LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
" PLANNING THE WAR"
Sut,—The review of my book, Planning the War, by Strategicus, your brilliant and knowledgeable contributor, published in your issue of June 27th, is so patently fair-minded that I hesitate to raise points which might suggest that I take exception to it m any material way, which is certainly not the case. From the fact, however, that a reviewer is seldom able to read books he is called upon to review attentively from cover to cover, it follows that things contained in it are sometimes overlooked, and this I think must have happened in the review in question. And since the particular points I have in mind are of very real interest to people who are thinking about the problems raised by the war, besides having special importance at the present time, I venture to ask your permission briefly to refer to them.
It is a misapprehension to suppose that in the outline of a central planning organisation which I give as an illustration of how certain abstract principles might possibly be applied, I cast the secre- tary of the Committee of Imperial Defence for the role which I state the Prime Minister fills today. My actual suggestion—based on the conception of planning as a co-operative effort organised on a wide scale in order to incorporate talent of every description—is to have a considerable number of subsidiary planning committees, each delegating a member to a Central Planning Committee over which the secretary, C.I.D., could preside as a sort of general manager. (I need hardly say that this bears no resemblance to things as they are today, since the development of plans could be inwards from the perimeter instead of outwards from the centre.) Above the C.P.C. would be the War Cabinet (Board of Directors) in which the Prime Minister would fulfil his constitutional functions, but relieved of the all too heavy responsibility of initiating plans.
It is suggested by Strategicus that Anglo-American planning cannot exist so long as America is not an ally. But why not? In all but name America is our ally (for that matter she was never one in name in the last war even after she entered it—shades of " entangling alliances "!) and I submit that the effectual planning of the com- bined war-effort does depend—and will increasingly depend—on the incorporation of American planning at the centre. And I suggest tentatively that this- might be done by the appointment of " observers " who would automatically become the American War Delegation should America enter the war. Again, I don't wish to be didactic on the subject, but I submit that the issue is one which should not be burked whatever the arrangement eventually adopted. The relationship at present does not amount in any sense to sharing responsibility for' planning and I feel that, having regard to what we are receiving gratis under the Lease and Lend Act, it would be the course of wisdom were it to do so.
As regards Dominions' representation, Strategicus asks "How can the Dominions be associated with the planning if the Committees are to be kept to a total of five members? Would any Dominion accept the member of another as its representative? " The difficulty is evident, but something has got to be done about it ; it cannot be evaded. The suggestion I venture to make with regard to the War Cabinet (applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all committees) is that the Dominions should be represented on that body by the Secretary of State, assisted by a panel of two High Commissioners chosen from day to day in accordance with circumstances. Further, that he should preside over a Committee of High Commissioners in permanent session. As to this proposal, I may say that the Committee already exists and meets daily. I have also been assured by one High Commissioner that the method of representation proposed would meet the desires of the Dominions, except that the proposed panel appeared to him unnecessary. As to this I can only say that I think the proposal should be made. It is reasonable to argue that the principle of a small War Cabinet definitely excludes incorporating in it four High Commissioners. But as this is otherwise desirable it is logical to propose as close an approximation to it as possible, namely, the panel idea. If the Dominions' Governments prefer to dispense with it that is their affair, but the proposal should be made.
Finally, Strategicus calls attention to the fact that at the end of November I suggested that the Lamea-Itea line was the place where we should give effective support to the Greeks should the need ever arise. " That," he remarks, " is certainly not reassuring. It is almost inconceivable that any British Government would have dared to suggest such a line, since it would have involved the abandonment of almost the whole of Greece "—incidentally since wholly abandoned. "Political and human factors cannot be ignored."
Here the issue is fairly joined. With all respect to Strategicus, I stick to my point and should enjoy defending it in detail if space permitted.
As long ago as last autumn, foreseeing what anyone with any knowledge of the Balkans must have foreseen, namely, that against a completely unified German plan there would be pitted, unless special measures were adopted, a completely disunited Allied plan, or series of plans, I proposed to the Government the setting up of a planning organisation in Athens. Our guarantee and the material aid we were already giving Greece in her struggle with Italy placed us in a position to carry our point. It would have been a perfectly legitimate measure to bribe recalcitrant politicians. But at all costs the situation resulting from three mutually independent British Commanders-in-Chief and the autonomous Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav Higher Commands was one which had to be dealt with. It should then have been possible step by step to carry the major part of making politically possible what was strategically desirable. Had this happened, had provision been made, as it should have been made, to establish large supply-dumps at places like Janina, Prevesa, and Missolonghi, the Greek forces in Albania might have been brought back to Africa as soon as the German threat to Salonika made it evident that their situation would shortly become untenable. Had these precautions been taken and had the Lamea-Itea line been strengthened, we need never have been driven out of Greece. But nothing was done to overcome Greek political objections and thus we ended by losing not only Greece but Crete as well.—I am, Sir,
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