EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN. the Khalifa Abdullah have crossed the
Bayuda steppe. gathered to a head at Dongola, started afresh in successive detachments, reached the neighbourhood of Wady Haifa, suffered a defeat at Arguin, and strengthened by the second column, have passed north beyond the Wells of Abu Simbel, the check received early in July not having been severe enough to turn them back. North of Arguin they have been compelled, however, to remain on the edge of the Libyan Desert, away from the river, the route of the united force being on the arid tracks which lead to the oasis on the left bank, west of Assouan. The Egyptian troops barred them from the Nile, and the long halt near Abu Simbel, although it gave time for the second to join the first hostile column, also enabled the authorities in Cairo to transport succour, and get together a British and three Egyptian brigades between Assouan and Toski. But that was not done without drawing upon the Mediter- ranean garrisons, the British troops in Egypt having been minimised to a point which left them in numbers barely sufficient to fulfil ordinary duties, and too weak to stand an unusual strain. The Dervishes have, therefore, proved that they can push over the purely artificial line called the frontier of Wady Haifa, can turn the posts on the Nile by marching in the desert, and force on a battle somewhere south, yet not many score miles south, of Assouan itself. It is this unpleasant series of incidents which have revived certain large questions deeply affecting the rela- tions between Egypt and the Soudan ; and grave proposals have followed urging the reoccupation of Dongola, Berber. and, of course, the road between Berber and Suakim. In other words, Egypt is asked to begin afresh the conquest of the abandoned Soudan. But what is Egypt, and who is Egypt ? Ruled by England in the name of the Khedive, still a vassal of the Sultan, the Nile State belongs to none of the three entirely, but endures many limitations springing from the rights enjoyed by other Powers, and to such an extent, that even a beneficial con- version of debt cannot be accomplished because France, for political reasons of her own, stops the way. Every expense incurred by the Khedival Government is a risk, since if carried beyond a specified point, it may, and probably would, furnish a pretext for intervention. The revenue surely does not more than suffice to meet the various needs of the country whence it is drawn, and leaves, when these are satisfied, no margin which could be spent on conquests. In the circumstances of the case, the less Egypt invests in defensive, still more in offensive measures, the better for her and her taxpayers. Now, at this moment, when the Desert is marching on the Delta, for that is what it comes to, and the cost of resisting the inroad has to be met, is it not cheaper to meet it a few score than many hundreds of miles south of Assouan ? If the interests of Egypt are duly weighed, and the mind is fixed solely on them, how can it be doubted that an adequate force on the near frontier, is less costly than an adequate force, to- gether with all that it implies, set down upon a distant frontier which, like Wady Haifa, would also be exposed to recurring attacks. Not only, in the plan proposed, .must there be garrisons at Dongola and Berber, but between Dongola and Upper Egypt, together with per- manent flotilla on the southern navigable Nile reaches, and likewise posts between Berber and Suakin, not to speak of the inhospitable waterless desert stretching south from Korosko to Abu Hamed. Would it be right, if it were possible, which it is not, to spend continuously upon so large and exacting a field, a much greater portion of the revenue of Egypt than can be required to defeat an enemy, annually even, at or below the second cataract ? If the aim is to protect the interests of the Nile State, then that aim can be best attained at the least expense by fighting the Soudanese invader when he is farthest from his starting-point, and the troops of Egypt are nearest to their supplies of all kinds. There is no defensible frontier line in the narrow Nile Valley. Wady Haifa is only an outpost and a watch-tower ; but, as we see, it serves to obstruct and delay a foe until troops can be brought up to thwart, defeat, and punish him. No frontier-line on the river could do more.
If the Soudan is to be brought within the bounds of civilisation by conquest, there would not be a shred of equity in forcing the work upon Egypt, and making her pay the piper. The grand project for the recovery of the lost posts of vantage, of course, could be carried into effect even against the reigning substitute for the dead Mahal. Troops might creep up the Nile as they have crept up before ; Dongola might be garrisoned and forti- fied ; a path with fixed water-stations might be made from Korosko to Abu Hamed, and a little host moved up to Berber, ready to join hands with an expeditionary force from Suakin ; and several sets of steamers might be floated on the Nile above the long cataracts, or wherever they could float and be effective. All this could be done for civilisation if civilisation would provide the fit leading men and pay for it, and if civilisation held Egypt un- trammelled by conventions, capitulations, and international devices. But let the proposed enterprise stand on its proper footing ; let it be called in name what it would be in fact,—an enterprise to conquer and govern the Soudan, not for the benefit of Egypt, but of civilisation; not exactly a new departure, but the resumption of a plan which, in Mahom- medan hands, has been tried and has failed, withering before the hot blast of fighting religious fanaticism. Should the task begun by Mehemet All and carried so far by Ismail be again taken up, who, to speak plainly, could take it up save the British Government ?—and that being the hard truth, we should be told so in as many words, and not mince the matter. Naturally, the founder and director of the design to recover the Soudan should call not on Sir Edgar Vincent, but on Mr. Goschen, to find the funds. Whether the revived scheme be good or bad, practicable or the reverse, no mystery should surround, no misnaming should accompany it ; above all, we should not be told that Egypt requires the Soudan for her safety, or that she could afford the luxury. At the same time, there can be no doubt at all that, if we cannot bear the irritation of repelling sorties from the Soudan, where they can the most cheaply be repelled, above the first cataract ; if we cannot endure the recurring attacks upon Suakin ; if our indignation at the slavery, slave-trading, and general barbarism now afflicting lands which Baker and Gordon hoped they had done something to redeem, overmasters us ; if we want to establish prosperity and call up trade,— then the way to proceed would be to hold the Nile at least up to Khartoum, which would carry our flag to Senaar, and stretch over to the Red Sea on a strong line of road. There are no other positions promising great power and relative immunity ; but we must not be blind to the cost in men and treasure, and we must not say that it is done for Egypt, but that we do these things because we think them right, and conducive to the welfare of the Soudan, as• well as honourable and glorious for that civilisation whose boundaries we are burning to extend.
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