BAILEY'S RATIONALE OF POLITICAL REPRE-

SENTATION.

THIS is a work that ought not only to be read, but studied, by' every one interested in the great problem it undertakes to solve— the Rationale of Political Representation, and hence in a measure the Philosophy of Gavernment. To say that it originates the theory of representation, or exhausts the question of government, would be incorrect ; but it may truly be asserted that it is one of the most able treatises on the science of politics which has ap- peared for many a day. The general views are sound, sensible, and well-considered ; the arrangement of the matter orderly ; the exposition most lucid ; and the style so equable, so clear, and so fitted to the subject, that with many readers its merit will be disregarded because that merit is of the highest kind. The author himself has most happily described it in the following sentence, which he applies to arrangement—" Language, like light, is a medium; and the true philosophical style, like light from a nortit window, exhibits objects clearly and distinctly, without attracting attention to itself."

Before entering upon the perusal of the Rationale of' Political Representation, the reader should bear two points in mind. First, that the work is not an essay, written with any temporary object, or to notice any single point of the subject; but that it is a philo- sophical treatise, dealing with Representation in its full extent, and la) ing down laws for its theoretical perfection. hence the author advances doctrines which may be thought either too abstract, or al- together impolitic if tested by present circumstances. Titus, he ad- vocates the payment of Members; and is opposed to pledges, to Members undertaking to resign their seats, or to active demonstra- tions on the part of electors with a view of swa) nig representatives, as well as to the dissolving power of the Executive. Second, that the author does not profess to make new discoveries, but to examine whether certain opinions are true or false, and to lay down a princi-

ple by which to try their truth or falsehood. Arguments—as upon the Ballot—are not therefore rejected merely because they have beet& used before ; for the work of necessity contains many floating opi-

nions, some new conclusions, and many disputed ones. In short, its novelty is in its principles, not in its details ; and its claim to originality rests upon its character as a whole, and not upon the merits of its parts.

Thus much for the general character—let us next come to the contents of the book. After an exposition of the subject and of the manner in which he intends to treat it, the author takes a general view of the proper object and province of government. The proper object of government he holds to be the good of the community; its proper province, "to promote the happiness of the community associated under it, by such measures as cannot be undertaken by individuals or subordinate associations for themselves, or cannot be undertaken with equal advantage ;" amongst which may be mentioned, the administration of justice, and the management of foreign affairs. He also determines, that although government has extensive powers for evil, its capabilities of doing good are very limited—confined, indeed, to preventing evils, rather than creating happiness.

When the two circumstances in the nature of government which have now been pointed out are considered together, when we recollect that in the main the power of the state in its effect-9 on human happiness is supplemental and preventive of evil, rather than primary and creative of good, we shall at once see that nothing can be more unfounded than the large share which has been attributed to governments in the prosperity of nations. It is an error of the same nature as that which should regard the natural mut healthy play of the oigans of the body as owing to thephysician. National prosperity is really, in all cases, the result of the principles of human nature operating in each individual in his private career, and the mistake of ascribing it to any other source has evidently arisen from the power of governments to mar what they cannot make. In the province of doing evil they arc indeed almost omni- potent. There is no limit but the insurgent spirit of outraged humanity to their power of preventing happiness and inflicting misery; and this power' has been amply exercised, both by despotic selfishness and mischievous, because ignorant, benevolence. By almost all the governments which have yet existed, this tremendous capacity for inflicting evil has been largely exhibited. It is no exaggeration to say that the prevention of attainable enjoyments, and the creation of positive wretchedness, have been their common, systematic course; and when in any country a departure from this course has taken place, when there has been a cessation of activity in creating evil, a withdrawal of the in- terference of authority with the sources of individual happiness, an all. atinence from mischievous meddling, the good effects which have resulted, the industry, the enterprise, the wealth, the civilization, the spirit of inquiry, the intelligence the morality, which have almost immediately sprung. up, have been placed' to the credit of the supreme power of the elate; when in fact the whole merit of government consisted, not in the active production of these i good fruits, but n the wisdom of giving the principles of human nature fairer play and further room for development. -" Mr. Glenville (says Burke) thought better of the wisdom and power of human legislation than in truth it deserves. He conceived, and many conceived along with him, that the flourish:- lag trade of this country was greatly owing to law and institution, and not quite so much to liberty ; for but too many are apt to believe regulation to be com- merce, and taxes to be revenue." The delusion respecting the wisdom and 'power of human legislation is not

