CAPTAINS SCOTT, GRINDL AY, AND BARBER, ON STEAM NAVIGATION TO

INDIA.

OF the general merit of Captain SCOTT as a traveller we have spoken already : his authority as a witness on the present subject

arises from his intimate local acquaintance with parts of the route that must be traversed—a considerable general knowledge of the remainder—the power of raising his mind beyond the petty pecu- niary details of the question, so as to look at it in all its various bearings—and, so far as we can judge, a perfect freedom from any bias of interest or prejudice. To few of these qualities can the other gentlemen make any pretension. Apart, indeed, from the im-

portance of their subject, their pamphlets are of little value ; being in a great measure devoid of facts, and destitute of arguments,

whilst their general views are of the most obvious and common-

place kind. Captain BARBER, however, is full in his exposition of the uses to which Steam Navigation to India, if successful, might be

turned in case of a threatened invasion by Russia ; and to Cap-

tain GRINDL AY'S publication is appended a variety of public docu- ments, which contain the statistics of the probable cost and pos-

sible returns of the undertaking. As the whole of the works united, cannot, however, be said to contain a complete view of the principles of the subject, we shall endeavour in our notice to supply that deficiency.

To dwell upon the importance of a speedy communication be- tween England and India, would be inflicting upon the reader rhetorical commonplaces. The purposes to which such commu- nication by the way of the Red Sea may be turned, are four,— the transmission of letters, the carriage of merchandise, the con- veyance of passengers, and eventually and in cases of emergency the transport of soldiers and of munitions of war. Of these the post-office function is the only one that is likely to be successful, at least at the outset. The expenses of freight by steam are ne- cessarily so heavy, that none but goods of small bulk and consi- derable value can afford the charge. Natural difficulties, of an insuperable kind, seem opposed to sailing navigation; in addi- tion to which, there are the costs of double unlading and lading at Suez and Alexandria, and of the land carriage between those places, with the risk of possible quarantine detentions on account of the plague; which last circumstance would extend the actual time of the voyage to nearly the same length as is occupied in that by the Cape of Gocd Hope. The inconvenience inseparable from new routes, the risks of the navigation of the Red Sea, the disturbance to health in heading the monsoon, and the remote chance of infection, would rarely be of sufficient weight to prevent persons engaged in official or commercial pursuits, and whose time is of consequence, from journeying by this route : such obstacles would, however, for some time to come, mostly induce families and invalids to pursue the safer and more familiar voyage. The transmission of an army can only be accomplished if the undertaking should succeed to a very full extent; not on account of the expenses, (for in such a case expense must be a secondary consideration,) but because a great number of steam-vessels ready to be " taken up" must be employed on the neater coasts and seas of India. Considering, however, that under such circumstances, we should be enabled to pour in troops to India in six weeks, and that Russia must suc- ceed in overturning the Persian empire altogether before she could be in a condition to reach the Indus with any thing like an army in a shorter period, the refusal to expend a few hundred thousand pounds in trying to attain such a great political advan-

tage, independent of collateral benefits of many kinds, is not to be expected from a nation which munificently gave twenty mil-

lions for a moral and religious object, or from a government which squandered a million upon Irish tithe-owners for no object what- ever.

Should the plan of establishing a steam communication with India succeed, (and for ourselves, we have considerable doubts

upon the subject, on account of certain natural difficulties to which we shall presently revert,) it may be questioned whether so large a sum as even 100,0001. would have to be sunk. At present there is a monthly steam-packet communication be- tween England and Alexandria : the voyage from England to

Egypt,. therefore, would merely require some slight regulations,

involving change perhaps, but little or no expense. The trans- mission of the bags from Alexandria to Suez would be very trifling ; and though the navigation of the Nile to Klieneh, should

the route by that place and Kosseir be chosen, would be costly. the navigation of the worst and most dangerous parts of the Red Sea would be avoided, and that expense of course saved. The East India Company's estimate, in March 1832, of the expense of

employing four steam-boats in a monthly communication between Suez and Bombay, amounted to 107,2001. per annum. This esti-

mate has since undergone revision by many persons in India con-

nected with the subject ; and, according to calculations appended to the Madras Memorial, the necessary outlay need only amount

to 50,9351. This enormous difference arises from reductions

in the first cost of the vessel, a diminution by about one half in the charge for fuel, the asserted sufficiency of three, instead of

four vessels, at any period of the year, (although it is necessary to keep one laid up against accidents,) and the statement that even three vessels need be constantly employed for six months only,

If the revised estimate be at all correct, the sum of 60,000/. would certainly be sufficient to cover the expenses of transit from Alexan- dria to Bombay or Point de Guile, in Ceylon, (those from Eng.

