The Victor of Tsushima
Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea-power. By Edwin A. Falk. With a Foreword by Rear _Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U.S.N. (Longmans. 16s.) AnmutAL TOGO, the victor of Tsushima, died on May 30th, 1934, at the age of 86. He was born in the days when Japan was, by the deliberate policy of her rulers, completely cut off from contact with the outside world—except for the strictly limited commerce with the Chinese and Dutch at Nagasaki, when the construction of • ocean-going vessels was forbidden and Japanese subjects were prohibited from going abroad on pain of death if they returned. He was five years old when Commodore Perry came to Yedo Bay and opened Japan to foreign intercourse with the menace of his " black ships " ; at the age of 15 he took part in the defence of Kagoshima against the British squadron which bombarded the city in 1863. In'the year of his death Japan was the world's third naval Power and her Government, with an admiral as Prime Minister, resolved not to accept anything less than equality in tonnage of capital ships with England and the U.S.A. in a renewal of the Washington Naval Treaty. The life of. Togo thus covers the astonishing progress of the Japanese navy " from Perry to parity " (as the author of 'this book phrases it), and Togo himself was the winner of the biggest naval battle between Trafalgar and Jutland. It was fitting that his death should be followed by a complete biograPhy available for English readers; and Mr. Falk haS performed-this task with commendable thoroughness.
Though his style suffers from a somewhat unwise use of literary ornament—as when he speaks, referring to the anti-foreign outrages in Japan in the early 'sixties, of " the intermittent sereams'of the victims playing a melody against the counter- point of increasing waterfront activity "—the narrative never lacks zest, and the passages dealing with the actual naval campaigns are remarkable for their clear and simple' presentation of intricate tactics, the battle pictures being strikingly _ The author begins his book with a British liner passing Cape Trafalgar, homeward-bound from the Orient on a spring
day in 1871, and a dozen Japanese youths in native atthe gazing from the rail at the site of-Nelson's crowning victory. They had been sent to England: to learn the art of naval warfare which had enabled, the Western nations to work their will on Japan in the two preeedin;cleenties-- t'1.11,4t _wont' be admitted within the Lion's Organ Ism and find out what made it growl." Togo had experienced the effects of British naval gunnery in 1863 ; now he was to go to school with the ex-enemy - and discover the senet of his prowess. He served his British naval apprenticeship on the training ship ' Worcester,' where he was nicknamed " Johnny China- man," Japan having no separate identity in those days in the mind of the average Englishman. Years later, when the two countries were bound together
by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Togo was Commander- in-Chief of the Japanese navy in the war against Russia, Captain Smith, his teacher on the ' Worcester,' said of him : " He was not what you would call brilliant, but a great plodder, slow to learn, but very sure when he had learnt, and he wanted to learn everything ! " This appears to be
a very fair, summary of Togo's qualities. He was not a supreme tactician ; he was definitely outmanoeuvred in the
first stage of the battle of the Yellow Sea. His greatness as an admiral was due to a 'combination of thorough all- round professional competence with an outstanding capacity for leadership. He never forgot that he was the commander of an army of men trained to fight with guns from floating. platforms and not merely an official responsible for manipu- lating a number of very expensive and very fragile maritime machines. It was said in Japan that Togo " uses his sub ordinates as his own fingers." It was his belief in the para- mount importance of personal leadership in sea-fighting that led Togo to adhere so rigidly to the tactically unwise principle that the flagship must always be in the van. Togo's theory of war was summed up in his saying that " the way
to win a naval engagement is to strike hard a the right moment," and he held that it was the admiral's part not only to take the vital decision, but also to lead the way.
In the battle of Tsushima Togo certainly " struck hard.
at the right moment " ; he aimed not merely at victory, but at the annihilation of the enemy, and he achieved his purpose. The audacity he displayed on this occasion was in striking contrast to the extreme caution of his operations against the Russian Far Eastern fleet in the preceding year.
Togo had shown that he knew how to play for safety ;- it had been necessary to eliminate the Port Arthur squadron with the minimum of loss to the navy which must subse- quently meet the Baltic fleet as well, and Togo had performed this difficult task with great skill and patience. But on the afternoon of May 27th, 1905, the situation was different.
As Mr. Falk says : " Caution had been jettisoned. The fleet in sight was the enemy's last.". Togo boldly attacked a fleet which on paper was approximately equal to his own, and gained a complete victory, sinking or capturing all twelve ships of the Russian battle line without losing one from his own. It is impossible to read an account of this battle without asking what might have been the issue of
Jutland if Togo had been in --Jellicoe's place, and it is hard to resist the conclusion that he would not have turned away from the German destroyer attack,- but would have staked everything for the annihilation of. the German battle fleet. For at Jutland, as at Tsushima, " the fleet in sight was the
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