• Speech on American Taxation. yet eliminated : there are still too many from whom the truth is hid, that the great fountains of the prosperity- and happiness of nations must ever be the prin- ciples of human natute, spontaneously guiding the actions of individuals to their own and the general good; end that the most which the supreme authority can beneficially do, is to remove obstructions, and to regulate the conflicting play of these principles when they do not adequately supply their own cheeks.

Dismissing the question of the proper object and province of government, Mr. BAILEY next proceeds to inquire by what means they may be best secured; which he holds to be the only test of forms of government. The passage in which he maintains this doctrine, and unfolds the germ of the argument by which he pro- ceeds to establish why a representative government is to be pre- ferred, is so able, that we will quwe it at length. It will be useful to smatterers of both extremes, whether mob or courtiers.

Could it be shown that irrespomible power, lodged in the hands of a single individual, is productive of greater good to the community than any other description of authority, every wise man would be its supporter and advocate. On the same principle, ciple, could t be moved that such an arrangement, as placed power in the hands of an inconsiderable number of petsone, who were not to be accountable ffon. the use which they made of it is recommended by a superiority in Ineleficial results over every. other political system, a wise nation would not hesitate to adopt it. It would be no valid objection that it is unjust to give one man irresponsible power over his fellows, cr a number of men un- controlled authority over the rest. On the supposition (improbable, perhaps,) that the welfare of the whole community could be promoted, by conferring on half of the people greater privileges than on the other half, it would be wise to do so; for to act differently, would be to sacrifice the common happiness to an empty regard for equality.

This then is to be the universal in iterion in matters of public concern, the test of forms of government, as well as of particular plans of representation, and of laws emanating front the constituted authorities. We are not to be decided in our choice by the circumstance of a political system conferring equal privileges, or by that of its bestowing them on some descriptions of people, and withholding them from others. Whatever is the arrangement submitted to our option, it is to he preferred, on proof being adduced, that notwithstanding all its inequalities and partialities, it ie, on the whole, the best for the community.

This view of the subject relieves us from all the vague declamation about natural and inalienable rights, which has become the conventional language of almost all people struggling against the encroachments of power. It is a natural right (says one) that every man of mature age and bound mind shall have a voice in the government of the country, and not be subjected to arbitrary rule. It is an inalienable right belonging to all men (exclaims another) that they shall not be taxed without being represented. Now a natural and inalienable right, whatever these terms may imply in the minds of those who use them, is one, the exercise of which, if it is not of a neutral character (that is to say, of no importance), is either beneficial or in- jurious to the community. If the enjoyment of it is beneficial, the right will be left undisturbed, should it be already existing, and will be conferred, if not existing, on the princ;ple of utility here maintained. If, on the other hand, the privilege or mode of action is injurious to the community, of what conse- quence is it that it can he dignified by the name of natural right ? For a

i nation to insist on the privilege of acting n some particular manner inconsistent with its own welfare, or in other words, on the right of doing itself harm, would be folly. Whether, therefore, a country should have a representative gnvernment, whether every man of sound mind and mature age should have a voice in the election of the legislature, whether no one should be taxed without being repreented ; and, on the other hand, whether supreme and irresponsible power eliould be lodged in the bands of a monarch, to govern and tax kis sub- jects at Ids own discretion, are points to be determined by the effects of these several arrangements on the public welfare, and not by a vague affirmation that certain specified privileges, anodes of action, or forms of government, are natural and inalienable rights,—language which, when it is closely examined, will prove destitute of any precise meaning. According to the doctrine here advocated, if a representative government is to be preferred to all other kinds, it must be on the ground that it conduces to the good of the community more effectually than any other. That it is fully entitled to a preference for this reason, will not require any long deduction to prove.

