Crisis in War
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SPEARS deals in this book with the first four months of the year 1917, when the Allies had the chance of harvesting the fruits of the battle of the Somme and, instead, lost them by a battle which brought France to the verge of disaster. From his position as liaison officer he was brought into constant contact with the main military actors in the drama, and he completes the story from a critical study of the documents and published writings. But this is no mere compilation. It is a brilliant and almost painfully living re- construction of a phase of the War which seems to run through the gamut of human emotions ; and it engages the interest so deeply, its moving quality is so profound, that almost it blinds one to the tremendous importance of the issues it raises. And it is difficult to resist a doubt whether this is a suitable moment for raising them.
The spring of 1917 covers the period in which the accepted strategy for the year's campaign was tried and failed. It saw the rise and fall of Nivelle, the replacement of the system of collaboration by one of subordination, and the substitution of grandiose for grand strategy. If English politicians preferred the Nivelle to the Joffre plans, who can blame them? They had no military training or second sight to see the deferred dividends of the Somme. They saw only its terrible casu- alties and the slowness of its pace. They divined by instinct the bungling tactics which were the cause of both. But Joffre was a casualty to French political intrigue, and Nivelle, whom he had designated as his successor in the conviction that even in his new position the Commander-in-Chief could be con- trolled, was a predestined spell-binder.
The British Prime Minister and the London that met him fell victim to his charms. joffre, who though not part of this picture overshadows it, had no small talk. Nivelle was only too ready to disclose over the dinner table his deepest thoughts, so that what should have been a closely-guarded secret soon came to be known to the people most interested, the Ger- mans. But long before that the Prime Minister had, at the Calais Conference, not only agreed to Nivelle's plan, but also to the subordination of Haig to the French Commander-in- Chief ; and even when, after the violent intervention of " Wully " (Sir William Robertson, the second vital figure in the book), the formula had been watered down, it left the position too delicately poised for permanence.
In his introduction Mr. Churchill attempts to offset the criticism of Mr. Lloyd George by introducing the facts of Russia's falling out of the War and America's entry into it. But both were subsequent to the Prime Minister's decision. If it be true that " the means for a successful offensive in 1917 did not exist," it is not particularly convincing to suggest that Nivelle's offensive was to be carried out by French troops, since the first proposals at Calais might have fatally involved the British Army in its failure. As it was, we suffered much in the sequel. It would seem more reasonable to conclude that the Prime Minister, not long in the saddle, had not then so experienced a hand on the reins. In the second phase of these delicate discussions it is clear that his action was much less open to criticism.
These problems are not directly posed by General Spears, but everywhere they pierce through his story. The relations of politicians and soldiers, and of soldiers of one race to those of an ally, are merely aspects of the human side of the War which dominates all mechanism and material ; and human nature, in times of crisis, reacts in a way that by normal standards is incalculable. In the strains set up by the War the strategy of an ally may be less objectionable than his stance or stature. Nivelle would consider no view but his own. He fascinated, but could not impose discipline on his own subordinates. But to the British Commander-in-Chief and his staff, tempera- mentally so different, all Nivelle's faults lay bare. His obsti- nate refusal to face the facts made them fear the worst—and, in the event, the worst happened.
General Spears' story has some of the atmosphere of great tragedy. The human actors, with their qualities, their errors and their malice, carry the spectator through the victory of Arras and the poignant scenes in the territory abandoned by the Germans to the climax in the follies, the terrors and the misery of the battle of the Aisne. It is an impressive canvas.
STRATEGICUS.