The two faces of Khruschev
Cecil Parrott
It is sometimes said that diplomatic memoirs are nearly always 'non-literature', but if this is true in general it certainly does not apply to the diaries of Veljko Micunovic, who was Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow from 1956 to 1958 and whose book Moscow Years has recently been published in Zagreb but not yet translated into English. It is one of the most fascinating books of its kind which I have read, dealing as it does in great detail with those eventful years which witnessed Khruschev's condemnation of Stalin, the start of the independence movement in the satellites (Gomulka and Nagy), Suez, the first incursion of Communist China into Europe and of course the very critical stages of Soviet-Yugoslav relations — with their successive bouts of rapprochement, refroidissement and re-rapprochement.
The book is not only of great general interest, because, as time goes on, it becomes more and more evident that the Khruschev period was unique in the annals of Russian history, but indispensable reading for the student of Soviet-Yugoslav affairs which are as much in the melting pot today, as they were during the important years of Micunovic's double mission. I say `double mission', because the author, like his distinguished predecessor and successor, Dobrivoje Vidic, (later Ambassador in London and now President of the Federal Republic of Serbia), served two tours as Ambassador in Moscow — something which our Foreign Office would never counsel.
I happened to be in Moscow at this time. Everyone liked Veljko Micunovic very much. Had we at the time known half of what Micunovic reveals in his diaries, we should have admired and sympathised with our colleague even more than we did. He came to Moscow at a critical turning-point in Yugoslav relations. His predecessor and his whole Embassy had been subjected, like other Yugoslav missions behind the Iron Curtain, to appalling harassment. From 1949 to 1953 Soviet officials and diplomats religiously cut dead every Yugoslav diplomatic representative they met at home or abroad, and when, after Stalin's death, Yakov Malik briefly shook hands with the Yugoslav chargé d'affaires in Moscow, it was so striking an event that it merited a special telegram to Belgrade. 'Such were the conditions which the Russians imposed on us,' Micunovic says in his book.
When the author was appointed Ambassador to Moscow, he was convinced that he would not be welcome there. The Russians have the habit of dividing leading Communists in other countries into two groups — pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet. In their eyes the new Ambassador fell very much into the latter category. As a Montenegrin, he had in fact every reason to be attached to Russia, the historic protector of his little country, and as a revolutionary he felt he owed special allegiance to Stalin. But before the breach with Russia he had (presumably while working for the Ministry of the Interior) experienced many unpleasant conflicts with the members of the Soviet KGB (then MGB), which with hindsight, he sees were signs of the storm which would soon break over Yugoslavia. When Stalin announced the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the socialist bloc, Micunovic made a very sharp antiSoviet speech at the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which the Soviets were to use afterwards as proof of Yugoslav disloyalty. It is therefore all the more remarkable that Micunovic lived this down and in the course of two years had made so favourable an impression on Khruschev and those other Russian leaders who were not hard-line Stalinists that his farewell audience with the then ruler of Russia lasted eight hours. When Khruschev died, Micunovic sent from Belgrade an open telegram of warm sympathy to his widow. 'We are convinced that millions of people in Yugoslavia and throughout the world feel with you and will hold in worthy memory N. S. Khruschev and his work. The name of Nikita Sergeievich will remain permanent in the history of the struggle of the nations for a better life, for collaboration and friendship between nations, for peace and progress in the world. To the friends and venerators of this exceptional man and those nearest to him, let this serve as a consolation for this most grievous and irreplaceable loss.'