It is a principle of human nature, that men will, in the majority of cases, pre- fer their own interests to that of others, when the two are placed in competition. An individual who possesses uncontrolled authority over his fellow men will, in the long run, or in the general tenor of his conduct, make his own pleasure and advantage Ids first object, whatever may be the consequences to his subjects. The happiness of those who are below him will be a secondary consideration, and will be compelled to give way to his own, whenever one interferes with the other. It will be the same with a body of men, however small or however

numerous. All will use the uncontrolled p is which they may possess for their own advantage, where there is a competition of interests.t It s vain to bring instances of disinterested men; of despotic rulers who have conscientiously Wielded their power for the good of their subjects ; of oligarchies that have had 13o other end in view than the happiness of the community over winch they pre- sided. In all these cases the question is not what are the occasional, but what are the usual and ordinary consequences. You might as well contest the law of political economy, which affirms that men will resort to the cheapest market, on the plea that there are benevolent individuals who frequent dear shops, and pay high prices to destitute widows and broken-down tradesmen from motives of charity. Such anomalies cannot disturb the general result; and to wise men, the general result of a combination of circumstances presents as decided a rule of conduct as if it were an invariable effect. Having thus cleared the ground, he proceeds in the same com- prehensive spirit, though the more limited nature of the subject may appear to narrow his view, to discuss and exhaust the questions more directly connected with representation. In effect- ing this, he considers the representative body in its character as a supreme legislative assembly, and in the relations it bears to its constituents, as well as in such more practical matters as the dura- tion of the trust, the number of persons the legislature should consist of, the publicity of-the proceedings, and the process of legislation or working of the House. In a similar spirit, he looks at the electoral body as to its constitution, its divisions into sepa- rate constituencies, and in the relation in which the electors stand to the community. A chapter on Elections, wherein he treats of the process of taking votes, and on the general conduct of candidates, constituents, and people, during the progress of an election, termi- nates this branch of the treatise. A chapter on the introduction of Changes in Political Institutions concludes the Rationale, and ^ All men (says Burke) possessed of an uncontrolled discretionary power, leading to the aggrandizement aud profit of their own budy, have always abused it." - Thoughts VS the .Preseat Dixon:ma&

forms perhaps one of the most valuable, or at all events the most comprehensive and interesting section of the whole. At this time, it possesses an additional interest from the nature of its subject, and deserves to be read with attention by all, but more especially by those two classes who would obstinately resist all reform, or who would rashly change for the sake of changing.

It is scarcely necessary to say, that in speaking of this work we have spoken generally, without binding ourselves to agree with every conclusion, or to swear in the words of the master. For instance, in his argument on the subject of pledges, he has drawn no distinction between practical questions depending in a measure upon facts yet unknown, or upon circumstances con- stantly changing—which is mostly the case with foreign policy ;. or questions whose decision must be settled by expediency or comprotnise—of which nature are matters of commerce and finance; and questions of principle, whose truth is finally settled—. such as those he himself instances, the Ballot and Triennial Parliaments. In the last case, there is no real distinction top an honourable man between an exoposition of opinion and a pledge. In the former cases, pledges are only required by ignorance, as they are only offered by ignorance or by fraud—the Malt-tax, for example.

It must not, however. be concluded from our summary of con- tents, that the work is only an exposition of abstract points. The writer borrows his illustrations from history or present politics; and discusses general questions with a present appli- cability and a homeness of effect which show that his eyes are open to passing characters, events, and subjects. Here are two.. illustrative specimens, the last of which contains a very neat defi- nition cf the elements of an ELLENBOROUGli.

TIIE USES OF DEBATE.

