TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEW FRENCH ARMY.
BARON VON MOLTKE, the Prussian Carnot, in his book upon the Campaign of 1866, lays it down as an axiom that the Prussian Reserves must never be mobilized without fighting. The decree calling them out disorganizes society so completely, that to pass it without adequate and visible need might produce a revolution. The nationality of the Prussian Army, so to speak, while it constitutes its power, constitutes it also a guarantee against wars not desired by the masses of the people. It is the special demerit of the French Army Bill that while the new plan places all France under arms, it does not make the Army strictly national. It is clear from Marshal Niel's speech that it is intended to increase the offensive force of the Empire to an amazing, to almost an appalling degree. The numbers given in the debates teach us nothing of the truth until we have reflected, not on the numbers added to the Army, but on the numbers released for foreign war. At present, according to Marshal Niel, the French Army may be held to consist, with the Reserve, of 600,000 men. So great, however, is the drain on it for Algeria, for Paris, for the departmental garrisons, and for the frontier fortresses, that when the Emperor entered Italy to fight Austria he had but 230,000 men, and of these less than half, or 107,000, were in line at Solferino. Enormous deduc- tions had to be made for the Tuscan corps d'arme'e, for sick and wounded, and regiments employed to keep up communications, deductions which even in a friendly country weakened the line of battle by one-half. The new Bill avowedly adds 150,000 men to the Army, or, say 100,000 effective soldiers to the battle-field ; but, in reality, it will add at least three times that number. it releases for war nearly all the garrison of France. Suppose the scheme, for example, finally accepted by the Legislature and carried into execution, and the Em- peror to resolve that he will fight Prussia rather than allow the absorption of Baden in the Confederation. He will instantly propose to call out the National Guard Mobile, 400,000 strong, and with them garrison all France, except perhaps Algeria, Paris, Strasbourg, Metz, and a few of the Northern fortresses, consuming altogether, say, 150,000 men. There will remain of his total regular army of 750,000 men 600,000 ready for foreign service at a moment's notice. Supposing one great army of 100,000 men to be stationed in Savoy and Nice, as a check upon Italy, which, be it remem- bered, has not the power to invade France by sea, the Emperor will still retain half a million of trained regulars, all mobilized, all ready for service beyond the frontiers, with whom to march, if necessary, upon Berlin. This army, vast as that with which Napoleon invaded Russia, will be perfectly homo- geneous, perfectly equipped, commanded corps by corps by Marshals of France—by Generals, that is, of unique experi- ence in great commands—and supported by an organization improved by seventy years of experience, and a hundred cam- paigns in all quarters of the globe. Behind them lies France, covered with railways, rich, fertile, and garrisoned after their departure by 400,000 obedient though, it may be, half -trained soldiers. We say deliberately, and with full recol- lection of the wars of the First Empire, that no weapon so fearfully strong has ever yet been at the disposal of a human being ; that nothing short of a nation in arms could resist it ; that from the day of its formation every country near France, save only Germany and England, will retain its independence by the Emperor's consent. We ques- tion, for example, supposing Napoleon in one of his dreamy moments to revive the Bourbon plans, whether her mountains or her people could save Spain from being overrun in a month. If the Channel were dry, England in presence of such a force would have to choose between the Prussian conscription and subjugation ; and even Germany, with its national army, its strong organization, and its able chiefs, is not beyond serious danger. She could not be subdued, but her regular army could be destroyed, and then the Landwehr coming to the front, every shot would slay some citizen not to be replaced. Even if the invaders were beaten they would fall back, after hideous slaughter, upon a France as thoroughly garrisoned as she is now, a France under arms, and maddened by fear for her independence. Of course, if the war continued, North Ger- many, with every man trained to arms, is at least as strong as France ; but for a short war, a war of our day, a war not in- tended to subjugate so much as to check, a war in which the prize would be a country outside both belligerents, and
for which, therefore, neither could fight to the death, this Bill makes France perceptibly the more efficient power. The method of modern warfare, moreover, has removed one grand restraint on war. It has ceased to be unendurably expensive. Even France could not keep 500,000 men in motion for seven years, as Germany once essayed to do ; but she can keep them for seven weeks, which is now amply suffi- cient time for a crushing victory or a great defeat. Half-a- million a day would mobilize even this tremendous force, and half-a-million a day for three months is less than the cost of the Crimean war. We do not say that Napoleon will use this tremendous weapon recklessly. On the contrary, the frightful magnitude which the next war must attain will, of itself, incline him to the caution which is so inherent a feature in his character ; while his people will at least be inclined to wait. until their new weapon is completely ready. All we say is, that if he is forced either by circumstances, or by an outbreak of French feeling, or by an attack, into a foreign war, the new Bill places in his hand a weapon such as statesmen may well dread to see in the hands of any man, however moderate, or- however wise.
The evil effect of the new Bill upon the internal re-
sources of France is, we think, exaggerated. Military training, especially in France, is not altogether unfavourable to the physical well-being of a nation. It has decidedly im- proved the Prussians and the Italians, and Marshal Niel had some excuse for saying that the French Army was a suc- cessful gymnasium. The mass of mankind in all countries are still so wretchedly off that regular diet, exercise, and drill benefit them perceptibly. Look at the lads at the recruiting depots even in England, and compare them with the same men when " set up " with drill, filled out with Government rations, and braced by regular but limited exertions ; and in France the improvement is still more thorough. A French peasant and a French soldier seem to belong to two different races of men. Even the injury done to the country by the celibacy of the Army may be exaggerated, for though Marshal Niel talked cynical nonsense about the halt, the maim, and the blind making good husbands, still the prohibition under the Bill as it stands ends at twenty-six, the usual age of middle- class marriage, and households set up at that age have as
many children as those set up earlier. It is in the additional means which the Bill provides for repression that the internal danger chiefly consists, and after all, it must be remembered that France has never had an army entirely separated in feeling from her people, and that drilled multitudes are of all multitudes the most difficult to oppress. To the external world the Army may be and will be a new danger, but to France itself the only great injury it will bring will be an increase of three or four millions a. year to the already heavy military budget, and a possible readiness for war, which may tend, under favourable circum- stances, to bring war on when it could otherwise have been avoided. Considerations like these evidently weigh little in France, and it is to be noticed that scarcely one speaker who is at heart favourable to standing armies has attacked the Bill, which, in spite of the dislike of the peasantry, will pass without serious opposition. So strong is the national feeling that even M. Picard's motion giving the Guard a franc a day when called out was rejected, and the people ordered to- serve without even that partial relief to the losses service must involve. If patriotism is weak in France, it must be confessed that national pride makes an excellent substitute.
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