SHOULD CYPRUS BE CEDED ? (To THE EDITOR OP THE
" SPECTATOR:1
Siu,—Although the recent attempt of the British Government to hand over Cyprus to the Greeks, to induce them to do what it was their duty and interest to do, was, fortunately for us, unsuccessful, there is no sort of guarantee that a similar effort will not bo made to get rid of a possession which has all along been regarded with special disfavour by a large political party, headed by the " Little Englanders." For it is manifest that the example of Heligoland —which one might have expected to provide an amply sufficient warning—has had little or no effect in teaching our adminis- trators the folly of parting with a station which in the hands of another and possibly hostile Power might become a serious impediment and menace to our naval or military operations. Suppose for a moment that, instead of Heligoland, we had ceded Cyprus to the Germans. What sort of a fortress would by this time have been made of the place ? And what sort of part would it be playing in respect of our communications by sea with Egypt and India and the Far East ? Port Said, at the entrance of the Suez Canal, is within about fifteen boars' sail of the nearest port in Cyprus ! And who can doubt that under German administration the island would have been converted into a stronghold far more formidable than Heligoland, while com- mercially and industrially it would be worth to them, at all events in peace time, more than twenty Heligolands ?
It seems, therefore, at this juncture incumbent upon every right-
minded Briton, who has personal and reliable knowledge of Cyprus, to sound as loud a note of warning as he can against any further endeavours to abandon it, and also to explain as clearly as he can what reasons there are for retaining it. Such reasons range themselves naturally under three main headings—the naval, the military, and the economic. As a base for operations in the whole Eastern part of the Mediterranean, the position of the island is unique, and obvious to the most sceptical if they will consult a common guide- book or encyclopaedia. From the lofty hills and mountains, rising in almost all parts of the island to a height of from a thousand feet near the sea to six thousand rather further inland, modern artillery could make the place impregnable, and afford protection to all war vessels which might come there for shelter or refitting. Close to Limasol, which is the nearest large town to Egypt, there is a largo salt-lake, literally within a few yards of the sea, which might be converted without any real engineering difficulties into a harbour capable of accommo- dating, if necessary, the whole Fleets of Great Britain, France, and Italy. Some expenditure would, of course, be necessary. But so it has been in the case of other strongholds. Neither Gibraltar nor Malta nor Aden has been made into a fortress without expense. And the money laid out in putting Cyprus into a properly defensive condition might be recouped very quickly by skilful utilization of its economic and industrial resources hereinafter to be mentioned.
In a military sense Cyprus is, to a Power situated as Great Britain, simply invaluable. It is the natural halfway halting-place betWeen the United Kingdom and all such countries as India and the Straits Settlementa. It would be an utter mistake to suppose that Egypt can serve that purpose. The dust, the glare, the absence of foliage and shade, the lack of sufficient vegetation, compare most unfavourably with the entirely different conditions in that island, which throughout the greater part of its history—until the foot of the Turk was planted there—was famed far and wide for its fertility and the amenity of its plains and forests. Both in summer—on the hills—and in winter— in the seaside resorts—the climate is ideal, and capable of recuperating the health and vigour of soldiers invalidated more or loss by a sojourti in tropical lands, or requiring a period of rest when transferred from stations in thfi torrid zone before confronting the rigours of an English winter.
The natural productiveness of the soil in Cyprus, and the potential wealth hidden in its- hills and in the waters which wash its shores, have been sadly neglected and injured during the long period of Otto- man misrule. Nor can it be said that during the thirty-five years of English administration as much has been done as might reasonably have been expected to rectify this mischief. But there is no sort of doubt that the Colony could easily be restored to its old pre-eminent position. The fertility of the soil is, as Whitaker declares, " proverbial " ; but the system of cultivation is deplorably primitive and inefficient. A very large quantity of wine and brandy is produced from the vines, which, however, are not at all scientifically or properly attended to by the native growers. But with a little encouragement—which has been conspicuous by its absence—wines of as good quality as the cheap wines from France could be imported from Cyprus to this country and sold at less than half the price. The same thing may be said of eggs and olives, sponges, and several other local products, which are seldom if ever seen or heard of here. As for silk, the quality of that produced in the island used to be universally admitted. But it has been entirely ousted from the English markets by that which is imported from Lyons ; so that the export of it, like that of the wine, has been steadily decreasing. Perhaps the most lamentable of the errors made in late years is the discouragement of the tobacco-planting industry in the island. Although Great Britain is singularly ill-off for colonies which can grow good tobacco, here is a place which appears to ba capable of producing and exporting a practically unlimited quantity of excellent leaf, which would supply a very large part of the enor- mous demand for home consumption of cigarettes, and pay a very handsome sum into the Exchequer, while the profit thus made by the islanders—and not by foreigners—would enable them to expend upon the development of their country that capital which is above all necessary for its prosperity. These are only a few of the considerations which can be urged in favour of retaining an island of which the value has of late years become so much more evident than before it was
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