Such words were not likely to please Khruschev's successors. But by that time Micunovic was back home having completed his second mission from 1969 to 1971. He had been fortunate to escape the critical year of 1968. Hisfarewell audience took place while the Soviet leader was holidaying at Gagri on the shores of the Black Sea. Khruschev sent 3 special plane with a bedroom in it to take Micunovic on the five-hour flight from Moscow. The Ambassador found him walking in the garden of a moderate-sized house on the shore, which was surrounded by pine woods, He gave Micunovic a hearty welcome and asked him if he knew whom the estate had belonged to. No doubt Micunovic expected the answer to be some Russian grand-duke or other, Khruschev said with a laugh! 'It otaher, was Berya's. That scoundrel knew how to make himself comfortable and so here We see the Yugoslav Ambassador arriving at Berya's villa!' In the course of the day they had three discussionstetea fete, not counting lunch and tea with Khruschev's family. After lunch Khruschev suggested they should bathe together. It was October, and Micunovic, who had found it very cold in Moscow and had a heavy programme of farewell visits, was particularly anxious not to catch a chill. 'Oh, you're a Muscovite,' Khruschev mocked. 'Here is the one place in Russia where you can safely bathe in October.' When Micunovic pleaded that he had no bathing things with him, Khruschev was not deterred and offered him the choice of his own wardrobe. Eventually, rather oddly got up (for the Montenegrin is a tall, thin man), they sallied forth together. Khruschev confessed to being a poor swimmer and having to wear a cork belt. They could only go about 50 yards from the shore and were accompanied by an officer in a boat, who timed the minutes the doctors allowed Khruschev to spend in the water. Micunovic decided not to go too near his host, only close enough to remain in earshot. The Yugoslav was particularly circumspect, because he remembered Khruschev telling him about a swim he had with Marshal Zhukov in 1956. Khruschev had been worried because Zhukov kept coming nearer and nearer to him. The book shows how Khruschev, finding it difficult to win the support of the Stalinists in the Praesidium, looked more and more for moral support from outside and especially from Tito, This caused him to confide in Micunovic and constantly seek his advice. His relationship with him inevitably stirred l'P jealousy. Once Gromyko coldly asked Micunovic, 'Or have you already discussed this question with Comrade Khruschev?' The most fantastic example of Khruschev's Yearning for outside support was his nightmarish incognito flight to Brioni with Malenkov during the Hungarian rising. The Object was to involve the Yugoslays as deeply as possible in the crisis and so prevent the isolation of the Soviet Union and himselfThe weather was horrifying. On the shores of the Adriatic there was a thick fog. The two Soviet leaders arrived exhausted after a long flight in a small plane. Malenkov was hardly able to stand. Khruschev's first Words were that he had never experienced such a flight, that it was worse than in the war. The talks, which lasted from 7 p.m. to 3 a.m., took place without the Soviet Ambassador or any representative of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. On the Yugoslav side only Tito, Kardelj, Rankovie and Micunovic were present — no shorthand writers, translators or experts. Khruschev told the Yugoslays that Oil the way he had stopped to have discussions with the Poles, the Romanians, Novotny' , and the Bulgarians. They had even consulted the Chinese. A feature of this book is that it exposes °nee more all the deviousness and treachery Of the Russians. Even at this meeting, at the verY highest level, when no holds would appear to be barred, the Russians were not being frank. In spite of the warm embraces Oil both cheeks and the respectful attention ostensibly given to their views, the Yugoslays knew perfectly well that the Russians had made up their minds already that they would send their troops in and the kind of rdgime they would impose. At first Khrusehev reviled Nagy by accusing him of murdering Communists, but when the Yugoslays s.nggested that there was still time to try to Influence him, Khruschev dropped his abuse ,of him for a time. The Yugoslays could at least claim one success. Khruschev wanted to have the Ambassador in Moscow, Ferencz Miinnich, as head of the new regime in Hungary, but the Yugoslays favoured Kadar (though he was not their first choice). But in Spite of the slobbery kisses, the dramatic night flight, the simulated respect for Yugoslav advice, the Russians had all their moves worked out. They only wanted the Yugoslays to rubber-stamp them. The Soviet invasion followed.
The reasons Khruschev gave for Soviet Military intervention are interesting. He started with an emotional cry that in HuntarY they were murdering, butchering and _anging Communists. They would desert the warsaw Pact and restore capitalism. `If we were to give in, the West would say we were stupid or weak. Neither as Communist — Internationalists, nor as the Soviet State, can we permit this. Why the capitalists would get to the frontiers of the Soviet Union!' They had their internal difficulties, Khruschev went on. People and forces could be found who would say: 'While Stalin ruled, everyone obeyed and there were no disturbances. Now that the present leaders had come to power, there had been a defeat and Hungary's secession, and this at a time when they were condemning Stalin'. The Soviet army might easily be the first to talk in this way and that was one of the reasons for them to be sent in.