The peculiar advantages of oral discussion are, that from the number and variety of minds simultaneously handling the subject, it is rapidly turned on all sides arid scrutinized in every part ; and secondly, that a state of clear. sighted-

ness is preduced in the understanding which is be1110111 to be purposely created, and is only the occasional visitant of the closet. In the process of debate, the doubt which hung over the mind clears away, the information wanting alai searched for in vain is supplied, the absurdity before unnoticed is made palpable, the fond conceit blown up by some partial experience melts into air, tile atten- tion is animated, and the perception sharpened by the alternate exposztien and reply, attack and defence. It can hardly be questioned, that if a. number of men, with adequate information, come together, and freely discues a subject to the best of their ability, they will arrive at a truer conclusion than the same men could attain, in the same time, by any other means.

It is no valid objection to this to allege that the discussions of public aesemblies are often narrow and superficial, compared with the contemporary speculations of the philosopher in his closet. This is not owing to any thing in the nature of the process, but to the fleer't CV of intelligence in the debatsre. The character of their debates will of course be determined by the character of their intelleet. It is true enough, that while Adam Smith was engaged in embodying his profound views of political science in the seclusion of his study, the iilemhers of the British Parliament were exhibiring a lamentable contrast of ignorance and error. lint we must recollect, that the philosophers who are really profounder than their contemporaries in active life are few, and that their profmulity does not proceed from the solitary prosecution of their inquiries ; although the solitariness of their path may frequently be the necessary result of their going beyond others. There could be no question, that if they could meet in discussion with men equal to themselves, capable of entering into their views and contending with their doctrines, their speculations would be immensely improved. It is to lie particularly observed, that there is no incompatibility between the two practices of private study and debate; but that they in fact mutually assist each other where they can be united. Private study gives profundity to discussion ; dis- cussion gives life impulse, direction, energy, to private study -' and men of pro- found minds would always gain by a free intercourse with their equals. As it is, the arguments and replies of philosophers Isbour after each other at compara- Lively wide intervals. Closet controversialists, shackled by that intervention of space and time which oral discussion annihilates, make tardy progress. Tim discussion of subjects in this way, is to the quick reciprocation of personal debate, what a game of chess by letter between competitors on the opposite choirs of the Atlantic is to the more rapid contest across a table.

TIIE RATIONALE OF SPEARING.

There seems to be an inveterate impression on the public mind, that the essence of statesmanship consists in the faculty of pouring forth an unlimited tor- rent of words ; that he is the wisest and greatest politician who is the readiest, the most prolix, and most dextrous debater. Nothing can well be more erroneous than this conclusion. Speaking in public- is a habit, and there are few men, wise or unwise, who could not become ready speakers by practice. It is true, that amongst men equally trained and accus- tomed to the public expression of their opinions, a difference in point of fluency may generally be observed : some possess the faculty in an extraordinary degree,. while others are as remarkably deficient in it ; but if we examine into the qua- lities of mind which are the causes of this difference, we shall probably discover nothing to establish a connexion between soundness of judgment and fluency of

speed,.

Facility of expression appears to depend very much on the predominant mode in which the ideas are associated. If an individual's thoughts are principally connected together by circumstances of time and place and superficial resem- blance, by those casual ties, in a word, which usually prevail in the mental trains of people little accustomed to reflection, lie possesses within hiniself the chief elements of a great talker. One idea perpetually suggests another, and as they all seem equally dependent, and there is no reference to any particular point on which the whole soles is to be brought to bear, or stall events a very loose reference, no cause exists why the speaker should terminate his oration, except what the impatience of his audience supplies; or except, perhaps, the failure of his own physical strength. On the other hand, if a speaker's ideas on any sub- ject rise n his mind because they are logically dependent, because they are strictly connected with the question before him, they are self-circumscribed within determinate bounds; a few words will frequently be sufficient to present them to the hearer ; and as every thought will have a bearing ea the conclusion intended to be proved, the process will naturally be biief.

Affixed to the Rationale of Representation, are two brief but able essays; one on Rights, the other on Equality. The general aim of each is to carry out the principle formerly laid down, that as the good of the community is the object of government,, utility is the sole test to determine either what is a right of man or how far political equality should be maintained.