BISMARCK'S PROPHECIES OF DOOM.

Ithe April number of the Nineteenth Century there is 1 a very remarkable compilation made by Mr. J. Ellis Barker from what Bismarck wrote on foreign policy after

his dismissal by the German Emperor in 1890. Many of these extracts have never yet been placed before English- men. Mr. Barker has dug them out of Bismarek's con-

tributions to newspapers—principally to the Hamburger Naehriehten. The purport of them all is that if Germany

fell foul of Russia she would be on the high road to ruin, and that in particular she must not allow herself to be embroiled with Russia in the interests of Austria's Balkan policy. Of course Germany has not become the uncon- scious victim of Austria's Balkan policy—she has done something much worse than that. Her madness has far exceeded the forebodings of Bismarck. So far from being the unconscious victim of her alliance with Austria, she has used Austria's Balkan policy as an excuse for deliberately making war on the world. She was not driven on by Austria's needs, but drove Austria on. With this reservation, however, we must say that Bismarck's prophecies of what would happen if his warnings were disregarded are one of the most notable examples of political prediction which modern history contains. His

foresight was almost uncanny in its clearness. If we changed the conditional tenses for present tenses, nearly all that he said might be written by a highly competent student of foreign affairs to-day, and would be a credit to his perspicacity.

We shall quote from these singular warnings presently, but before we do so we must say a few words about Mr.

Barker's conception of Bismarck's character. In his desire to present Bismarck's policy in startling contrast to that of the German Emperor, be writes of it as though it were the natural product of a mind temperate, scrupulous, and

On the whole pacific. We cannot accept this view of Bismarck. We remember too well his manipulation of

the Press, his expedient of attributing to people senti- ments which they had never expressed in order to direct' public opinion through a particular channel, his wholesale inventions, hi. diabolical cleverness at making an evil

cause wear a moral appearance, and above all his deliberate making of war for the advancement of his country and not

because her supposed grievances bad any real existence.

Mr. Barker says that Bismarck's wars against Denmark, Austria, and France were necessary for the creation of modern Germany, and that Bismarck behaved in accordance with his instincts when after he had obtained his object he preached peace and encouraged the revival of demo-

cratic methods. We can only say that it was then too late.

Bismarck could not restore what he bad himself destroyed. He had taught the German people to associate military success with absolutism, and to depend upon the policy of blood and iron for their material expansion. It was impossible suddenly to call a halt, and to say that these things were right and necessary up to a certain point but not beyond it. The fact is that Bismarck degraded diplomacy. Although the recent policy of Germany was contrary to all his wishes, her present plight is none the less the Nemesis of his teaching. Of course, though he stood for evil statesmanship, he was also supremely prudent and far-seeing, whereas the Emperor, who stands for evil statesmanship, is also reckless, clumsy, and foolishly superficial. We would much rather have to deal with a man like Bismarck than with an incalculable personality like the Emperor. None the less, it is necessary to warn Mr. Barker's readers against accepting the idea that Bismarck's standards were, on the whole, high and honourable.

After Bismarck, the great " pilot," had been "dropped

in 1890, he appealed again and again to the people to assert themselves in the Reichstag against the bureaucracy. His appeals were in vain. He also tried to hearten the smaller German States to demand a more important position in the Federal Council—all in vain, or perhaps we should rather say too late. But by far the most interesting extracts given by Mr. Barker contain Bismarck's warnings against Chauvinism, against a split with Russia, and against the identification of Germany with Austria's Balkan policy. In May, 1892, he wrote in the Munchener Allgemeine Zeilung

Prince Bismarck had created Germany on a broad national basis. When that task had been fulfilled, he and his successors had only to preserve Germany's position, the creation of which had demanded such heavy sacrifices. This being his fundamental maxim, it was necessary for Germany to be as strong as possible. At the same time, it was necessary to avoid, as long as possible, all appeals to arms in which Germany could win nothing, but could only lose. His leading view was that every extension of territory beyond the limits of 1871 would be a misfortune. . .

Bismarck's entire foreign policy culminated in the idea of iso- lating France and of placing the new frontiers which he had given to Europe under the protection of all the other Powers... . Germany's position and activity will always largely depend upon her Allies. On the day when the loading German statesmen have to decide on peace or war they should inquire conscientiously whether the prize is worthy the sacrifice, and whether the desired result cannot be equally well obtained without a war, the issue of which no one can guarantee. War is made only for the sake of peace. It is made only in order to obtain those conditions in which we wish to live with our opponent when the war is over. . . . Is it really necessary to pursue a new counsel' The new pilot is, perhaps, not able to steer the German ship of State with the knowledge and determination of his predecessor, but is it therefore necessary to abandon altogether the course that had been steered in the past P"

In order to prevent Germany from being drawn into a purely Austrian quarrel with Russia Bismarck had concluded a secret treaty with Russia which assured her of Germany's benevolent neutrality in the event of an attack on Russia by Austria. This treaty, of course, kept Russia and France apart, for so long as it existed there was no need for Russia to seek for outside help. The treaty was really the whole expression of Bismarck's policy after 1870. Biamarck saw how easily Austria might collide with Russia in trying to rule her South Slav population after her own methods, and he was determined that Germany should not b4; dragged into that quarrel. In the Hamburger Nachrichten of April 26th, 1890, he wrote

