3 AUGUST 1912, Page 5

THE STATE OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.

WE do not want to see the Unionists in too optimistic a frame of mind, for over-confidence is bad for political parties. It induces feebleness rather than that strenuous activity which is required to produce a change in the field of public affairs. The Unionists are still in the wood, and, considering that their own internal diffi- culties are many and great, we are not going to encourage any shouting before they are out of it. If, however, we direct our eyes rather to the position of the Liberals than to the special perplexities of the Unionists, we cannot but feel full of hope that the life of the Ministry will be short. The party is steadily, if not rapidly, disintegrating. All the indications point that way, and all the signs are becoming visible which prelude the breakdown of political combinations. We do not, of course, mean that the Liberal Party is going to be permanently destroyed, but only that disintegrating forces are at work which will make it for a time, and possibly for several years, a body upon which it will be impossible to found a Ministry. The first of these indications is one which it is a convention to scout as unimportant, and one which no doubt can always be explained away, but which, never- theless, is a clear symptom of decay. The Govern- ment's majorities throughout this Session have been falling greatly in the by-elections and in almost as marked a degree in Parliament. No doubt, as we have said, the falling-off in the Parliamentary majorities, which on Friday week almost ended in disaster (the Government was Saved by only three votes from being in a minority), can be "satisfactorily accounted for," and no doubt logically these apologies are perfectly sound. Yet any one who can cast his mind back over the last twenty-five years will remember that such accidents, perfectly explicable from the Whips' point of view, have always been the precursors Of Ministerial shipwreck. They are things which somehow or other do not happen to a Ministry in a really strong Parliamentary position, but invariably happen to Ministries which are gradually breaking down.

The political critic who dwelt solely upon the fall in Ministerial majorities inside and outside the House would be like the physician who in diagnosis looks only at the symptoms. That does not get one very far. We must consider the causes which have produced the symptoms and determine whether they are temporary or accidental in their nature, or are really signs of deep mischief. On this occasion, however, we do not wish to trouble ourselves with the causes of the general unpopu- larity which is overtaking the Ministry and its programme, though these are plain enough. We mean that we are not going to discuss what votes have been lost, though there are very many, by the operation of the Insurance Act, or by the unpopularity of the Home Rule Bill and the feel- ing, very widespread we are certain, that the measure in question is financially unjust to England ; that it will not really solve the Irish problem; and, finally, that it will bring another and far more difficult problem into being—the problem of how to force North-East Ulster under a Dublin Parliament without bloodshed and coercion on a large scale. It is conceivable that the country as a whole believes that North-East Ulster has no right to threaten open resistance to an Act of Parliament, but the voters instinctively feel that the question for them to answer is, not what Ulstermen ought to do as obedient citizens, but what they will in fact do, and how their threatened action is to be met. We desire now to examine rather the internal condition of the coalition which supports the Government. If we turn to the state of the Irish Party we fully admit that nothing could be more satisfactory from the Whips' standpoint. They are docility itself. They will do anything they are told to do, and never give the slightest trouble. They are, in a word, the drudges of the Administration. And small wonder, considering the enormous dimensions of the political bribes which they are receiving in the Home Rule Bill. They have been gorged with concessions, political and financial; and even though it may be true that gratitude is not a, thing which greatly affects politics, the word would have to be eliminated from the dictionary if they did not work out their political wages in the lobby.

If we turn to the Labour Party the scene is very different. The Labour Party are not to be depended upon. They would like for many reasons to copy the Irish and be the drudges of the Government, but they dare not. Though for the most part they are by nature, privately, and, so to speak, " at home," amiable Noncon- formist Radicals of a mild temper, the men from whom they derive their power and whose instructions they are bound to carry out are of a very different character and in a very different frame of mind. The servants are quiet and peaceable lovers of political ease, but the masters are restless and dissatisfied. They refuse to understand. or even to allow for the exigencies of the House of Commons, and they are beginning to hate the very name of Liberal. They further believe, no doubt quite unfairly, that they have been tricked and made use of, and that the failure of all the Labour movements of the past year is due to the Government. Thus the Labour Party in effect are being more and more forced into a position of hostility to the Government, and this hostility has been rendered specially acute by the belief that the Liberal machine is trying to steal Labour seats—a thing which even the sleepiest Labour member resents. At Hanley the theft was successful. At Crewe it was not. But this in no way makes the Liberals and the Labour Party feel " quits. On the contrary, there is a growing rift which will be experienced at every by-election, and ultimately will be felt in the lobbies, for the influence of the conflict will affect the Commons last of all. Here, curiously, the faithful Irish are the hope of the Government. The influence of the Nationalists upon the Labour Party is very considerable, and on several occasions they have effectually played the part of the tame elephant which keeps the wild elephant in order. What is really worse than the fissure which is slowly forming between the Labour men and the Government is the tension within the Liberal Party itself between the Moderates and the Extremists. Whether that tension extends to the Cabinet no one is in a position to say for certain, but it has admittedly affected the House of Commons, and a Radical group or " cave " of malcontents has been formed who, rightly or wrongly, believe that they have the sympathy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This malcontent group has a double origin. Some of its members are determined to force upon the Government the policy of the Single Tax, or at any rate some system of confiscatory taxation of land values, if not actually Mr. Henry George's whole proposal. No doubt the great majority of the Cabinet, possibly all the Cabinet, are against such a policy, but nevertheless they have done a, great deal to encourage the notion that if they are only pushed a little they will start, or acquiesce in, a rousing campaign against what is vaguely called the monopoly in land. It is the old story. The tiger has been allowed to taste blood, and is now growling very loudly for more. Those who gave it the " slight taste " but wish to restrict the amount of blood to an ounce or two are now getting desperately frightened at what they have done. Even more menacing than the need of meeting the demands of the Site Value tiger is the need of finding some method of satisfying those men who are determined that naval preparations shall be allowed only if those preparations can be shown to be inadequate. The bulk of the Liberal Party are, we feel sure, in favour of making the country secure, and would support the Government in carrying out any measures, however costly, which Ministers pronounced necessary. But the group of which we are speaking is of quite another opinion. They have taken the Ministerial pacificist rhetoric in the past as meaning something, and hey are now declaring that they have been betrayed by tMr. Churchill and others, and that they will not stand what they assert to be " a violation of the true principles of Liberalism."

