this English and Brazilian law of blockade. The last letters bring intelligence that a squadron of French men of war sailed into Rio, with their ships cleared for action, and-forced the Government to restore the French ships which had been seized, together with full indemnification for the loss of property sustained by the merchants. What, then, is the position in which we have absurdly placed ourselves ? We submit to the capture of our merchantmen by belligerents, under circumstances in which other powers do not submit to it, but redeem their ships and goods by force of arms. Why, it follows of necessity that the carrying trade of blockaded ports and countries will be withdrawn from the unprotected flag, and given to that whose safety is provided for by its sovereign. The trade of England then loses when she is a neutral, by the maxim which she tries to establish ; and when she is a belligerent, she gains nothing by the rule, because the other great maritime powers will coalesce to violate it, even at the expense of a war with her on the same principle on which they now separately reject it when feebler nations attempt to carry it into execution. But the main objectiou to the blockade of the Dardanelles is, that Russia has bound herself to Great Britain to abstain from this, amongst other exercises of her belligerent privilege in the Mediterranean. To permit such a blockade by the Mediterranean fleet of Russia, would he to suffer at once an insult to our honour, by tolerating a breach of faith; a loss to our interests, by an interruption of the national commerce; and a disturbance of the far-famed "settlement of Europe," by aiding the downfal of the Porte.
MORNING Posy—The reported intention of Russia to blockade the Dardanelles, has given rise to serious apprehensions of a rupture between that Power and Great Britain. If this intention should be carried into effect, it will be the first opportunity afforded to England of disengaging herself from the ignominious trammels which our late Liberal policy, in regard to the affairs of the East, and the memorable treaty of London, the exponent of that
policy, imposed upon her; and it will at the same time afford to future statesmen a forcible illustration of the fugitive nature of such advantages. as are acquired, and the precarious tenure of such tranquillity as is purchased, by becoming a party to injustice. The right and duty of England to resist the blockade of the Dardanelles are founded upon special circumstances and express agreements, and do not in the slightest degree militate against the general principle of blockade as the right of all belligerents capable of exercising it—a principle which England, as the first of maritime powers, has always respected and sustained. England, when she united with Russia in an alliance which contemplated interference by force of arms in Turkish affairs, contracted at the same time a tacit but solemn obligation to prevent that alliance from contributing to the success of any isolated designs, or the infliction of any separate vengeance, which Russia might meditate against the Turk. After the atrocity of Navarin, which clearly emanated from the Treaty, the only way in which it remained possible for England to fulfil this obligation. was to interdict to Russia the employment of her naval force in the Mediterranean, as the instrument of her separate hostility towards Turkey. This England did, and Russia, by express compact, recognized the justice, and undertook to govern her conduct strictly in pursuance of the terms of the interdiction. It is clearly a case of special circumstances and express agreements, with which the general right of blockade has nothing whatever to do. We are the more anxious that this should be clearly understood, as we perceive that the party in England, for whose gratification the disgraceful and unfortunate treaty of intervention was concluded, are attempting sedulously, under favour of circumstances which they think propitious to their object, to undervalue and impeach the right of blockade altogether. Independently of the case of the Dardanelles, which we have already shown to stand upon its own special and peculiar grounds, it is urged by those who are desirous of innovating upon the law of nations, that the scrupulous respect which England in her neutral character pays to the right of blockade, is adverse to her commercial interests. England respects the blockade of Buenos Ayres ; France and America refuse to respect it, and have compelled the blockading power to make restitution or compensation for whatever injury their commerce has sustained. Other similar instances are adduced or alluded .to, and an apprehension is expressed that the carrying trade of England will pass into the hands of other neutral states, who know better than England how to make principle bend to convenience. The argument and the policy to ivhich it points are altogether worthy of the political school which enforces it, but altogether unworthy of the attention of the British Government or people. If our commerce sustain injury in consequence of other Governments seeking to benefit their own by forfeiting their neutral character and violating the law of stations, it surely becomes England to seek reparation and redress, if it be worth while to seek them at all, at the hands of those who offend the law of nations, rather than of those against whom the offence, injurious to England incidentally, is directly committed; nor will this argument lose any of its weight with a generous and high-minded people, because the former happen to be powerful, and the latter to be weak. Besides, apart from all considerations of principle, or generosity, or honour, England has a permanent interest in the maintenance of the established law of nations with respect to blockade, much greater fortunately than any of which either France or America can be conscious. GLOBE—There is a peculiarity in the blockade of the Dardanelles which has been suggested