4 APRIL 1952, Page 4

Two Views of Trieste

It is hardly surprising that the term " blackmail " has entered into Yugoslav cominent on moves for an extension of Italian control over the city of Trieste. Within a fortnight of purely Italian riots in the 'city possible rewards to be given to the Italians are being canvassed. Should Italian troops be allowed to take over from the allied forces in Zone A ? Should Zone A be handed back to Italy forthwith ? Should the three-Power declaration of 1948 (by Britain, France and the United States) be implemented, and the whole of the Free Territory, Zones A and B, now go to Italy f.) The last suggestion, which comes from Italian sources, is largely academic, since the Yugoslav grip on Zone B is firm, and unlikely to be relaxed. But all three are likely to be mentioned at this week's talks in London between British, American and Italian representatives. It is easy to understand the growing Yugoslav resentment, for quite apart from the fact that the 1948 proposals could only be carried out at Yugoslav expense, no Yugoslav representative was invited to the London talks and even the news that the talks were to take place got to Belgrade very late. Not that Yugoslavia is without spot in this matter. The control exercised by Yugoslays over Zone B makes the term " Free Territory " look rather inappropriate. But in any case there is nothing to be gained by a situation in which the Italians are talking to the British' and American authorities in London and the Yugoslays are talking at them: There is no doubt that the British and American soldiers would be very glad to say farewell .to Trieste, and there is equally no doubt that to hand over control to the Italians in Zone A, leaving the line between the two Zones to harden with time, would be one way of doing it. But that would leave bitterness' on both sides and promote not stability but instability. At the moment it is difficult to see how the London talks can help the Western POwers to lay down this unwelcome burden. But Mr. Eden's statement that a solution to the whole Trieste problem could best be reached through direct halo-Yugoslav talks is undoubtedly reasonable.