CHINA AND THE POWERS.*
I navz tried throughout," writes Mr. Thomson in his pre- face, "to present the Chinese view of the matters in dispute equally with that of the Powers." This is the dominant note of the book. The author is neither pro-Chinese nor pro- European. He has his partialities and his dislikes ; he is not always, we think, consistent with himself; some of his con- clusions seem to be doubtful, and some of his anticipations improbable ; but he is conspicuously candid and just. Taken as a whole, this is a highly valuable contribution to a question on which many words yet remain to be said.
Mr. Thomson begins with the causes of what may be called, for brevity, the "Boxer" outbreak. "It was," he writes, "essen- tially a national uprising, an endeavour to obtain freedom from a foreign interference which to the bulk of the people had always been utterly hateful." This hostile feeling had been recently accentuated. A succession of bad harvests had caused scarcity, and the people attributed the failure of the crops to the interference of railways and telegraphs with local deities or natural powers,—it seems absurd, yet there are partisans who argue as if British rule in India brought about the failure of the monsoon. Burial places had been disturbed by the construction of railways ; the disturbance was inevitable —given the railway—as graves are scattered everywhere, but it was not, therefore, less odious. A more easily intelligible grievance was the attitude taken up by the missionaries. They had denounced ancestor-worship, which, indeed, they could hardly help doing, if they were to preach the GospeL They were suspected of obtaining undue favour for their converts in the Law Courts. And one important section of them had certainly been guilty of a most impolitic usurpa- tion. The Roman Catholics, ever hankering after "temporal power," had extorted from the Chinese Government the con_ cession that their priests should rank as Mandarins and their Bishops as Governors of provinces. And there had been generally the consciousness, abundantly justified by what we know to have happened, that China was commonly regarded by the Western Powers as a happy hunting-ground for wealth-seekers, national and private. Extended markets and concessions were made pretexts for not a little oppression and scandalous robbery.
The outbreak was precipitated, taking place some months before the date—October 9th—which had for astrological reasons been fixed. On June 10th Admiral Seymour started to relieve the Legations in Pekin. Mr. Thomson fully acquits him of all blame. The demand for help was so urgent that it could not be neglected. He had to go, and he took the best way of going, though, in the light of the easy wisdom that comes after the event, his movement may be criticised. But Mr. Thomson finds grave fault with the capture of the Taku forte. "It was not," he says, "until the Allied Admirals sent to demand the surrender of the forts that the Chinese Government took any hostile steps." Here he seems inconsistent with himself, for he has told us that on June 4th—the Admirals' demand was made on the 16th- " General Nieh, who had been sent out ostensibly with orders to suppress the insurgents, was reprimanded by the Dowager- Empress because he had attacked and defeated the Boxers." It might have been prudent to deal with the Chinese autho- rities as if they meant peace—this was the line taken by the American Admiral—but the action of the Allies can scarcely be blamed. So much Mr. Thomson concedes (p. 30), but we cannot "recognise the difficulties in which the Chinese Government was placed" by this action. That Government was hostile—not without good reason, it may be—but did not want any driving into war. However this may be, after the fall of the forts the Chinese troops joined the "Boxers," and the Tientsin settlements were in the greatest danger. We
• Chintz and the Powers a Narrative of Me Outbreak of 1900. By H. C. Thomson. London: Longman/ and Co. [10s. 65. not.]