to us as raising a doubt whether, independently of the promises of Russia, it is one to which this country ought to submit. The Dardanelles is not a port, or a passage to one port only, but a channel of communication between two great seas. Is it not, it is asked, an undue extension of the right of blockade for a small squadron stationing itself in such a channel to interdict or impede the intercourse between one of these seas and the rest of the world ? Would it be deemed a lawful exercise of the right of blockade for a British fleet, if we were at war with some of the Baltic powers, to statian a fleet in the Sound to seize all neutrals bound to the ports of our enemies ? The extravagance of our own pretensions, in the hey-day of our blockading system scarcely reached so far. On the other hand, if the blockade be intended as affecting the port of Constantinople only, to be entitled to respect it must be effectual. It is not enough for,the blockaders to say, we can effectually prevent ships from entering from the south,' when they are at full liberty to enter from the north. Now the Bosphorus, the northern entrance to the port of Constantinople,`is avowedly open
—can the partial blockade from the south be entitled to any respect The first part of this argument, however, might be met by the fact that the Turks themselves have exercised, both in peace and war, this power of interrupting or directing the commerce of the channel of the Dardanelles ; and it would be said it is now too late for neutrals to treat it as a free and open sea for all nations, when they have submitted for ages to have it considered as a passage which they were entitled to use only under special concessions from he Turks. The Russians, too, may say that they only prevent those stores from being carried to Constantinople which the Turks themselves would prevent being carried through the sam channel to Odessa.
NEW TIMES—Cleverly as this is put, we must confess we do not attach much weight to it. Our contemporary ought to recollect that the case is different between the Black Sea and the Baltic. It is not, likely that all the states that abound the shores of the latter should be belligerents. But in the present case the Black Sea is bounded by the territories of only two powers, and these powers are belligerents. We ground our right of resistance to this blockade solely on conventional stipulatioes. Russia agreed to remain neutral; and we, on our part, agreed as a neutral to enforce certain measures concurrently with her upon Greece. We have performed our part of the treaty—she has broken hers. We have saved, as it is called, Greece; and Russia, to forward her own personal and ambitious ends, dissolves the connexion, and leaves us to our remedy. And what is that remedy P—Wiats Tines—The measure of humiliation flits even to the overflow, and England descends to what Buonaparte, in his insolence, used to denominate her " natural station"—namely, that of a third or fourth rate power. Mean and ignorant councils have accomplished, in one short year of peace, that which the most gigantic arm that ever held a sword was beaten to the earth after fiercely attempting by a war of twenty years' continuance : and since the accession of the present extraordinary Ministry, that power which was erewhile accustomed to raise high her crest above all nations, and to move by a nod the political universe, has DOW become a by-word for treachery to friends, and for abject resignation to the will of enemies, alike the formidable and the feeble.
STANDARD—Nothing can be more absurd than the fancy, that we are bound to interfere actively in every war, no matter where or from what arising, under penalty of having our honour tarnished, We cannot too often repeat, that our policy is essentially insular, and that we are never called upon to depart from that system, unless in such cases as those which armed us against the Jacobins and their successor. When the whole frame-work of society is threatened with destruction, or when the entire power of the continent is in danger of falling into one grasp, which may wield it against us, then we are imperatively required to come forward ; but surely not on every occasion when a quarrel breaks out emotes our neighbours. Any discussion on the particular case of this blockade, and on the part which we are going to take in consequence, would be premature and useless, until we are informed what are really the steps that our ministers intend to adopt. All that Lord Aberdeen's communication has done, is to announce the fact of the Emperor of Russia's intention to blockade the Dardanelles, in order to put our merchants on their guard. It does not announce whether it is our intention to respect the blockade if put in force, or the contrary. Until we know what ministers mean to do, it is idle to say that the honour of the country has suffered by the act of a belligerent power, over which she has no direct control. Russia, according to our interpretation of the blockade law, had a right to declare, if she had the power to enforce, Constantinople in a state of blockade ; it is a right which we have always claimed for ourselves, and which we have uniformly compelled every neutral to respect. It appears to us that, by her disclaimer of making any part of the Mediterranean a field of contest, she has deprived herself of that right, and consequently that every nation aggrieved by the blockade may make its reclamation in any manner it thinks suitable. We shall not argue with those who say that we are not able to prevent it BY FORCE if we please. Russia, unable as she has proved herself to make any impression on the semi-barbarous force of Turkey by land, could hardly afford any resistance to the power of this country by sea. For ourselves, we sincerely hope there will be no war until our own interests are endangered. We know that we are prepared for it then, awl that it is needless before.
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