LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLY.

No. II.

OBSERVING the vague notions on this subject generally entertained, and even by some who on other topics are distinguished by dis- tinct conceptions and accurate reasoning, we did not presume to imagine ourselves exempt from the common failing; and it was no surprise to find that the inadequate expression of perhaps im- mature thoughts, in our paper of the 21st October, had exposed us to the hostile animadversion of the Examiner, on the 28th. "How was it," remarks that journal, "that the Spectator never thought of broaching its slavish doctrine of 'the limits of the

right of public assembly' in the struggle for the Reform Bill ? What would have been thought of such a doctrine when its appli- cation would either have put down the Reform agitation or brought about a violent revolution? "—This is easily answered. Indeed, the question was forced upon our notice by the declamatory way

in which the late suppression of a meeting it Ireland was taken up—

by the assumption, as here, that because t would have been unjust and dangerous to attempt to put down the Reform Bill meetings, therefore all public meetings must be tolerated. We felt that there must necessarily be, in a country of regular government and public order, some limit to the right of popular assemblage. The question was of practical importance; and yet nowhere could we find a satisfactory exposition of what constitutes the difference between those public meetings that a government ought, and those that it ought not to permit : so we ventured upon a speculation of our own. The Examiner is aware that there is a difference. It regards any argument that would have justified the suppression

of Reform Bill meetings refutable by the reductio ad absurdum ; but we believe it approved of the prohibition of the Bull-ring meetings at Birmingham, and it appears to blame Sir ROBERT PEEL for not having checked the Repeal agitation soon enough. Wherein, then, does this acknowledged difference consist ?

The mere legality or illegality of a meeting is no sufficient test of the class to which it belongs. The proceedings of the Physical Force Chartists at their meetings may be admitted to have been technically illegal; but so were many of the proceedings of the Reform Bill agitators at many of their meetings. Yet the Examiner, which is shocked at the idea of putting down Reform Bill meet- ings, approved of putting down the Chartist meetings. Of two sets of meetings, both strictly speaking illegal, it is held that it would be unjust and tyrannical to suppress the one, and a neglect of duty not to suppress the other. This being the case, we must seek some other characteristic mark to enable us to dis- tinguish between them, than mere conformity or contrariety to the law. The Examiner seems to think that the rejection of mere technical legality as the test of whether a public meeting is allow- able, tells exclusively in favour of the government : the example adverted to shows that sometimes at least it tells much more in favour of the people. The difference between assemblies that may, and assemblies that may not be permitted, does not consist in their mere formal methods of conducting business. Large and frequent assem- blies of the people were the principal instruments both of the Reform Bill and the Chartist agitators. With a view to dis- cover whether there were any features in the public meetings themselves that might so distinguish them as to enable us to say that one set were safe and allowable, another otherwise, we attempted a classification of public meetings according to

their ostensible objects. We distinguished meetings for dis- cussion, meetings for receiving information, (to hear lectures and

the like,) and demonstrative meetings—meetings to pass resolutions and adopt petitions. It was shown that all such meetings might be perfectly innocent in themselves, and that the tolerance of them on the part of government is necessary to the existence of a free

community. But it was shown at the same time, that circum- stances might communicate to such meetings a tendency to endanger

the public tranquillity without producing any compensating benefit, and that then government would be entitled to suppress them. It is on this point that we seem to have been least successful in making our meaning clear ; at least it is on this point that the grossest misconstruction has been put by the Examiner. The Examiner, however, we must be allowed to remark pa- renthetically, has not merely misapprehended, but has misrepre- sented what we said. This is its commentary — "Meetings for discussion are then to be tolerated, but meetings for petition, or demonstrative meetings, if of troublesome frequency, are to be put down. In other words, the means are to be permitted, but not the end for which they are good. Discussion forms opinion ; but when opinion is formed, the expression of it, if repeated too fre- quently, is to be smothered." The passages, the import of which

these sentences profess to represent fairly, are as follows—" De- monstrative meetings have a tendency, in times of high and general excitenientip to create and foster a turbulent and rebellious spirit.

This tendency is increased when such assemblies take the not un- frequent form of meetings to hear lectures and addresses, and ' when they are harangued in an exaggerated and declamatory style, encouraging violence and opposition to the law and constituted authorities. This is the class of meetings which it is the duty of

government to watch, and under certain circumstances to pro- hibit." And again—" Nor does their danger consist in their being demonstrative : the frequency of their repetition, the tenour of the speeches delivered, the deportment of those who frequent them— ail these must be taken into account." The tendency of meetings is stated to be what renders them allowable or otherwise ; and cir- cumstances which communicate to them a mischievous tendency are enumerated. The commentator in the Examiner represents "frequency" as the only feature insisted upon ; and in mentioning it he surreptitiously introduces the wordtroublesome' " for the purpose of insinuating that frequency was only objected to in so fax as it rendered the meetings troublesome to government. Frequency, however, was enumerated as but one of the indications of deliberate systematic action. Without dwelling longer on such disingenuity, we shall endeavour to place in a clearer point of view what features in public meetings entitle a government to suppress them.

