Tibet's Turn Chinese Communist forces of unknown strength have invaded
Tibet from the east and north-east, where the wide and sparsely populated districts of Chinghai and Sikang, though forming part of the Tibetan massif, have for many years been recognised as Chinese provinces and have in fact been under effective Chinese control. China's claim to the suzerainty of Tibet properâalthough, like her analogous claim to Burma, staunchly upheld by Chinese cartographersâ is roughly as well founded as would be a British claim to the suzerainty of France. Tibet, like France, las more than once in the past been subdued and plundered by her neighbour ; but there is no more than that to the de jure side of this wanton affair. The Chinese Communists, impelled by a blend of rapacity and nationalism which their visible excuses do nothing to disguise, are simply out to grab a large slice of tercitory which is weakly defended by its unworldly and inoffensive inhabitants. In this discreditable project they are likely to succeed. The Tibetans, though united in, their dislike of the Chinese, are not united among themselves, and in the Panchen Lamaâa puppet inherited by Peking from the Nationalistsâ the invaders have a strong card in the field of political warfare. On the other hand, though 'neither the training nor the equip- ment of the Tibetan forces qualify them to put up much resis- tance, the Chinese face administrative problems of great magnitude. To conduct a winter campaign at a mean altitude of somewhere between ten and fifteen thousand feet is not an easy matter ; and the aggressor, though he may hope to supplement his supplies by cattle-rustling and the occasional capture of a granary, will need to, carry not only all his food on pack animals, but all their fodder as well. The Chinese are often unpunctual ; and it seems probable thatâthough the consequences are unlikely to be so seriousâthey have made the same mistake that Napoleon and Hitler did of taking the field against General Winter later than was advisable.