shall not attempt to epitomise Mr. Thomson's admirable story of the siege. For a time the European force was greatly outmatched. The Chinese had powerful batteries, some of the guns being of the most effective kind. Had they used them with energy, "expending without intermission the same quantity of ammunition that they actually fired during the period of the bombardment," nothing could have saved the settlements. Happily they could not make up their minds to do without dinner (12-2), and sleep (10 p.m.-4 a.m.), and the place was saved. But it was saved, "as it were, by fire." It is pleasant to read of the courage and skill shown by the besieged, especially by young officers put into places which they could hardly be expected to fill. We gladly repeat, after Mr. Thomson, the name of Mr. G. Gipps, midshipman of the ' Orlando,' who had charge of a gun at a very dangerous point, and worked it with "great coolness and ability." Then the tide turned. On July 13th the native city of Tientsin was bombarded. The fire was exceedingly hot, fifteen hundred shells being poured into the city by the British guns alone in the course of about eight hours, and the Chinese artillery made but a feeble reply, though when the assault was delivered they inflicted considerable loss on the Allies,—it is curious to read that they used smokeless powder, while some at least of our guns were served with the old- fashioned material. The critical period was when a narrow causeway had to be crossed in close order, and both the British and Japanese artillery had expended all their ammunition. But for the happy chance that one of the Hong-kong guns bad a few rounds left, disaster might have followed. When night fell the city had not fallen, and the troops had to stop where they were. Early in the morning the Japanese sappers blew in the outer city gate. (The electric wire that should have exploded the charge was cut by a bullet, but a gallant officer, K. Inawe by name, sprang forward and lighted it with a fuse.) The inner wall yet remained, but a " Jap." climbed it and opened the gate, and the city was taken. The Japanese had the chief honours of the day, suffering at the same time more severely than all the rest of the Allies,—five hundred out of a total loss of eight hundred.
Tientsin taken, there was a long delay before the advance jon Pekin was begun. A Council of War resolved that they must wait till sixty thousand men had been concentrated, and Ibis force could not be expected before the end of September. Happily the British and American commanders, aware of the critical position at Pekin, declared that they would, if necessary, advance by themselves. The Japanese gallantly hacked them up. Their contingent was the most numerous, and it bore the brunt of the fighting. This part of his narrative Mr. Thomson curtails, as the story has been told by others. He adds, however, some interesting details. An important testimony is borne to the value of khaki. "The Russians and the Japanese lost in several attacks far more than the British, who were alongside of them, and exposed to precisely the same fire, the difference in loss being attributed to the conspicuous colour of their uniforms." Japan, with characteristic promptitude, has determined to adopt khaki. Of the efficiency of their troops Mr. Thomson 1.118 the highest opinion. Indeed, he rates the strength and importance of the country very highly. "What is of most importance in the present situation is the sudden and unexpected rise of Japan both as a military and as a commercial force. It has indeed changed the whole balance of power in the East" ; and he adds, in language that has a curious significance in the light of recent events, "the sooner we can bring ourselves to recognise that, the better." We may see great dangers ahead when we look all round the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but it must be allowed that we should have been but ill pleased if any other European Power had slipped into our place.
A painful side of the subject remains to be noticed. To put the matter briefly, the conduct of the European troops during and after the campaign has not been such as to make the future more hopeful. The Russians occupy a bad pre- eminence. One of their worst acts was the destruction of two barge-loads of unarmed Chinese—they were coolies in the employ of a British company—who were stranded in the Pei-ho within range of their guns. These absolutely inoffensive creatures were slaughtered to a man. The Germans are Clescribed as having been "harsh and unrelenting, and their
conduct as individuals intolerably galling and oppressive." It was the German Government that proposed the destruc- tion of the Imperial tombs. "Nothing, no amount of provoca- tion, can excuse the terrible treatment of the Chinese women and children by certain of the Allied troops." We quote Mr. Thomson's own words. He says nothing more. But else- where be absolutely acquits our troops, both British and Indian, and the Japanese. They looted, as everybody looted, though the Japanese seem to have kept the national interest in view, but they were wholly free from other offences. We have no wish to particularise what Mr. Thomson leaves vague, but "certain of the Allied troops" does not mean either British or Japanese. It is a significant comment on the campaign of calumny which has been carried on against us in St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Paris.
It is a relief to turn from these horrors to the heroism, it is only right to say, the unexpected heroism, of the Chinese Christians. The missionaries frankly acknowledge that they had undervalued the courage and devotion of their converts. They had not "yet resisted unto blood," but when the trial came they did not fail under it. It is the one thing which we can regard with unmixed admiration in the whole story. There was much patient endurance and not a few deeds of brilliant valour by the men who fought their way up to Pekin ; but on the whole Europe comes with but little credit out of the Chinese War of 1900. The prospects of the future, even as regards our material interests, are gloomy indeed, except we can mend our ways. Mr. Thomson deserves the thanks of his country for his honest and courageous protest.
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