Public meetings—whether for discussion or deliberation—are in themselves of a neutral or indifferent character. They take their character of praiseworthy, innocent, or mischievous, from the in- tention with which they are held—from the ends which those who bring them together mean them to promote. The intentions of the collectors of public assemblies must be inferred from their tendency. If the dangerous tendency of any meeting is clear to a dispassionate bystander, we are entitled to assume that it was equally clear to those who brought it together—that they wilfully and knowingly committed an act of a dangerous tendency. This is the rule in regard to all crimes : those actions only are criminal which proceed from a criminal motive ; but the motive is inferred from the overt acts of the accused, not from his professions. In this manner, public meetings—in themselves innocent—if employed to disturb the public tranquillity, to endanger persons or property, to change the law or the personnel of government by violence, be- come criminal. In themselves they are mere indifferent instru- ments: they are like the press or the sword ; guilt or innocence is not their attribute, but the attribute of those who use them, and depends upon the purpose for which they are used. When large bodies of men march to meetings in military array—when they go armed to such meetings—when they are addressed in harangues stimulating them to acts of violence—when they are assembled under cloud of night, with torches—in all such cases, danger is to be apprehended, scarcely to be avoided; and it is the duty of a government to forbid the bolding of such meetings, and if they are held in defiance of its prohibition, to punish those who take part in them. It is the duty of a government to prohibit meetings which have a tendency to lead to violence and rapine. It is easy to conceive meetings having such a tendency, against which there is no law ; and it is pretty generally allowed that there are meetings which have no such necessary tendency, against which there are laws. As the law at present stands in this country, it is not a sufficient guide for Government : the law as it stands, were they to follow it closely, would lead them to do mischief by forbidding innocent meetings, or leave them to do mischief by sawing criminal ones. There may be some who believe a code might be devised free from

such a defect. We doubt whether it is possible, and therefore ad- vocate leaving to the Government the authority to prohibit in

emergencies any public meeting from which they apprehend danger, and leaving to the people the power of appealing to the Legislature for redress when this authority is oppressively or unnecessarily exercised.

These views, of course, can only apply to ordinary times and a settled government. There are crises in the history of every na- tion when general rules cease to be applicable. The Revolution of 1688 and the Reform Bill struggle of 1832 were of this class The institutions of the country had ceased to correspond with the convictions of the people. The nation felt that formal law had become essential injustice : the whole nation, with the exception of an inconsiderable minority, felt this. But in both cases, the mino- rity had the technicalities of law in its favour. In 1832, the nation almost to a man felt convinced that a change in the law of the elective franchise was necessary. Even under the old system a majority of representatives holding this opinion had been elected to the House of Commons. The Executive Government—the Ministers for the time being—entertained the same views. A ma- jority in the House of Peers alone opposed the change; and so

long as the letter of the law was observed, this majority of the Peers had it in their power to counteract the will of the nation. The moral sense of a nation cannot be controlled by mere forms : the time had come when a choice must be made between a peace- able or a violent revolution ; and the Government wisely put itself at the head of the popular movement, and by violating the letter of the constitution saved its essentials. The passing of the Reform Bill by means of the temporary abdication of the majority of the Peers was as much a revolution as the passing of the Bill of Rights by means- of the abdication of JAMES the Second. No parallel can be insti- tuted between a case in which the resolve of a whole nation (right

or wrong) had thrown the law into a state of abeyance, and cases in which the discontent of one class of the people, or one province of the empire, can only disturb the peace if it succeeds, and will be put down because the national majority is in favour of the existing law or constitution. There is as little analogy between the cases as between the Parisian barricades of 1830 (bepraised at the time alike by Whig and Tory) and the emeutes of the Porte St. Martin.

So much for the arguments of the Examiner, apart from the rhetorical devices with which they are garnished. To prepare its' readers for finding in our remarks something which they might not otherwise have thought of, the article has the heading " Old Tory Slang Revived." This is a practical application of the fallacies

designated by BEETHAAt as "the fallacy of false classification" and "the fallacy of vituperative personality." The "Manchester massacre," and the "worst days of Pitt and Castlereagh," of course do duty in tie choice collocation of epithets; and BENT.. Ham's "fallacy of imputed motives" finds a fit illustration in the following morceau- " The Spectator taking the part which was formerly 80 worthily filled by the Morning Post, with this difference in the acting, that our weekly contemporary does not, like the undisguised open partisans, say the Govern.. meat has done so and so and it is right, but it lays down most oracularly the rule of right, and leaves people to find out that the conduct of the Government precisely corresponds with it. There is a very backnied sort of flattery like this, holding up as a beau ideal the exact copy of the person to be bepraised, o course without a word or a thought of the application."

If the object of the Examiner was to assist in ascertaining whe- ther there are any limits to the right of public assembly, and what they are, the introduction of such fallacies was injudicious, as tending to perplex the discussion : but if, on the other band, its object was rather to gratify old grudges against the Spectator, the device was scarcely more judicious, inasmuch as its flimsy texture could not be expected to stand the wear and tear of one week. Whether by having "done so and so," the Government will be found "right," depends on issues of fact, which have yet to be tried in the courts of law, and on reasons of policy, to be sifted in Parliament. We are considerably less anxious that the Govern- ment should be thought "right," than our contemporary seems to be that it should be "wrong." Why should we desire to " flatter " the Government ? No person connected with the Spectator has any connexion, intercourse, or means of communication with the Government, or its supporters ; we are not acquainted with an in- dividual whom such a course would oblige. No—we leave "flattery," and all its advantages, to the Examiner, which has long been cele- brated in that line.