New troubles disturb the British sway in India. The insurrec-
tion at Moultan, of which Lieutenant Edwardes seemed to have got the upper hand, has swelled to larger proportions in the pre- sence of General Whish's army : that which was kept in check by a subaltern bursts all bounds when a general officer is turned on; and where the lieutenant carried everything before him, single-handed, the well-equipped general is only too glad to carry himself off again and send for help. This paradoxical sequel to the brilliant and irregular exploits of the younger officer is thoroughly explained by the facts of the case; and although something remains untold which is necessary to fill up the ac- count, we believe that conclusions based upon the prominent facts already known will prove to be tolerably correct.
The actual state of the Sikh territory at the date of the present acconnts may be described thus. The Native Government in La- hore remains under English hold ; it seems unable; perhaps unwilling, to shake that hold ; but it proves to be no reliable means of maintaining English control through Native in- strumentality over the nominally subject province. At the three extremes of the great triangle having Lahore for its centre, a spirit of contumacious treachery is established in open rebellion. Towards Peshawur in the North-west, the Hazareh people are in revolt. It is the same at Noorpur in the North-east; and at Jum- moo, in the same quarter, Gholab Singh is suspected of secretly favouring the rebels. At Moulton, in the South, General Whish and his army have been repulsed in the attempt to take the city ; a reverse partly but very inadequately ascribed to the defection of Shere Singh with 5,000 Sikh allies. Every corner, therefore, of the triangular region of the Five Rivers is in a rebellious con- dition.
There is but one solution of this untoward turn of affairs— insufficiency of means to the proposed end. We have the capa- city, moral and material, to possess the allegiance of the Sikhs by keeping them aware of our overwhelming power ; but we falter in the application of our resources, for no other reason, apparently, but that universal tendency of the English mind which prefers economy in the use of resources, to the amplitude that makes suc- cess a certainty. We are now suffering in the Punjaub the ine- vitable consequence of that foible—a greater cost in bringing up arrears than would have been needed for success at the outset of the enterprise. While Edwardes pursued his chivalrous and pre- cipitate career, its very precipitancy and audacity sufficed to main- tain his mastery over the barbaric mind of his Native fol- lowers. The more deliberate expedition of Whish demanded other elements of success : he should have been rapid, though deliberate—and he was slow ; he should have known the ground he had to traverse, the force he had to encounter, the town he had to take—such knowledge was to have been bought or caught flying ; but, not providing himself with it, every water- course in a district like Holland, every fresh band of the enemy, every wall, was a surprise ; and regularly-prepared approaches were defeated by a series of misconceptions. Even the defection of Shere Singh was probably as much an effect as a cause : the barbarian, who would have followed Ed wardes spell-bound by the prestige of success, hesitated to remain with a halting chief Who could not keep up with his own victory.
But not to be too severe on General Which, let us allow that the inefficiency of his advance is covered by the insufficiency of the whole British policy in the Punjanis: we have taken half possession of the territory, and half convinced the Sikhs that our power is not to be shaken off, that our conquest is final.
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