W E are still unable to believe that peace in the
Far East is near at hand. The Japanese have triumphed in the campaign, but not necessarily in the war. The courage of the Russians, and. their readiness to sacrifice themselves, which are probably quite equal to those of the Japanese, though they do not seem so because they arouse no sentiment of surprise, have not availed to compensate for the inferior quality of their leaders, and for this cam- paign at least the huge Empire, in spite of its endless resources, must be pronounced decisively beaten. The re- sistance of Port Arthur has been heroic, more so than that of Sebastopol, which was not so far from the centres of Russian strength, and was not assailed by so modern an artillery ; but it is obvious that the great fortress, if it has not, as some rumours intimate, already fallen, must very speedily fall. The Japanese draw closer and closer to its last defences with a slow scientific persistence of purpose which makes them even more formidable than their wonderful con- tempt of death ; while every day as it passes leaves the defenders fewer, more exhausted, and, if they are like any other human beings, more in despair of ultimate success. The sea can bring them nothing; there is no aid coming to them by land; there is nothing to do but die, and the deaths of them all will not even help to keep the Japanese out. The Japanese can die too, and. will in any numbers needful to secure their ruler's purpose. The fate of Port Arthur may be considered sealed, and the terrible losses in human life which its capture will have involved make no difference to the result. Japan, with her fighting classes still unexhausted, and her conscription still working like a machine, can afford even heavier losses than those. On land, also, fate has been unpropitious to the Russians. Even if General Kuropatkin is not surrounded, which is the hope of the Japanese Generals, and, we take it, the objective of their long-drawn plans, he is still being slowly beaten back by hard fighting towards the frontier of the province he was sent to defend.; and that is defeat, even if the motive of continuous retreat can be explained. A great army does not fly before an enemy out of policy alone, nor does a General drop brigades before his foes as the Russian mother dropped. her children before the wolves. It is just possible that the tremendous battle now raging round Liaoyang may result in a "draw"; but even then General Kuropatkin must retreat in order to gather up his full strength, now slowly dropping in from Western Russia, and. prepare with new resources for a second, and possibly greater, effort. Russia has lost this campaign, that is the history briefly stated, and the pressing ques- tion for observers is whether she will fight another.
We believe that she will, subject always to the condition that there is no general internal revolt. Such an occur- rence is possible if the peasantry have ceased to fear a beaten Government, or are convinced that the war will drain them of too much of their strength, and if the soldiery are unwilling to put insurrection down ; but it seems to us most improbable. Very few Russians realise what the loss of sea-power means, and fewer still are fully convinced that it has been lost. There has been no invasion, no capture of any ancient Russian city, nothing to enable an unusually ignorant population to see the war. They feel the draft made on them by the summons to the Reserves, and they are disturbed by rumours that Holy Russia is not crushing her enemies with her usual com- pleteness; but there has been no disaster sufficiently visible to destroy the mingled fear and respect felt for the authority of the Czar, or to induce the people to run the terrible risks involved in any insurrection not supported by the soldiery. So long as there is obedience the governing group in St. Petersburg can go on with the war if it will ; and its material resources, except at sea, are not yet worn out, or even seriously affected. Even if the Russians have lost in the campaign two hundred thousand men through the hardships of transport, the outbursts of sickness, and the deaths in actual fighting, these losses will soon be replaced by the con- scription, more especially as most of the dead belonged to the Asiatic side of the vast Empire. The losses of officers, ended. which have been frightful, are already made up, according to the most recent telegrams, by wholesale promotions of the non-commissioned, who in an immense number of cases are probably better qualified for the hard work of the campaign than the men of the upper classes who become soldiers. They will at least be careless whether luxuries are obtainable or not. Better artillery, better powder, better munitions altogether, are all procurable for money ; and the idea that the wealth of Russia has been exhausted in a single campaign of six months is positively inept. The Treasury must provide for the interest on the Debt, and for all that is purchased abroad ; but it has reserves of gold to meet those necessities, and everything procurable at home can be paid for in paper, to be redeemed on the conclusion of the war. There are plenty of resources for a second campaign, and the great Russians are, as we believe, determined to fight one. They have at least three sets of motives, any one of which would induce them to adopt that course. They are as proud of Russia as we are of Great Britain, and would feel ultimate defeat by an Asiatic Power as an inexpiable shame. They are firmly convinced that their defeat has been due to unpreparedness, mismanagement, and corruption, and. believe• that with a few months for reorganisation they can collect a mighty army, resume the offensive, and in the next campaign drive the Japanese into the sea. And. they feel, rather than see, that a shameful peace, especially if it included an indemnity, would be fatal to the autocracy ; that is, would, in their judgment, be the precursor of anarchy, and probably of dismember- ment. "The Romanoffs," said a Russian revolutionist to the writer one day, "and. the Romanoffs alone, hold. Russia together." They can at the worst only be defeated again, and the terms after a second defeat would for them scarcely be harder than after the first.
But, it is said, there is another possibility to be con- sidered,—that of intervention. The war, with its conse- quent panics produced by the fury of traders at the inter- ruptions to sea-borne commerce, is injuring the prosperity of Europe, and. the Powers therefore may be inclined to intervene. That is true ; but they may also be disinclined. to run the risk of rebuffs, or to make the great exertions which an intervention not confined to words would cer- tainly entail. Why should they make them ? In order to spare human life, or, as it is usually phrased, to stop the effusion of blood? That is a motive which has occa- sionally influenced individual Kings, but which has rarely or never deflected the action of great States. Is it that intervention will promote interests that are dear to them ? With the exception of France, which is excessively dis- inclined to disturb the general peace, the weakening of Russia relieves each of the Powers of a sort of nightmare. Great Britain ceases to fear for India, and Germany—the people at all events—ceases to apprehend. an invasion from two sides at once, each an invasion of half-a-million of men. Austria recovers her old position of safety in the Balkans, and. is relieved from the danger of a summons to support Germany in a war from which she could reap but little direct advantage. It is true that William IL may have hoped for Russian assistance in securing practical possession of• the province of Shantung, but -with the Russian defeat that hope must have died away. No peace that can be expected. would enable Russia to interfere in that quarter for the next ten years, or could. prevent China, with her soldiers trained by Japanese officers, from tightening her hold upon Shantung. America has been cured of her old sentimental friendship for Russia, and Italy, whatever her wishes, will not dream of acting alone. Only France is really concerned to main- tain Russia as she is, and France will not move without the consent of Great Britain, even to save her immense pecuniary stake in Russian solvency. The intervention, then, must be limited to words, and words would have no effect either upon Russia, which feels that the alternatives are victory or a complete upset of her existing system, or upon Japan, which regards intervention as a device for depriving her of the just rewards of her enormous sacrifices and her great success. The Powers will, we feel convinced, abstain from interference; and with the Powers abstaining, and Russia obedient to her rulers, there will, we predict, be no peace until another campaign, possibly bloodier even than the present, has been fought through and.
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