THE ARMY MANCEUVRES
By INIAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE, /*I-1HE first Army manceuvres held since the War have aroused more interest than any which the War Office has ever staged. This would probably have been the case in any circumstances, for we have to-day in our country a hundred men Who have some practical know- ledge of, and therefore interest in, military affairs to every one before 1914. But there were special features in these . manceuvres which many were curious to see: New weapons and new methods were to be tested on a considerable scale.- New types of tanks and armoured cars, tractor-drawn artillery, various forms of mechanical transport, aircraft in greater numbers than had been seen before, were all to be displayed, and there was to be an interesting experiment in manoeuvring infantry in omnibuses. The scheme of the manceuvres was so arranged as to make them a test of modern mechanical mobility as against the normal pre-War rate of military progress.' This more than sufficed to bring spectators in numbers to the manoeuvre area and to fill columns of the news- papers. - The commanders of the contending sides were well chosen. The leader of the smaller force, which was' equipped with the larger proportion of new 'appliances,. Sir Alec Godley, was, in old days; a protagonist of Mounted infantry and is a firm believer in mobility; the Aldershot training of Sir • Philip Chetwode was sure to display the old methods at their best. In the event Sir Alec Godley accomplished the not very difficult task 'set him trium- phantly and easily. - • His mission was . primarily defensive, and since, in manceuvres, the *slowest moving: arm, infantry, Chetwode's chief . arm, advances into battle with far greater speed and confidence than it does when the air is thick with bullets and shell, it is reasonable to assume that he Would have been even more successful had the war been real. - This does not mean that the advocates of mechanic- alization (a dreadful addition to the dictionary) have triumphed. There was little in the manceuvres to show. that Sir Alec would not have accomplished as Much had his superior mobility taken, still more than it actually did, the form of cavalry. • In October, 1914, German cavalry delayed the advance of Smith-Dorrien's second corps through Neuve Chapelle just as much as Godley delayed Chetwode. The fact is that our island is too small and too thickly populated to make it at all' easy to arrange tests of this nature. It requires a great deal of iniagin-; ation and ingenuity to bring a fast moving and a slow moving force into collision on ground where tanks and tractors will not do a great 'deal of costly damage. The event proved that the forces had been started too near together to make the test of the new mobility complete or fair.
The manteuvres opened :with. a -raid by a detached force consisting of cavalry, motor-drawn -artillery and infantry carried in - lorries -to secure the crossings over the Test at Whitchurek. The infantry started by night from Ludgcrshall, which is only some sixteen mileS from Whitchurch. Execrable Weather, . misleading in- formation and sonie failure of improvised means of communications caused delays, and the infantry . would probably have reached their goal as qukkly, if they marched -on their feet. Every trained soldier knows that the time required to entrain and detrain troops makes it quicker to march them for short distances than to send them by train. It would appear that this applies also to the movement' of infantry by: mechanical transport.; If the distance had been forty miles instead of sixteen the result would probably have been very different.
. Chetwode's infantry marched better under very trying conditions than did the infantry of 1914. In one respect only were they less tried than their pre- decessors. In old days bivouacking was the rule and bivouacking in a wet field in September was not pleasant. For these manceuvres it was the exception. The experi-. ence of the War has given the countryside a fellow- feeling' for the troops which did not exist to anything like the same extent when we last held Manoeuvres.- Somehow and in some way shelter was found for most of the men and the hospitality of the folk of Water]] Hampshire was without bounds. But these amenities do not alter the fact that the Aldershot infantry had to make -great efforts in rain, cold and mud and made them with complete success.
The advance made in 'skill in coneealment of eavalry, artillery and infantry, was very noteworthy, with the result that there was remarkably little that was spectacular in the nuthceuvres. -I am not sure that the effort to confine the lnanceuvres strictly to business was not overdone. There is something to be said for the old Continental practice of ending manceuvres in -a set piece. This does not teach the troops, or their officers, anything, but it provides the spectators with a show; and those who live in the inantenyre-area have suffered some inconvenience, -and many of then] have been put to some :expense. Young soldiers like the excitenient of a charge and of firing off blank aminu- nition, and it is Somewhat dispiriting to march night after night and then go home without even see. ing or having a shot at the other side. The manceuvres were stopped -presumably because the situation had become. artificial and there was nothing more to be learned from it, but the result was that the spectators on Grately Hill' went away feeling that something had gone wrong and that 'did not increase their respeet -for Army. Adminis"-. tration; The tanks were not numerous --enOugh to be' spectacular, and the one -show to interest others than' experts was provided by the Air force, which was daring, ubiquitous and indifferent to weather as We, expected it to be. One heard it said that the' airmen flew ton loW and in war would have been shot doWn in:. numbers; but anyone who has felt- the effect Of planes' swooping with machine guns frOm the 4cs, knows ',that they would not have been received so calmly. as they were in the Hampshire lands. The' experiment -of bringing 'a Territorial brigade to take its part with the regulars was' a complete success and should be continued in future and, if possible, on a larger scale. • - TO sum 'up, we learnt that the' training of the Army' on the- Old lines is to-day better than it has ever been, but ilt,e did not get a .complete and satisfactory answer to file questions: are we, to proceed More rapidly- with the Provision Of mechanical appliances; and, in particular,: are we to provide Motor transport for the infantry ?- Two brigades of our field artillery are tractor7draNin ;' are we sufficiently sure 'that, we have the best types to' justify us- in equipping the remainder in the same way ? Obviously there are grave inconVeniences in having: part of an army capable Of moving at three miles an hour and doing: twenty miles a day and another part moving at twelve miles an hour and doing' one hundred Miles in a day. Equally obvious -is' it- that mobility is of first iniportance to a snuill army 'such as ours. As: Sir William Ironside, the present head of the Staff College, has shown in his recent book on Tannenberg, it was superior mobility and training which enabled a small :German army under Hindenburg to defeat vastly larger but clumsy Russian forces. "In the next4ltrar," as he says, "success will go to that army which possesses the best mechanical and- destructive weapons, such as motor vehicles, aircraft, artillery and tractors, and which can make the best use of them, thereby economizing its man power." We have for peaceful purposes developed the motorbus and *lorry far more than any other country. and have reserves of material and manufacture to fall back upon which others do not possess. We have, therefore, every inducement to solve the problem of applying motor transport of all kinds to military purposes and the experiments of these manceuvres should be continued, but next time on a scale as regards space which will provide a more thorough test:
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