Intervention came at a favourable time because of the aggressive actions of the British and French in Egypt. 'They're bogged down there just as we shall be in Hungary.' In reply, the Yugoslays blamed the whole affair on Rakosi. If the necessary action had been taken earlier, these developments could have been avoided. But they them-' selves were in a difficult position. For them the word 'counter-revolution' and the idea of Communists being killed was still a red rag to a bull. There would have to be intervention, they agreed, but to spare bloodshed there must be careful political preparation. Probably if the Yugoslays had taken a tougher line, it would not have deflected the Soviet leaders from their purpose and might have diminished their own chances of playing a moderating role, but in the event their 'moderating role' was not very effective. The fact was that, like Khruschev, they were prepared to see a measure of reform in the other Eastern European countries but not a complete about-face.
Micunovic spent much of his time trying to keep Khruschev up to the mark in his work of de-Stalinisation. He regarded it as a great mistake that his speech on Stalin had not been published in Russia. As long as it was kept secret, the officials and Party members did not need to take it seriously. Consequently the liquidation of the Anti-Party Group in 1957 was regarded by Micunovic as a great success. On the eve of Tito's first visit to the Soviet Union since the breach, Molotov had been removed. Now the rest of the Stalinists had been got rid of. But not all however. Some remained to succeed and outlast Khruschev.
Here for the first time we read Khruschev's authentic own account of the proceedings which led up to the final removal of Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Kaganovi6 and Shepilov. His is probably a one-sided account, but according to him the plot to remove Khruschev seems to have been prepared by Malenkov and Bulganin. Khruschev had already noticed something strange in Bulganin's behaviour and Malenkov had proved the most active in the opening stages. Khruschev mentions the support given him not only by Zhukov but by Konev as well, so that, as has been assumed, the army was presumably thrown into the scales to ensure his survival.
This book is full of other instances of Soviet duplicity. Tito came to Moscow in 1956; the Moscow Declaration was signed between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; it stressed the point, important for the Yugos lays, that relations and collaboration should be on the basis of equality and inde pendence. To the Yugoslays' astonishment, even before Tito had returned to Belgrade after the visit, Khruschev had secretly held a meeting in Moscow of all the satellite heads, at which he made no mention whatsoever of the Declaration signed only two days previously. Evidently the satellites were not be be told of a statement of principles which was more liberal than the Russians would accord the other East European countries. On the eve of Khruschev's holiday visit to Yugoslavia in September 1956 the Soviet leaders sent a secret circular to all echelons of the Communist Party and of the satellite communist parties repeating all their suspicions of Yugoslavia. It could not fail to come to the eyes of the Embassy. At the same time Pravda carried violent attacks on Yugoslavia for having sentenced two Yugoslays, who had returned from emigration in Russia after having worked for the Soviets at the time of the great quarrel. The Russians wanted to have it not just both ways, but as many ways as possible. They wanted surface friendship with Yugoslavia, but it must be interpreted in a more realistic and self-advantageous way to the lower echelons of the Party and the Satellites. Their leaders wanted to exchange hugs but at the same time maintain a fifth-column of 'Cominform' Yugoslays in Russia or abroad.
There was one sector where the Russians had a lever over the Yugoslays. They had promised to provide credits to them for building a new aluminium industry which the Yugoslays would pay for in exports of the same metal — an arrangement greatly to the advantage of the Soviet. But they could not resist using it as a means of political pressure on Yugoslavia, blowing hot and cold according to how the Yugoslays 'behaved'. At one stage they suggested that the German Democratic Republic should join the agreement, but the Yugoslays objected that they had no relations with that regime. In the end the Russians forced the Yugoslays to comply by transferring all the credits allocated to Yugoslavia to the German Democratic Republic. Thus in the end Yugoslavia had to sign an agreement with Ulbricht's regime, which complicated relations with the Federal Republic. This book should be read by all politicians who have to deal with the Russians and especially those who have an idealised view of them. The author knew how to handle them. He won their respect and affection, for what it was worth, but he did so by telling them openly what he and his leaders thought. There is much speculation on what will happen when Tito finally leaves the scene, with the Soviet Union waiting to subvert it, but this book shows that Tito has men about him, who have a very shrewd idea of what the Russians are up to and that it is very hard to make a Yugoslav bend, let alone break — especially if he is born in Montenegro.
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