land to Alexandria being incurred already),; and if no remune- ration were to be looked for, it would not be ill laid out in esta- blishing such important advantages as must accrue from virtually diminishing by one-half the distance between England and India. Some return, however, would be made, even at the outset ; and should experiment decide the practicability of the plan, that re- turn would annually increase till it probably became a source of profitable revenue. What income is likely to be derived from it at present, is difficult to say. According to calculations in the document already alluded to, 28,0001. is given as the estimated returns; but these are perhaps coloured by the desires of the persons making them, and at all events are only paper receipts. But taking them at that amount, and reckoning 58,0001. as the sum necessary for transmitting the mail through Egypt and car- rying on the steam navigation thence to India, 30,0001. only would be the annual outlay by Government. But whether the first annual expenditure would be thirty, or twice or three times thirty thousand pounds, is of little conse- quence. The main point is to establish by experiment, the punc- tual practicability of the passage : and of this, we must confess, we have always entertained considerable doubts, from natural or geographical obstacles. Some of these—as the intricate and riskful navigation of the Red Sea—are always in being; another— as the monsoon—is only operative during one-third of the year; but that is sufficient to destroy the utility of the line as a post- ollice communication. However, upon these points, Captain Sean is able to speak with more freshness than we can ; so we will call him into court. The following passages appear to us very happily to exhaust the subject in all its bearings; and they sofas ex- press our own views upon the question, that we were loth to abridge them. We should remark, however, that Captain BOURCHIER, a naval officer who made a voyage from Bombay to England via Egypt, estimated the risk of steam navigation in the Red Sea as being greater than Captain SCOTT considers it, on account of the

narrowness of the channel, and the frequency of sudden and violent squalls, to which it is exposed in common with all land-locked seas surrounded by mountains, and which he appeared to think sufficient to wreck even a steamer, especially during the night. But as the gallant tar was wrecked on a coral reef himself, ho perhaps had a prejudice against the inhospitable waters.

DIFFICULTIES OF NAVIGATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND INDIA.

It is expected (though I much doubt it) that the contemplated railroad to Cairo will draw to Suez a great part of the English trade with China and India. The establishment of a steam communication with Bombay will certainly give as impetus to the commerce of the place; but there are too many difficulties in the way ever to permit of its carrying on a flourishing trade by means of sailing vessels ; for, besides the insecurity of the anchorage and the risk in landing goods, a northerly wind blows from Suez to Jedda, almost uninterruptedly from 3 larch to September, against which but few merchaut vessels could make head, even with plenty of sea.roum ; whereas here they would be confined to a very narrow space. surrounded on all sides with dangerous coral reefs, and without a port on either coast to seek shelter in. At the straits of Juhal, indeed, the entrance to the Gulf of Suez is contracted by these reefs to the width of only a few miles. The same obstacles, though presenting great difficulties, are not so insur- mountable for steam navigation ; but, though the English Government may find it worth while to incur the expense of keeping up such a mode of commu- nication with our Eastern possessions, yet, as a continental speculation, there is not at this moment the slightest chance of its answering. There is, however, a terrible obstacle in the way of keeping up a constant communication even by steam between Bombay and Suez ; an obstacle which, if not altogether insurmountable during several months of the year, will be found so bard to overcome as to render the intercourse during that period at all events very unccrtaiu. I allude to the south-west monsoon, which blows, from the month of May until the autumnal equinox, between the coast of Adel and that of India. Difficult as this obstinate wind would under any circum- stances be to contend against. even with steam power, yet perseverance would eventually prevail, could fresh supplies of fuel be furnished to make good the consumpiion occasioned by such a contest. But that, in the present case, is out of the question. From Bombay to Illucala (the nearest port where a supply of fuel could be deposited) is a distance of 1400 miles; and no steamer could possibly contrive to carry a butlioiout quantity of coals to make such a distance against a con- stant strong adverse wind. The remainder of the voyage could be accomplished without much difficulty, as between Macula and Suez (a distance of 1600 miles) the ports of Mocha, Jedda, and Kosseir, successively present themselves, at any of which fuel could be procured as occasion might require.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE RED SEA AND THE EUPHRATES.

In one respect, and in one only, the projected communication with India by the Euphrates holds out an advantage over that by the Red Sea,—namely, that steamers proceeding to the Persian Gulf during the prevalence of the south- west monsoon, would neither have to contend against that wind for such a dis- tance, nor have it no directly opposed to them; the entrance of the Persian Gulf being only nine hundred miles from Bombay, and its bearing about E. N. E. On entering the Euphrates, however, the difficulties of this line commence; and they are such as will have to be encountered at all seasons and at every step, consisting of rocks, shallows, rapids, (rendering steaming by night out of the question,).scarcity of fuel, insecurity of the deplits, from the hostility of the natives and wandering tribes, intolerable beat, insalubrity of climate, and, nally, a long land journey across a mountainous country from fir to Scanda- soon. This journey may at the present moment (thanks to Mohammed Ali) be undertaken with confidence ; but if any change should take place in the go- vernment of Syria, might next year expose travellers to the tender mercies of the "poor, oppressed" inhabitants. lo comparing the two routes, therefore, though it be admitted that the voyage from Bombay to the Red Sea is impracticable for four months of the year, namely from June till September, yet it is doubtful whether, during that same period, any Europeans could bear up against the intolerable heat of the Persian Gulf; an for the remaining eight months of the year—even should the thou • sand obstacles that the navigation of the Euphrates now presents be eventually overcome—that route must, without dispute, cede to the other, on the score both of expedition and security. Regarding the two routes in a military point of view, as lines of communica- tion between Great Britain and her Eastern possessions, that of the Euphrates would be thrown so forward towards the enemy's frontier as to be exposed to be intercepted at the very commencement of hostilities ; whereas the line by the Red Sea would be perfectly secure until the enemy had succeeded in obtain- Mg possession of Lower Egypt. It is superfluous to observe, that the friendship of Egypt is necessary for the security of either line. The navigation of the Gulf of Suez (as that portion of the Red Sea to the north of the Straits ofJubal k called) has already been noticed as attended with danger and difficulty as regards sailing-vessels ; but a steamer, provided with a pilot and abundance of coals, would, by being able to steer a direct course, be comparatively free from risk.