To show that we are not exaggerating we have only to quote from the remarkable article headed " An Indepen- dent Radical Party," by Mr. H. W. Massingham, published in the Daily News of Monday last. The article begins with a sporting description of a mettlesome horse and of its " occasional tendency to go mad " at " a shadow, a dark spot on the road, the sight of a cow looking over the fence." If, however, the rider or the driver has a good pair of hands he may subdue the frenzy of the horse and bring it back to its level jog-trot or canter along the high road. Mr. Massingham next tells us that he has " observed a similar defect " to that of the horse with mad tendencies in some of the " statesmen " with whom he has had the honour of acquaintance :— " They are all right when they are well-bitted and firmly driven along the path in which they ought to go. But now and then the sense of power, or the absence of principle (or both these charac- teristics in combination) is too much for them, and they bolt. This is what has happened, at a rather perilous pass in the history of Liberalism, to the First Lord of the Admiralty. And to add to the dangers of the situation there is no sign whatever that a strong and quick and clear-sighted direction of policy is at hand to catch the runaway—who incidentally happens to be galloping off with our principles, our party, and our money."

Mr. Massingham next proceeds to rub in his metaphor in detail, and, in effect, to accuse Mr. Winston Churchill of " beading up for another German panic." We need not, however, deal with his attempts to add up the sums in naval arithmetic and bring out an answer different from that set forth by Mr. Churchill and one more pleasing to the Radical mind, or with his declaration that " twice within the last four years have false statements been made on this matter of the relationship between the British and German Navies." Again, we shall not trouble our readers with his views as to the " criminality of war," or his remark that the Prime Minister " must be taught, as Lord Rosebery was taught, that the torch of Liberalism was put into his hands, not in order that he might ex- tinguish its power of illumination, but that he might hand it on undimmed and undiminished." The essential thing in Mr. Massingham's article is his answer to the question as to what must be the conduct of men " who do not profess principles in order to put a certain body of clever speakers and managers into office, but put these gentlemen into office in order to advance their principles." In a passage headed " The Banner of Revolt," which we must give in full, he says :- " Now there is one political force which can stay this crime, or create doubt and hesitation in the minds of those who are more and more inclined to accept the sophistries of the defence which such men as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Churchill instinc- tively prepare. There must be an independent Radical Party voting remorselessly against the Naval Estimates, and re-creating not by violent speech, but by persistent argument and agitation, the ground of rational feeling and calm intelligence in which, again, the root of Liberal policy can grew. Does this party want a leader? I predict that it will find it in Mr. Ponsonby, who has honesty and ability, a wide knowledge of life and politics, and, above all, courage. Let him raise the banner of revolt. Thou- sands will gather round it. And, above all, let this party vote against the Estimates. They will be told that they will destroy Home Rule. I answer : Let them vote against the Estimates. They will be asked not to weaken the Government and strengthen the reaction. I answer : Let them vote against the Estimates. For what will happen as the result of this tactic of principle—this refusal to yield to the temptation tinder which, if a man succumbs to it, his hand is for ever crippled for striking a blow for the things he believes in? The policy of force will not indeed, be destroyed. But it will be supported by the party which believes in and rests on force, and opposed by the party which denies that force is the master principle of modern govern. merit. And that, in the present perversion of Liberalism, will be a great gain."

What will be the actual result of this raising of the " banner of revolt " remains to be seen when the House reassembles in October. It is possible, of course, that by that time Mr. Massingham and his followers will have got tired of their revolt, and will have come to heel again with sufficient mildness. That, no doubt, is the calculation of the Liberal Whips and of the thick and thin party men who profess to think nothing whatever of the cave men, and, to use Mr. Lear's immortal phrase, regard it " with affection mingled with contempt." On the other hand, it is just possible that the worm has really turned and will show fight. In any case, however, we are convinced that the effect on the Liberal Party and its pro- spects must be bad. On the merits of the case we have, of course, no sympathy whatever with the revolters, but nevertheless they unfortunately do represent a certain amount of public opinion, and probably Mr. Churchill's personal position in his party will be to some extent undermined. And here we would give a word of warn- ing to Unionists. They must not fall into the error of thinking that the fact that Mr. Churchill is attacked by the extreme pacificists on his own side is a proof that he has made adequate provision for the Navy. That is a delusion. Mr. Massingham's declaration that he is like a mad horse is, in fact, no certificate of political character with which Unionists can be satisfied. Mr. Churchill has not done quite so badly as the Radical section had hoped, but he has failed to insist on that provision which alone can maintain our naval lead, and, further, he has achieved something little short of a fiasco in the matter of the Mediterranean. In a word, the creation of distrust among Mr. Massingham and his followers is not the same thing as a, sound naval policy for the United Kingdom.