FRANCE AND THE GENOA CONFERENCE.
IT is sincerely to be hoped that the discussion between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Poincare at Boulogne last Saturday ended as happily as the inspired accounts say it did, for we recognize that a real and not a sham co- operation between Great Britain and France is indispensable to the recovery of Europe. If Mr. Lloyd George's friends are right the Genoa Conference is to be carried out sub- stantially as it had been planned at Cannes at the moment of the dramatic resignation of M. Briand. That is to say, M. Poincare as Prime Minister has not been so unbending as M. Poincare the Nationalist journalist. Everything depends, however, upon whether the reservations which M. Poincare has succeeded in making have within them the power—if he should wish this ultimately—to throw the train off the lines. Mr. Lloyd George's friends tell us that the permanent way is now safe and that the train will almost certainly reach its destination. May it do so It would be impossible to recognize too clearly that a very fundamental issue is at stake—the issue between M. Poincare's doctrine (to take it in its strongest form) of physical security and prosperity for France by means of holding Germany down and exacting from her large reparations and meanwhile maintaining an expensive Army and Navy, and ()a the other hand, the doctrine of toleration, conciliatica and co-operation for which Mr. Lloyd George stands. Since he became Prime Minister: M. Poincare has sent several Notes to London designed, so far as we can judge, to transform the character of the Genoa Conference, if not to prevent the Conference altogether. Evidently he does not believe at all in the usefulness of this Con- ference as it was originally planned. Necessity makes strange bedfellows and the argument which M. Poincare unexpectedly developed that the Genoa Conference would deal an unfair blow at the League of Nations by usurping its functions was not without its humour. There is a certain plausible appearance, of course, about this con- tention that if the League of Nations is a reality there is no room for another body like it. But the argument does not really bear examination. For one thing, America, Germany and Russia, who are invited to the Genoa Con- ference, are not members of the League. For another, all decisions of the League have to be unanimous so that France would be able to prevent the League coming to any decision about any single item in the Genoa programme. When M. Poincare found that his Notes made no im- pression upon London he agreed to meet Mr. Lloyd George at Boulogne, and it seems that he still hoped considerably to rearrange the programme drawn up at Cannes. What- ever may he behind the rather vaguely worded official announcement about the Boulogne discussions, it is to our mind a very long step forward that M. Poincare should have agreed to join in the Genoa Conference at all. We suspect that Mr. Lloyd George told him that Great Britain would carry on in any case, and that if France refused to send any delegates to Genoa she herself would be the greatest loser. If that be so, M. Poincare probably felt that he could not afford to be left in the lurch and possibly to forfeit the good opinion of the world. And when he had once come to that conclusion the only thing that remained for him to do was to make the best terms he could. We say that what has happened is a long step forward because, whatever the value of the reservations may be, M. Poincare has agreed to the principle of trying to settle the economic affairs of Europe in a Conference in which Germany and Russia will be represented. To put it quite plainly, if the Genoa Conference should be a success, no room would be left for any more meetings of the Supreme Council. There would be no more inner and outer circles. Everybody would have become a principal in future settlements. After that the admission of Germany to the League of Nations, and even perhaps of Russia if her representatives should behave rationally at Genoa, would become practical business. In the circumstances the fixing of April 10th as the date on which the Conference is to meet is quite satisfactory. Owing to the Italian Ministerial crisis, which has only just been resolved, there had to be some delay in any case.
If the reports which are current are not exaggerations a real debt of gratitude is owed to Dr. Benes, the young and extremely able Premier of Czecho-Slovakia. He acted as intermediary between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Poincare, and it is possible that he impressed M. Poincare with the fact that a strong individual policy is quite reconcilable with a broad European policy—indeed that the one is impracticable without the other. For is not Dr. Benes at one and the same time the founder and cultivator of friendly relations—a policy of mutual help- with his immediate neighbours and the • strong; capable and -businesslike director oft the rapid' material reeovery of his own country?
According to the new arrangements for Genoa the! questions of • -reparation • by Germany and the- reduction of- armaments in Europe will be ruled out We do not at! all dislike the( reference 'of the disarmament question to the League of Nations, which has been growing in repute; thanks chiefly to its-really useful settlement of the Silesian - question. Bat 'it may be found that the embargo upon: the question of reparations will make it extremely difficult, if -not impossible, for the Genoa -Conference to draw up a programme which will really' restore European financial stability and rehabilitate -trade. As regards the question whether the Russian Soviet Government is to be recog- nized or not, we are quite 'content. to let the decision depend upon the attitude of Russia at the Conference. The really important thing is that no stickling etiquette, should be allowed to stand in the! way of- throwing the gates of Russia as wide open as possible to :trade. Even : under the very 'best -conditions that can be hoped for the revival of trade in Russia will be a very slow process. We are convinced, however, that political common -sense in Russia is much more likely to develop if Russia is in constant contaet with the outer. world. The acknow- ledgment by Russia of her obligations in -the way of debt and her respect for foreign property are to be test questions. We are sure, however, that the likelihood of Russia satis- fying the, tests will be in direct proportion -to the degree of her association with the, rest of the world. The Bol- sheviks talk as though they had abandoned Communism temporarily only in order to set it up on- stronger founda- tions. But that is all -moonshine. It is impossible for people who have suffered as the Russian people have suffered under • Communism-, and have -then been allowed to taste the beginnings of comfort under -a different system, to go-back willingly to the causes of their misery. Finally, we are very glad to- record that Mr. Lloyd George is able to -speak of the proposed pact guaranteeing France against unprovoked aggression by Germany as a matter that is practically settled. France can have the guarantee -whenever -she likes in the form in which it has been already offered.
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