Battles and Wars
By DARSIE GILLIE PARIS
PRESIDENT de Gaulle stepped onto the political stage on June 18 nineteen years ago with the assertion that to lose a battle is not to lose a war. The complement is obviously no less true: to win a battle or even a campaign is not to win a war. Perhaps the President may have this in mind, following the collapse of the railway strike threat after an order had been issued requisitioning the railwaymen to maintain an essential national service.
There is no doubt that once the situation had arisen the Government had to take some action. The railwaymen had decided on an eight-hour strike, to be followed at uncertain intervals by other eight-hour strikes. This was the tactic suggested by the Catholic union. The Communists had suggested a single twenty-four-hour strike, but this was rejected because it would have left the Government indifferent—a single day without transport is a minor inconvenience as compared with repeated shorter interruptions. The Socialist unions had suggested a series of two- or three- hour strikes. This was rejected as lacking in dignity and infuriating to the general public. A long strike was out of the question. The men, though irritated by a strong sense of injustice, were not ready for it. The eight-hour strike seemed practicable, dignified, weighty. It had one great weakness. It affected a single shift. This meant that the prosecutions for refusing to comply with the requisition order would not have to be spread too widely, especially as they could be aimed at the comparatively small number of men needed to keep the trains in movement. The trade unions had to with- draw but they did it with dignity, maintaining the united front of Communist, Socialist and Catholic organisations. There have been no public recriminations between the three.
Had the Government failed to act, both its main achievements would have been im- perilled—authority of the government, and stability of the economy, both of them much too new to be firmly established. It is only a month till we begin to go over to the new 'heavy franc' equal to a hundred of the old ones. This, it may be said, is mere shop- window dressing. But you cannot restore a pre-1914 franc twice over; and to fail in the first attempt would be to make any further attempt at stabilisation doubly difficult. The new franc is the outward sign of a great wager that the franc can become a hard currency— that the sacrifices called for six months ago can be made to yield worth-while results.
The immediate victory for the Government is therefore genuine. The question is whether the issue should ever have been alloWed to arise, in this form. From President de Gaulle's first return to the public scene last May it has been evident that his first preoccupation— avoiding civil war—was immediately followed by a second—avoiding being considered the leader of a purely Right-wing movement. This had happened to him, contrary to his intentions, when he launched his French People's Rally in 1947. From a Machiavellian point of view—apart from anything else—this would gravely hamper the President's plans. His aims are not those of the French Right, which he considers to have very little under- standing of what constitutes French greatness. He must be able to play off Right against Left—using the Right for support in main- taining a strong army and national dignity, the Left to pursue a policy capable of associating the people of Africa with France on a new basis. The Right already clearly distrusts the President, and is constantly trying to interpret his words and actions in a sense that he did not intend to give them.
The austerity policy launched last December was conceived in a way that led straight to the recent troubles. It is always difficult to be equitably austere. The complaints of the
business world and the farmers might sugges that the measures adopted in the last week 0 the year were pretty fairly allotted. Several of them certainly showed courage. But there were clearly sops to businessman thinking-- in particular, the one which made medicines payable by Health Insurance only after theT first three thousand francs. The wage freeze1 too, came when the pay of public servantsplii including most of the great nationalisekis? undertakings, had fallen seriously behind thoins in private industry. Above all, in spite 01Ad assurances of respect for trade union righ es,
these bodies felt that they were allowed ri criticise only after essential decisions h re been taken. This could be defended in view or the secrecy needed in an operation of whiapro devaluation was an organic part, and alstisf because the new regime wanted to di re courage lobbying. But as time went otiPhi nothing was done to restore the trade unionEn1 to a sense of their importance. bur
Finally, the manners of the Fifth Republithci are not always good. Last April the PriaMS Minister did not even answer the letter of thoftc Catholic railwaymen's union about longbart promised readjustments. The joint demand as s( the five organisations representing the railway:104 men was rejected very summarily, althouglitati this united front—a rare phenomenon-lo r should have been a warning. The Governmeratis( did, indeed, make two general concessions t T the working class at the beginning of thiub: month, abandoning the economy on medicines:-■ et and increasing family allowances by 10 peo it cent. But this was done belatedly, and aftelier there had been a devastatingly successful onekde
day strike on the Paris Mdtro. lave
The defeat of the railway strike is, thereforOne- a- success for the regime considered as a stroll 1\1 conservative government. But the unpop4st method used, that of requisition, will proiaTat a very grave handicap for the President hinProL self in his evident desire to establish a ver)°" different order. Is it really compatible with t$ right to strike? In his June 18 speech he liste3Thi the forms of greatness to which the neraP regime aspired, every one of them appealiffune to liberal or Left-wing ears—social prograirr in France, the community including to e African States and Madagascar; the politicin" economic and social transformation of Algerilhe European unity, of which the co-operatit3th within the Six was only a beginning; help b?ilin.
f w ave
the favoured nations for the underdevelop Though few Frenchmen of the Right wo explicitly reject any of these, nearly all wo ave feel the lack of what they really wanted dIoli.c hear—something about the repression Hof' 'Anti-France', for instance. There is not eire0Te a reference to France's claim for a' betties status within NATO, and nothing at all abov ac Algeria remaining for ever a part of the Fredver State. The President is evidently trying tour, recover the waning confidence of the Left:Ten But, alas, how many of the Left will at tPtnT e moment feel that the President is talking ei_ them, and not at them ? flea.
Previous page