The advantages of the line by the Nile, Khenell, and Kosseir, consist in the greater certainly and safety of the passage ; and as regards profit, in the temptation it would hold out to common tour- ists, by carrying them directly up the valley of the Nile, through the midst of the antiquities of Egypt. Its drawback is the longer time it would occupy. But as this could not at the utmost make above a few days' difference, it appears to us to be by far the more preferable route. However, here is the summary of Captain SCOTT'S opinions. It may be premised, that the estimated dis- tance from Suez to Cairo is Si miles•' from Kosseir to the Nile, by the shortest route, 96 miles; by another, which is better supplied with water, 102 miles.

Kosseir, whilst it offers a better anchorage and more convenient landing. place than Suez, is not so well calculated for the terminus of tic voyage from Bombay ; for though a railroad C1/11111 he laid down to Kheneb, by which letters, goods, &c. might be conveyed to the Nile, within an hour of the same time as by that about to be established between Suez and Cairo, yet steam mitigation on the Nile is open to one of the objections that present themselves on the Eaphratcs,—namely, the difficulty of " progressing at night ; comolucntly, much more time would he occupied in getting from Kbeneh to Cairo, than from Kosseir to Suez. Could this difficulty be overcome, (which, by establish- ing a series of floating lights on the river, I think it might be,) Kosseir should be fixed on as the point of communication rather than Suez ; since the most dangerous part of the Red Sea to navigate, as well as that over which the noitherly winds are most prevalent, would thereby by avoided.

There does not appear to be any possibility of improving the port of Suez, or, I should rather say, any means of making one, for it is a mere roadstead. The channels through the shoals that lie between the anchorage and the town, even at high tide, are very shallow ; whilst at low water they are practisable only for small boats ; and, with the least wind, such a surf is raised as to cut off all communication between the town and shipping.

To counterbalance the weight of evidence put forward by Cap- tain Scow, nothing whatever is to be found in the pamphlets of Captains GRINDL AY and BARBER. Obviously writing as thick-and- thin advocates, they pass over altogether the obstacles to the plan ; and assume at once, that because the voyage has been several times performed, it can therefore be constantly performed with punctuality and safety.

But although the difficulties arc considerable, and the prospects of a successful termination not very promising, we consider the Government bound, upon large principles of public utility, to give the experiment a fair trial ; and if, after a reasonable time, it be found that the voyage can always be accomplished with certainty, to continue the undertaking until it pay its expele.es. But we agree with the risiastic Journal, that this undertaking cannot properly be intrusted to private speculators or to joint stock com- panies. To give it a chance of success, more especially of pecu- niary success, the transmission of letters to India must be sub- jected to post-office regulations. Diplomatic arrangements must also be entered into with the Pasha of Egypt ; for we certainly have no kind of right to scud over that potentate's territories at our pleasure; nor, if he permitted a collection of individuals to run a mail through them, should we have any guatantec for its continuance, any public claim for its safe conveyance, or even any title to inquire about its luss. Moreover, an outlay of public money, fur such an object, can only prudently take place under the direction of some public functionaries respon- sible for its due expenditure, and the proper execution of the plan in all its parts. To grant 60,000/. or 70,0000/. a year to a joint stock body, as is proposed by the embryo " East India Steam Navi- gation Company," would be vicious in all points. Attaching little weight to the fact of there being already a monthly line of packets to Alexandria, and to the circumstance of the Madras calculations rating the net outlay from India to Suez at only 23,000/. a year, no body of individuals would attempt such an undertaking with- out the prospects of profit ; and if the public are to guarantee the risks, they may as well have the gains. In dealing with a body of fluctuating directors, however respectable, there would be no real responsibility for the due application of the money, or the certain fulfilment of the undertaking. As a treaty must be entered into with the Pasha, Government cannot be relieved of all interference with the business : and as the plan, to succeed at all, can only succeed by means of the postage on letters,—and this will be com- paratively little without a law conveying a post-office privilege,— it would be an anomaly, to say the least of it, to hand over a tuna tion of government to a joint stock company. And should it fail in their hands, the cost of the experiment would have to be re- peated, for no one would be satisfied with the result.