A Softening of Contours
By ANTHONY HARTLEY
Now that the American Government has been rescued from the decrepitude into which it had fallen during the last years of the Eisenhower administration, renewed noises about some kind of Russo-American negotiation are beginning to be heard on both sides of the Atlantic. And, given the desirability of such a negotiation, it is worth devoting a little time to answering two preliminary questions about it. The first of these is: is Khrushchev sincere? Is something changed since the death of Stalin? Or is talk of agreement a blind designed to cover Communist expansion?
' The immediate objective of Mr. Khrushchev's policy appears to be a meeting with President Kennedy; this follows logically from his efforts over the last two years to bring about a summit conference. To this end he has now made a number of conciliatory gestures: the release of the American airmen from the RB47, the less-publicised signature of the Russian-West German trade agreement, favourable references in the Soviet press to the new American adminis- tration and so forth. He possibly has a genuine desire for a slackening of international tension —either from fear of a nuclear war or else from a wish to devote more resources to the raising of the Soviet standard of living and less to the manufacture of armaments. He also would like to impress the world in general and the uncom-. mated countries in particular with the peaceful- ness of Soviet intentions. And he needs to score some kind of success in direct negotiation with the Americans. Since his policy almost certainly meets with opposition within Soviet governing circles, not to mention the objections to it on the part of the Chinese, he is likely to be keen that it should appear to pay off relatively quickly —either in terms of a relaxation of international' tension or in terms of some tangible gain. And his eagerness for a speedy summit meeting may also be explained by his evident confidence in his own ability at negotiation.
The first of these considerations—a desire for a slackening of tension—must be important to him, if only because it is easier for a Soviet statesman to advocate a tough line. The most reasonable explanation of Mr. Khrushchev's anger at the U2 episode is that, having taken something of a political risk in his softer atti- tude towards the Americans, he felt that he had been made to look foolish and had been reck- lessly exposed to the criticism of possible rivals. This seems to indicate a certain degree of sin- cerity—a sincerity which, it should be noted, 'I repeat—inspection and control. . . does not exclude his regarding negotiations as being primarily in aid of the Soviet Union's Political advantage; an attitude which will be easier to cope with in the long run than a crusading Communism, but will also gather many more short-term successes.
.Given the probability of Soviet sincerity in wishing for top-level negotiations, what would the negotiations be about?
It is at any rate clear what they would not be about. Mr. Khrushchev is not prepared to surrender the considerable start which world Communism and anti-colonialism give him in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Nor is this merely bloodymindedness. Whether the story that British statesmen tried to get from him a recognition of Britain's 'special position' in the Middle East is true or not, this is precisely the kind of arrangement that any Russian negotiator would be mad to make. Quite apart from the Immediate utility of possessing a faction of de- voted supporters in every country in the world, the USSR could not take the risk of being super- seded by China at the head of the international Communist movement. Nor, for that matter, would it be particularly useful for anyone if this happened.
On the other hand, for precisely opposite reasons Mr. Khrushchev would probably like settlement on Berlin to which the American Government cannot agree. The West's weak spot Is colonies and resentful ex-colonies; that of Russia is the East European satellites. The key- stone of the system (an excessively shaky key- Stone) is Herr Ulbricht's East Germany, which the existence of a Western island in Berlin renders even more vulnerable than it would Otherwise be. And, just as Russia cannot aban- don its potential sgurces of strength in the under- developed countries, so it is impossible for America to undermine NATO by giving way en Berlin.
Any talks between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev seem likely to deal with dis- armament and with what might be called 'bases and spheres of influence'--a phrase which can Cover many detailed crises in international affairs today. Progress on the disarmament issue de- pends either on the devising of an effective System of control or on the establishment of mutual trust between the contracting parties. Since the possibility, of a system of control of thermonuclear stockpiles seems to be doubtful, and since such trust does not exist, we will have to wait some time before the present 'balance of fear' can be changed for anything better; but What could be achieved is the stopping of tests and agreed measures to prevent the possibility of either side starting a nuclear war by accident. This would probably go some way to meeting that rather paranoid desire for security which appears to preside over much Russian thinking on foreign policy.
The questions raised by 'bases and spheres of Influence' are also complicated by Russian fears. Mr. Khrushchev must undoubtedly wish to see the Americans leave such countries as Iran and Turkey, and, it must be confessed, this wish is not entirely unreasonable. The West sees itself as defending these countries against the threat of Communism; all the Russians see is a heredi- tary enemy granting bases to their main inter- national opponent. For a long time the Americans had things very much their own way in the establishment of bases. Up to and beyond the death of Stalin it was assumed that it was normal for a country to be uninfluenced from Moscow and the symptom of a dangerous malady if any such influence became apparent. Now it is to be expected that the other of the two leading world powers will affect increas- ingly the decisions of governments not actually allied to the US.
The danger of this process is that both sides in the cold war become committed to proteges of whom they are only imperfectly in control. Mr. Khrushchev may regard the present regime in Cuba as a means of exerting pressure on the US, but he also had to resist being dragged along behind Fidel Castro. American policy in Laos has been forced by the Siamese and Right- wing Laotian supporters to go further in the direction of armed intervention than was either locally wise or internationally desirable. In Asia, Africa and Latin America local enmities are being polarised by one or other of the two blocs which divide the world. We are assisting at the creation of a Balkan situation on a vastly greater scale. And, if the process is allowed to continue,' it cannot be doubted that it will end at Sarajevo.
How can a summit meeting help to remedy this situation? It would be convenient, of course, if a series of swaps in the nineteenth-century manner were possible—potential bases in Cuba against potential bases in Iran—with each side withdrawing from the other's immediate sphere of influence in the interests of a mutual agree- ment to differ apart. But no such arrangement is possible, despite the fact that behind the oecumenical façade of world Communism Soviet foreign policy does seem to make a distinction between Russia's immediate spheres of influence and the rest of the world. Neither the US nor the USSR can abandon their clients in what has been more a war of nerves than of armies.
What Russia and America could do is join in a self-denying ordinance. Such an agreement could keep Africa clear of direct outside inter- vention or, in a Laos situation, ensure the coun- try is neutralised as an alternative to war. While the powers would keep their local allies, they could agree to restrain them and to try to prevent the alliances degenerating into competition, especially over the supply of armaments. Then, perhaps, we could see an end to a situation in which the great powers are at the mercy of allies whom they cannot abandon and cannot control, and whose internal feuds make them profoundly irresponsible.
What can be expected from a negotiation be- tween Russia and America is, therefore, not so much a liquidation of outstanding international difficulties as a softening of their contours; an agreement to differ less sharply. This would be less a discovery of solutions than a transcending of immediate problems. It would not be much, but it would be something.
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