"Austria cannot hope to obtain Germany's support for pro- moting her ambitious plans in the Balkan Peninsula. Thee. Austrian plans hays never been encouraged by Germany as long as Germany's foreign policy was directed by Prince Bismarck. On the contrary, the Prince has, at every opportunity, particularly at the time of the Bulgarian incident, shown with the utmost clear- ness that he is very far from wishing to promote Austria'. special interests in the Balkans in antagonism with Russia. Such a policy would not be in harmony with the stipulations of the Triple Alliance. That Alliance views only the dement emergens, not the incrum resume, of the signatory Powers. Least of all is it Germany's business to support Austria's ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. If such ambitions exist, and are to be promoted with the assistance of other nations, Austria-Hungary will have to address herself not to Germany, but to the nations interested in Balkan politics. These are all the Great Powers except Germany. They are (apart from Russia) England, France, and Italy. Austria can always arrive at an understanding with these Powers if she wishes to further her interests in the Balkans, and Germany used not concern herself about them. Germany's point of view is this : that she has no interests in Balkan affairs.

Again in September of the same year Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten " We attach the greatest value to the preservation of good and cordial relations between Germany and Russia. If Austria and Russia should differ, Germany can mediate most snce.ossfully if she is trusted in St Petersburg. Besides, a breach with Russia would, according to our inmost conviction, make Germany dependent upon Austria. . . . No one can object if Austria succeeds in her Balkan policy without a war with Russia which would demand enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure."

When the German Emperor took to piloting his own ship of State on his well-known principle of sic vole, sic Jules (which may be paraphrased : "No charts for me. No rocks ought to dare to exist in the waters which I sail"), the secret treaty with Russia was not renewed. The Emperor, Prince Hohenlohe, and Caprivi apparently failed to see the point of it. The publication of the article in which Bismarck revealed the fact that that treaty had been in existence is still a well-remembered incident in German diplomatic history. In January, 1892, Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger Nachrichten of the change of German policy in the Balkans. He scented the great danger to the Triple Alliance, for he knew that Austrian ambitions backed by Germany must provoke the suspicions of Italy - "We fear that since then the strength of the Alliance has not increased.. .. A crisis in Italy, a change of sovereign in Austria or the like may shake its foundations as greatly that in spite of v.11 written engagements it will be impossible to maintain it. In that case Germany's position would become extremely serious, for in order not to become entirely isolated she would be com- pelled to follow Austria's policy in the Balkans without reserve. Germany might got into the leading-strings of another Power which, it is true, has accepted the new position of Germany. However, no one can tell whether Austria's historic resentment will not re-awaken and endeavour to find satisfaction at Germany'. cost if the fortune of war should no longer favour Germany or if the pressure of European events should weigh upon us."

As Bismarck wrote in his Memoirs : " With France we shall never have peace ; with Russia never the necessity for war unless Liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders falsify the situation." We know now that dynastic blunders needed no aid from any other sources of blunder- ing. Bismarck never hesitated to point to Italy as the doubting member of the Triple Alliance. Germany and Austria might ruin themselves by a foolish use of the Alliance, but Italy might leave it altogether. This, he saw, was the ticklish task for diplomacy—to keep Italy in the Alliance. It is almost incredible that in spite of these warnings the German rulers should have gone out of their way to try to drive Italy out of the Alliance, and should then express their astonishment at her conduct. In June, 1890, Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger Naehrieliten:— . In view of France's aspirations, Italy most be able to rely on the assistance of the English Fleet, for the Triple Alliance cannot protect the Italian coasts. Hence, Italy has to think of England, and consideration of England may conceivably limit Italy's freedom of action. The maintenance of the present relations between Austria and Italy must be the principal care of the diplomats, especially as, if Italy for some reason or other should abandon the Triple Alliance, the Austrian Army would be com- pelled to protect the Dual Monarchy against Italy. Hence it would no longer be able to fulfil Article 1 of its Alliance with Germany, according to which it should assist Germany • with its entire armed power.' By the detachment of Italy, the Austro- German Alliance would militarily lose as much that ire vales would become very problematical" Still more succinctly Bismarck wrote in the Hamburger Naehrichten in May, 1892: " If England is opposed to Germany we can never reckon upon Italy's help." And he added : "Only moderate diplomatic skill is required to avoid a war with Russia for generations." It was largely his insight into the needs and feelings of Italy which made Bismarck, formally at all events, Anglophile. He spoke of a war between Germany and Britain as "unthinkable."

Bismarck once said that he had learned the art of patience from deer-stalking and fishing. He would have his country sit still and wait now that she had become a unit and an Empire. He looked upon the Kiau-chau adventure as a foolish running of risks, just as he had thought it madness in Germany immediately before to join with France and Russia in depriving Japan of the fruits of her victory over China. Japan might some day be a powerful enemy, he pointed out. And that prophecy, too, has been fulfilled. We hope that Mr. Barker's article will find its way to Germany. No doubt Germans, like other men, have short memories, and they will be able to learn here, if they have forgotten, how clearly every trouble which now afflicts Germany was foreseen, and how joyfully their rulers ran their heads against the brick wall which Bismarck had plastered with danger-signals.