THE SACRED TRUST
By LEONARD STEIN
A FEATURE of the Charter of the United Nations which has not attracted as much notice as it deserves is the group of articles dealing with dependent territories and providing for the administra- tion of some of them under a system of international trusteeship. This is a topic on which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were silent. The establishment of the trusteeship system may be ranked with the affirmation in the preamble of " faith in fundamental human rights," and the impressive enlargement of the functions assigned to the Economic and Social Council, as one of the major innovations introduced at San Francisco. It belongs to the same order of ideas. The underlying conception is in each case the acceptance of collective responsibility, not only for the maintenance of peace between States, but for the discharge of certain moral obligations towards individual human beings, and especially towards those who, for one reason or another, stand in need of protection.
Such language may be thought a little too lofty by those who have heard echoes of the lengthy and, at times, acrimonious discussions in the committee which considered the trusteeship proposals under the patient and skilful chairmanship of the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser. From what has been allowed to be known of the pro- ceedings it is clear that there was no lack of the sapping and mining and manoeuvring for position to be expected on such occasions, and that not every delegate was at all times inspired by a single-minded zeal for the interests of the peoples concerned. But it would be a mistake to draw the cynical conclusion that the trusteeship pro- visions of the Charter are mere make-believe. Like them, Article 22 of the League Covenant had its weaknesses and its lacunae and was the subject of prolonged wrangling behind the scenes ; yet the mandatory system, with all its imperfections, was not make-believe, but a genuine attempt to give effect to the principle that the welfare and development of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves forms " a sacred trust of civilisation." The language may be a trifle grandiose, but the words are not meaningless. The founders of the United Nations have accepted the principle, and, building upon Article 22 of the Covenant, have sought in their turn and in their own way to ensure its practical application.
It has not been found possible, at this stage, to define precisely the scope of the trusteeship system. The territories primarily in view are those now under mandate and those which may be detached from enemy States as a result of the war. It may be presumed that "enemy States" are meant to include Italy, so as to bring in the Italian colonies as well as territories to be taken from Japan. But the trusteeship system will not necessarily be applied to all the terri- tories in one or other of the specified classes. Which of them are, in fact, to become "trust territories" is described rather vaguely as "a matter for subsequent agreement "—between whom is not stated. It may be conjectured that the intention is to bring in the mandated territories, but to leave the door open for selection in the case of possessions to be surrendered by Japan and Italy.
The scheme is modelled upon the mandatory system, but—as will be seen—with some important modifications. An interesting new departure is the arrangement—an American contribution—by which a "trust territory," or part of it, may be set aside for special treatment as a "strategic area" under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council. Each " trust territory" is to be allotted an " Administering Authority." This may be one or more States or the United Nations as a whole, so that a kind of condominium unknown under the mandatory system is not excluded. "Terms of trusteeship" are to to be framed for each " trust territory " and submitted for final approval, to the General Assembly or, in the case of " strategic areas," the Security Council. Except where " strategic areas " are concerned, supreme authority in all matters connected with the operation of the system is vested in the General Assembly. Under the League regime questions relating to mandates were often discussed at Assemblies, but decisions were reserved for the Council. The Charter prefers the wider and more public forum.
The Assembly is to be advised and assisted by a Trusteeship Council analogous to the Permanent Mandates Commission, but con- stituted on a different principle and in one important respect enjoying larger powers, since it is expressly authorised to carry out inspections on the spot. The Mandates Commission was a body of individuals appointed by the League Council and selected by reference to their personal qualifications. The members of the Trusteeship Council are likewise to be " specially qualified persons," but they will sit as representatives of States, and certain States, including all the Big Five, will be entitled to representation as of right. It may be, therefore, that the proceedings of the Trusteeship Council—a bcdy of official delegates—will have a more political flavour than those of the Mandates Commission, whose responsibility was a collective responsibility to the League Council. Whether the change is for the better time will show.
While the general conception is plain enough, the Trusteeship Chapters are not notable for precision. The actual selection of " trust territories " from among those eligible for selection is a matter for " subsequent agreement" between parties not specified. The " terms of trusteeship " are to be agreed upon by " the States directly concerned." In the case of territories held under mandate by members of the United Nations, the " States directly concerned " are to include the mandatory. Except for this, there i no guidance as to how these States are to be identified or as to the significance of- the word " directly." The Charter provides for the approval of " terms of trusteeship " by the Assembly or the Security Council, as the case may be, but there seems to be no lake prov:sion for approval of the " Administering Authority," nor, indeed, is it clearly explained by whom, or by what process, the Authority is to be nominated, or who is to decide in any given case whether it is to be one or more States or the Organisation itself. There is likewise some obscurity as to who is to be entitled to decide the rather important question whether a given " trust territory " shall be a " strategic area." It may be that on some points it was thought best to be vague. Whatever the explanation, there are a goal many loose ends, and the looseness is not in all cases merely verbal. It might have been better if the -United -Nations had been able to -be -a little mere explicit as to what they- had agreed upon, but the' underlying principles are clear and command respect.
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