RUSSIA IN THE NEW PHASE
By STRATEGICUS HE Prime Minister on Sunday night touched on the nature of the present problem of the Allies. It is impossible to ignore fact that we have entered a new phase which promises to lead s to victory if we pursue it with undiminished resolution and un- Taried vigour ; and yet at the same time only folly can be blind
o the tremendous strength of the German war-machine. Somehow ,he two propositions must be held before the mind simultaneously the truth of the situation is to be reached. Hitler spoke of the idiotic " strategies of the Allies as one of the complications of his task ; but in thus stigmatising the Allied operations he was uncon- sciously revealing the foundations of his own success, for, of course, t is the unexpected and unpredictable nature of his actions that has been our worst handicap. Clearly, in the end, the strategy which cannot command the support of the professional soldier in Germany must be unsound, must contain in itself the seeds of its own destruction.
It is this that gives the interest to the reported conferences between Hitler and his generals, this, too, that suggests the true bearing of the ostentatious dissociation from his decisions expressed by Goering. For some time it has seemed elementary prudence that the Germans should retreat in Russia. Failing a decision, fail- ing a much more damaging blow than they had obviously inflicted upon the Russian Army, the new positions attained in the year's campaign were a liability at this stage in the war. Hitler did not even claim that there would be any immediate gain from the terri- tories he has conquered this year ; and even the most pregnant intuitions cannot have blinded him to the fact that the territories would never be productive if they could not be held. It can be recognised that the old front is better organised this year ; but the vast new gains pose an entirely fresh problem, and over great stretches of country the main security is the presumed inability to challenge the positions.
Frederick the Great pointed out: " You must know how to lose opportunely, to sacrifice a province (he who seeks to defend every- thing fails to save anything)." How well have the Russians, how badly has the great Frederick's pupil, assimilated that doctrine. It seems to be true that there were certain readjustments proceeding before Stalingrad ; but they were not to interfere with the imple- menting of Hitler's assurance that the city would be taken. The very form in which the assurance was cast made it more incum- bent upon him to make it good or lose prestige. It has been noted that until a day or two ago the Germans were still attacking the city, attempting in effect • to push their way out of the end of the lack. Now they are counter-attacking, trying to limit, if not prevent, the Russian recoil in the city. It seems undeniable that the enemy is here in an almost desperate plight. The Don bend has been cleared until it is entirely in Russian hands. From the south the net has been closed. It is closed on the north. It is a veritable
sack. •
The Russians about the line of the river Chir are holding off the Germans who might relieve the encircled troops by a blow from the west, the only practicable direction for an effective counter-offensive. On the south-west they are driving the enemy down the line of the Kotelnikov railway. Within the sack there are about 300,000 of the enemy. Their lines of supply are cut, not merely at a point but over considerable distances. The attempt to supply such a mass by air-transport must be doomed to failure, even if the Germans were not at present thrown back upon air-supply lines in two other directions. Armies of the size involved cannot be kept in the field by air-supply alone ; and it is not obvious how the enemy is to break out, even if Hitler were disposed to accept Frederick's counsel.
So the position stands at the moment ; and it must be recognised that with the fate of the armies trapped between the Volga and Don ROCS the future of the whole position in Caucasia. The defensive ?rip upon the central Caucasus was broken by the success below Nalchik. The link between that position and the Stalingrad force is immediately threatened by the scuth-westward drive below Stalin- grad. If the armies between the Volga and the Don should be
destroyed, that flank would be driven in. The prospect may appear to be a little ambitious ; but it is the sober purpose of Marshal Timoshenko, and he has in his favour the fact that the troops are not all German. The Rumanians have been complaining that they are being called on to do more than their share.
Hitler will no doubt try to relieve the encircled armies ; but his great mobilised force is now suffering its worst tensions, and they are certain to grow. The attack upon the Rzhev-Velikie Luki sector is a much more dangerous thrust. At Stalingrad the Russians only threaten the circumference of his position. At Velikie Luki they are not far from the heart. The junction is only fifteen miles from the main lateral railway that serves the whole of the central and northern armies, and enables reinforcement of one from the other to be made easily and rapidly. It is only go miles from the Latvian frontier. It is this that explains the much more desperate resistance, and the fact that only 40o prisoners were taken when ro,000 dead were left on the battlefield. Rzhev has been encircled before ; and although its capture would clear the Moscow-Riga railway up to Velikie Luki, the main immediate effect would be moral. In fact, this sector is of such importance that last winter it was held when almost any other army in the world would have given way before the wide-flung, persistent and resolute attack.
At the moment the main role of the attack is to pin down the troops and prevent reinforcements being sent to the south ; and there are movements about Voronezh that suggest the same purpose. In sum, these multiplied attacks are-emphasising the strain that must be occasioned by the concentration in the south. It is very probable that they will be followed by other blows, on the Leningrad sector, for instance ; across the Volkov or on the Briansk front. The Russian staff is making it more difficult for the Germans to effect in safety the transfer of troops which are already moving or ear- marked for movement to the south and west, and sooner or later some critical sector will give way before the strain.
There is no doubt that Hitler is attempting to maintain his bridge- head south of the Mediterranean. He appears to have transferred about zo,000 men to the fringe about Bizerta and Tunis. There are detachments in some of the coast towns on the eastern side of Tunisia. There is a force of unknown strength in Tripolitania, and Rommel may have roo,000 or more troops with some tanks and artillery about El Agheila. The latter could fall back on Misurata or even Tripoli with advantage. At present he is standing firmly, while Montgomery feels about the position before launching an attack which must be rather more difficult even than the assault at El Alamein. There should be little doubt about his ability at least to compel Rommel's retreat in spite of the tactical strength of the position, since the force before him can hardly be materially as strong as his own, and the Eighth Army has developed a mastery of its weapons that is the best augury of the future.
Even less can one doubt that the First Army and the United States forces will deal faithfully with the enemy at Bizerta and Tunis. According to the reports of correspondents, the railway connexion between the two ports has already been cut and the forward troops are only some twelve miles from Tunis. They are there beginning to force their way in the direction of historic Carthage ; and it seems probable that it will be Tunis and this ancient city that first fall to the allied attack. But Hitler will do all he can to hold the dwindling fringe of ground, since it seems impossible that there should be a Dunkirk from this area and Italy is clearly a broken reed. The Allied air forces are now gaining the mastery, and the command cannot fail to recognise its cardinal importance. But, if it is challenged, it can only be through the diversion of more and more of the Luftwaffe's strength from the Russian front. If Hitler has thought of this source of reinforce- ment, the development of the Russian offensives should deter him. Whether it will or not no one can determine, and the German officers who have been summoned into conference cannot help him on his terms. He is, in fact, facing a second front. It is not the only front that will be opened against him ; and that they can recognise even better than he.
Hitler has lost the initiative, and the advantage of interior lines under such a condition changes its loyalty and reverts to the Allies. Exterior lines offer a wide choice of points of attack, particularly when they are in the hands of a dominant sea-power. The most potent remaining weapon that may be used in restraint of the developing Allied initiative is the submarine. General Smuts was right to draw attention to this vital problem. Buildings are appar- ently still exceeding sinkings. It is impossible to say if the Allied shipbuilding, which is also exceeding the losses, is turning the balance. All that we can say is the position is far from being wholly discouraging. As regards the development of our initiative this is obvious, since some of the troops who landed in North Africa travelled 3,000 miles, and we know that the shipping we secured in North Africa is double what we lost. The new phase, then, marches well. It is Hitler who is now suffering from the effects of diver- sion ; and if the battle about Stalingrad should continue as it has begun, it might result in a victory that would resound throughout the world.
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