THE WRONG WAY AND THE RIGHT WAY
SO much will depend upon the relations between the Allies and Germany during the next few months that we must return to the subject of the continued occu- pation of Cologne. Our criticism will be concerned entirely with the manner of our staying on, for we do not deny that from every point of view, including that of Germany herself, it is desirable that we should stay for the present. As we pointed out last week, if we were to leave the Cologne area on January lOth the French com- munications would be exposed, and in order to safeguard them the' French would be sure to march in directly we went out. For the purposes of tranquillizing Europe we should then be worse off than ever. Germany herself would admit that. The Germans would rather have us than the French in Cologne. Further, so long as we and the French are simultaneously in Germany we have a greater hold over French conduct than we should have if we left. All this, indeed, is so patent to the German Government, that if we had asked them the plain question, " Do you wish us to stay in Cologne till August when the French will be due to evacuate the Ruhr ? " they would almost certainly have answered, " Yes."
If we had extracted that spontaneous and friendly " Yes " from Germany there would have been rio place for the tremendous anti-Allied campaign that is now going on in the German Press. It is essential that for every step we take along the road to a European settle- ment Germany should take an equal step with us. We must have her willing co-operation. Instead of securing German compliance the British Government put up Lord Curzon in the House of Lords to make a statement which set German nerves on edge and has destroyed part of the confidence which had been created by the successful inauguration of the Dawes Scheme.
Last Saturday the Ambassadors' Conference decided unanimously to give as the reason for continuing the occupation the fact that Germany had defaulted in the matter of disarmaments as required under the Treaty of Versailles. It will be said : " But surely you do not seriously mean to encourage Germany in defying the Allies ? The Treaty is explicit about the extent to which Germany must disarm. She has not made a genuine effort to fulfil her promises. On the contrary, she has thrown dust in the eyes of the Allies. She has obstructed their military inspectors. Why should we go out of our way to reward bad faith ? If we are going to conduct international relations on those lines we shall be admitting that contracts do not really matter, and we shall in fact consent to the very state of mind which was the cause of the Great War." We must explain that it is not any part of our business to excuse Germany or to deny that most of the accusations brought against her are true. Personally, we have always felt that the Germans are so doltish in their bearing towards other nations that they put themselves in the wrong whenever they possibly can by sheer stupidity—by the ungainly art of acting as their own enemies and of failing to make it easy for other people to make things easy for them.
In order to be quite clear on this point, let us narrate a few of the facts which we believe can be cited against Germany. We need not mention such things as hidden stores of arms, or aeroplane, gun and bomb factories which have escaped the cognizance of the German Government. We shall confine ourselves to what the German Government themselves may be held responsible for. In the Morning Post of Monday, General J. H. Morgan, who has served on the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, described some of his experiences. He pointed out that in the 1922 Budget provision was made for no fewer than 35,000 N.C.O.'s. This for an Army of which the nominal strength is 100,000 ! In the German Army Estimates for this year the number of N.C.O.'s budgeted for is 31,766. When the French occupied the Ruhr the regular Allied inspection broke down ; but since it has been resumed the German authorities have persistently refused access to the pay sheets, the only documents by which the inspectors could determine whether the Reichswehr is maintaining a huge cadre of instructors for the purpose of passing recruits rapidly through a training, and thus in effect building up an Army vastly greater than that permitted in the Treaty. The Germans, if they think that the suspicion of the Allies is unfair—the suspicion that they are creating a large short-term Army instead of a small long-term Army as prescribed by the Treaty—could easily put an end to it. They have preferred not to do so, and General Morgan's suspicions were confirmed by the fact that all the long-term soldiers whom he came across were N.C.O.'s and all the short-term soldiers were privates. Thus a masked Reserve is apparently being built up. Apart from the Reichswehr there are the so-called Security Police, who are police only---iin name. They are really second line troops who have received tactical training with the Reichswehr. At the same time, iu General Morgan's belief, the German military authorities arc keeping in touch with all officers who attend " refresher " courses with-the Reichswehr and are ready to be posted to new units at a moment's notice. In fine, the old German Officer Corps has not ceased to exist. As for the Staff College, which was supposed to have been suppressed under the Treaty, it has bobbed up in a new form. Special staff courses are provided for officers at the Headquarters of each Division. Since the work of the Inter-Allied Com-- mission was resumed lists of officers receiving staff instruction have been uniformly refused. We imagine that even if General Morgan is mistaken on certain points the report of the Commission as a whole will agree in sub-, stance with the facts stated in this Morning Post article.
All that in itself is a formidable arraignment, but it must be remembered that the German Government have been blackmailed continuously by the Nationalists, and even when they have purchased the right to political existence they have never dared to say boo very loudly to the military geese who surround them. If they had been less stupid, no doubt, they would have been bolder, necause when it became clear that nobody had a practical alternative to the Dawes Scheme the position of any Government committed to that scheme was always a good deal safer than it seemed. The German rulers would indeed do well to remember that though Great • Britain earnestly desires to see a final -and peaceful settle- ment of European affairs, the triangular puzzle which Great Britain; France and Germany are trying to solve will never in fact be solved unless Germany helps to make a solution possible. It must not be supposed that because we criticize our own hand in the game we absolve Germany.
As for what we ought to have done ourselves, we hold that the action of our Government should have been con- ditioned by the fact that the French occupation of the Ruhr was illegal, and was definitely stated to be se by successive British Governments. We-want to see created in Germany a peace-feeling—not a war-feeling. The psychological aspect of the problem is the most important of all. Even when we have admitted that the-accusations of the Allied Commission are substantially true, can we really think that Germany, even with her illicit accretions of military power, is an enemy to be feared ? At present by comparison with the heavily armed nations which surround her she is helpless. We must not, of course, forget that she may desire a war of revenge, and may yet build up a great new Army in order to carry out her designs. But what is most likely to make such a desire become real and active ? Surely the feeling among the German people that they are faced by implacable enemies who will hold them down so long as Germany remains weak.
By omitting to explain British motives clearly to Ger- many, and by simply citing the military default of Germany as our reason for sittingtight at Cologne, our Government have made it possible for the Germans to say that we intend an indefinite occupation, and that we shall always find some fresh excuse for staying on. Moreover, we have given them a pretext for pointing out that, though France suffered no kind of punishment for her breach of the Treaty in occupying the Ruhr, Germany (being weak) is to be punished for her breath of the Treaty. We ought to deprive Germany—which we can really afford to do in the light of her present helplessness—of any incentive to re-create her war-mind instead of making her a present of an evil incentive. Otherwise, she will be tempted to do what the German States did after their shattering defeat at Jena. On an increasing scale she will go on passing short-service men through the cadres and establishing a huge Army while nominally she has only a.small one. The end of such a policy is certain—Europe will never settle down.
And in whose name will such a disaster be brought about ? It will be in the name of Security. As though security could ever be attained by trying to sit on the heads of seventy million people ! If France retains the friendship and respect of America and Great Britain she is safe. That is her true security. What is the use of pursuing the shadow and abandoning the substance ? The assertion that the whole of the Treaty must be respected has- already become absurd. The Dawes Scheme itself is a large • modification of the Treaty—yet that has been accepted by every sensible man in France.
What has been done cannot now be undone. But muck of the mistake in psychological tactics may be retrieved' if we accept the good offices which America seems half willing to offer, and aim at a compromise by which a date will be fixed for the withdrawal of both the French and British troops.
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