BOOKS OF THE DAY

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Peace with the Dictators ? (Prof. C. K. Webster) W. H. Auden (Frederic Prokosch)

The Life of Jules Cambon (E. L. Woodward) .. The War in Spain (Archibald Lyall) The Irish Countryman (Derek Verschoyle) 1016 More News from Austria (Douglas Reed) to18 Keepers and Poachers (Christopher Hobhouse) Imo War and the Christian

1020 Fiction (Kate O'Brien) 1022 The June Magazines

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1032

IS PEACE POSSIBLE ?

By PROFESSOR C. K. WEBSTER

SIR NORMAN ANGELL is one of the most successful publicists of our time because his writings are simple and sincere. He

clarifies great issues in lucid phrases and drives his points home by repeated variations on the same theme. His books also give the impression that they were written with an over- whelming conviction of the truth of their message. They have necessarily corresponding defects. Great simplification and deep conviction in the presentation of complicated situa- tions lead inevitably to statements and judgements which r2 too clear-cut to be true. Motives and theories are invented for those whose main defect is that they have never possessed any. The processes of thought of those who have betrayed the League, and thereby produced the precarious situation in which we now live, are not so absurd as Sir Norman paints them. Nor is the remedy quite so clear as he suggests. But the merciless indictment in this book of the vacillation and weakness of those in charge of British policy and the analysis of the great danger to which we are exposed are of the greatest value today.

Sir Norman is at his best when he describes the strange conduct of the Imperialist groups who have encouraged the Government to abandon so much of what was previously considered fundamental in British policy. He writes not only as an advocate of peace but also as a patriotic Englishman

and expresses his contempt in vivid and scorching phrases of which this is a fair sample :

" The tone adopted by the Rothermere Press against the Spanish Government could hardly be more violent if Spanish armies were in occupation of Kent ; while the same papers could hardly be more enthusiastic in their praise of the Hitlerite and Fascist Government(s) if the German or the Italian Press laws were operative in London."

He emphasises the supineness of their present attitude by contrasting it with that which the same groups adopted before 1914 towards Germany, surely far less a menace to the British Empire than the Germany of today. He shows their incon- sistency in attacking the League for " coercion " and advo- cating a policy of non-interference, while they acquiesce in and even applaud the coercion of China and Abyssinia and the most direct interference in the internal affairs of Spain by the Fascist States. This attitude he attributes to a dislike of the League because it limits British power as well as that of other countries and to a hatred of Communism so intense that it amounts to religious fervour. The result has been to render Britain powerless while the Fascist States have accumu- lated strength and prestige and strategic positions which may well determine the result of the conflict if it comes. Indeed, Sir Norman suggests that, even if armed conflict be avoided, such a policy must result in Britain being exposed to overwhelming pressure and eventually forced to accept a Fascist creed, imposed by a minority supported from outside, France having previously undergone the same fate. In any case, the situation has steadily deteriorated. Japan, he asserts, was easier to deal with in 1932 than in 1937, while Italy, established in Abyssinia and dominant in Spain, is a far greater menace than she was in 1935. Hitler with the Rhineland is far stronger than before he sent his troops across what we had already proclaimed to be " our " frontier.

In all this, it must be admitted there is some exaggeration. It is not true that by the possession of Abyssinia Mussolini is " getting near to controlling the Suez." It may well be

that Japan has brought about her own downfall by her adventure in China. But it is true that the attitude of the " Garvins and Bernard Shaws, big and little, who actually applauded his conquest," is a direct encouragement to Mussolini to take further risks. The Pacifists who tend to produce a similar

Peace with the •Dictators ? By Sir Norman Angell. (Hamish Hamilton. 7s. 6d.) effect Sir Norman treats more tenderly. He does not discuss the religious basis of their creed, but affirms that, though it is not wrong, it is impossible to apply under present con- ditions and would result in handing over the new generation to be trained in the very doctrines which Pacifists most abhor.

To those who assert that Britain must complete her rearma- ment before she can act with effect, Sir Norman replies that allies are just as important as armaments in a great conflict and that if we pursue our present policy we shall lose them all before it begins. We have already an alliance with France and presumably we would not reject the help of Russia if the conflict broke out. What he proposes therefore is to recreate the alliance which he admits the League had become. It is, however, different from the pre-War alliance because it is based on principle and open to all who accept its rules against the employment of violence. It can, indeed, only be justified, in his opinion, if its members agree to accept Third Party judgements in their disputes with other States.

This is the weakest part of his argument, for he nowhere defines accurately what he means by Third Party judgement. How, for example, is Third Party judgement to be applied to the claim of Germany for the return of her Colonies ? Legally she has no claim. Who is to assess a claim based on economic or moral grounds ? The only method that can be applied to such a problem is that of a negotiation between the interested parties. It is the old dilemma which is ignored in this book. But if the rest of the programme be carried out and it becomes clear that, the Fascist States cannot impose their will on Europe without meeting with a resistance which will at any rate overthrow their governments, their leaders naay well pause and consider whether negotiation will not after all suit them best.

It is a pity that so excellent a thesis is occasionally sup- ported by questionable history. The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine for example did not, as Sir Norman Angell seems to think it did, save Latin America from an attack by the Holy Alliance. More serious is his assertion that the Belgian question was of no importance in 1914. It was vital, for it brought about the unity of the British Cabinet and people and probably thus decided the issue of the War. Sir Norman would have done well to take this fact into consideration for it is just the lack of such unity that has paralysed British policy.

Nor does he consider the possibility of detaching Italy from Germany or Germany from Japan. He regards the Berlin- Rome axis and the anti-Comintern bloc as much stabler struc- tures than many good observers hold them to be. Many situations may arise which are entirely ignored in his analysis.

But the main argument of the book rings true. If the Fascist States are much weaker and much more embarrassed than Sir Norman assumes, they are so strong that they can only be prevented from imposing their will on Europe by common action which is based not on a common ideology but on a common attitude towards international affairs. Their right to govern their own territories by their own peculiar methods is not questioned. But when they use their armed forces to secure the dominance of minority parties in other countries, is not that "aggression" in every sense of the word ? If such practices are condoned, no country is safe.

A policy of resistance to armed force is in no sense an alter- native to that which the present Government professes of seeking friendship with all countries regardless of ideologies and endeavouring to reconcile potential enemies. On the contrary, it is its natural complement. Recent events would almost make it seem possible to believe that at the eleventh hour it may become the national policy. Non Angelli sed