The Riddle of Formosa
By JOHN RODGERS, MP 1-F those girls ever invaded the mainland, they I would get a resounding welcome,' a British journalist said to me as we sat watching the impressive military parade in Taipei on Formosa's `National Day.' He was referring to the Free Chinese Army's glamorous Women's Corps marching smartly by in their light blue peaked hats and traditional high-necked, close- fitting light blue jackets, with white split skirts, nylon stockings and black high-heeled shoes. When one thinks of the boiler suits worn by the Chinese Communist women, one can see his point. But the parade itself, which lasted two hours, was an impressive display of Chinese military training and discipline and American equipment. For the Nationalist armed force of 600,000 people is without doubt one of the biggest, fittest, youngest and best-equipped military organisa- tions not only in the Far East, but in the world.
To the forces drawn up before him, Generalis- simo Chiang Kai-shek reiterated the familiar view that the immutable policy of Nationalist China was to return to the mainland and that the invasion might begin `at any minute.' It was acclaimed with enthusiasm. But is it realistic to expect an army of 600,000 men, however well- equipped, that is based on a largely rural popula- tion of only eleven million, to take on Red China with its 700 million population? Was this really the intention of the Generalissimo or the Gimo as he is called in Formosa? Subsequent talks with his sons and with various Cabinet Ministers gave me a slightly different impression.
Several Ministers and generals did indeed repeat that the Kuomintang's unchanging policy is to return to the mainland, and that Taipei is merely the temporary capital of the Republic of China. They could not otherwise justify their presence in and control of Formosa. It is evident, too, that the growing acerbity of Soviet-Chinese relations has created a renewed optimism, a con- dition of euphoria even, in Taiwan. Although the Kuomintang at first believed the split between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung was a temporary disagreement, they are now convinced that the schism is deep and permanent, partly personal, partly historic, but fundamentally economic and strategic. They do not believe that the death or resignation of either Khrushchev or Mao is likely to heal the split between Moscow and Peking. The Kuomintang also believe rightly or wrongly that the undoubted mismanagement by the Com- munists on the mainland has left the Chinese people discontented, hungry and ripe for revolt.
This was the point made by General Chiang Ching-kuo, the elder son of President Chiang Kai-shek. He is responsible for the security services, guerrilla and sabotage operations on the mainland and the Veterans' organisation. Unlike his younger half-brother, Major General Wang, who is handsome, debonair and extrovert and who stresses that he is not interested in politics but is a simple soldier, General Chiang Ching-kuo is inscrutable, short of speech, incisive and very clever at not revealing more than he wishes. When asked if he thought the invasion might start at any minute, he replied that the question of when and how it should take place would require careful study. But the Moscow-Peking split might, he felt, encourage a spontaneous up- rising and the Kuomintang might be 'invited' back to the mainland. Without this uprising he was doubtful if the invasion would take place or succeed. The general stressed that they were still participating in a civil war and that they had no desire to involve other nations in this struggle. Nor had they any desire, as Mao had, to become a nuclear power. They welcomed the partial test- ban treaty and had already added their approval to it.
Unlike the `Gimo' and practically all the other leaders of the Kuomintang with whom, I spoke, Chiang Ching-kuo felt that while the breach be- tween Russia and Red China could only help the Free Chinese, this breach might well not be permanent. He admitted that an invasion of the mainland might bring the two countries together or else proyide an excuse for Russia to seize Manchuria and Sinkiang. When asked if he be- lieved there might be a possible secret deal with an anti-Mao Tse-tung party or with Russia her- self, he shrugged his shoulders and said he would doubt it, but he did not deny it. This attitude is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that the General was trained in Moscow, spent some time in a concentration camp in Russia, is married to a Russian wife and speaks Russian perfectly. After talking with the General for over two hours I came away with the feeling that the invasion of the mainland was a long way off. His views are of particular significance because in many quarters he is regarded as the most likely successor to his seventy-six-year-old father.
This question—`after Chiang-Kai-shek, what?' —is in the minds of all who are interested in the Far East. Is he, as has sometimes been made out, just a despot, the head of a tyrannical and even corrupt regime, which will collapse with his death? At seventy-six he is still extremely fit and youthful.
It is true that Formosa considers itself to be in a state of civil war, and this justifies the imposi- tion of martial rule with all it entails in the curb on free speech and the lack of free elections. When in 1949 the two million anti-Communists straggled across the sea from the mainland, they included the elected representatives of the Republic of China, who now meet rather mournfully in the National Assembly at Taipei. They still purport to represent the electorate of the various provinces on the mainland though many of their members are dead and cannot be replaced. Since Chiang- Kai-shek claims to be the President of the Republic of China, it follows that free elections cannot take place until his return to the main- land. Only local elections to the Provincial Assembly are allowed to take place. It is this claim to be the legitimate government of China with a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations that also makes recognition of Taiwan by those countries such as our own who have given de facto recognition to the Peking regime almost an impossibility.
Though we have not recognised the 'Free Republic of China,' in Taiwan we should not underestimate its achievements and its role. After the destruction and impoverishment of the war years, it has, with American aid, revitalised agriculture and encouraged industry. Its land reform programme has meant that within ten years 85 per cent of the farmers own their land, in exchange for a fixed proportion of their rice crop farmers are provided with fertilisers, irrigation schemes have gone ahead, the vast Shihmen reservoir is nearly completed. I visited several farms of my own choice. The holdings are small— five acres will support a whole family—they are intensively cultivated, chiefly with rice and sugar cane, but also with tea, fruit, vegetables and sweet potatoes, bamboo supplies greenstuff and also furniture, implements and fencing. Each holding carries a large stock of chickens, ducks and pigs, but no cows or goats. The farmhouses were well and painstakingly built of brick, the children strong and healthy and the tradi- tional pattern of Chinese family life is unbroken. It must be remembered, too, that the Generalis- simo's well-trained and well-equipped army is one of the great bastions against Communism in the Far East. Quemoy and Matsu with their impreg- nable fortifications lie only three or four miles from the Communist mainland. From them can be seen and forestalled any aggressive move on the part of the Communists; they are without doubt, to some degree, an insurance against Mao Tse-tung's dream of world domination. And Chiang Kai-shek must still be reckoned as an important factor in the Free World.
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