THE SECRET OF WATERLOO.*
THE brilliant article which Captain A. F. Becke published in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica under the heading " Waterloo Campaign" showed all competent students of military affairs that this young officer of Artillery was destined to take a high place amongst the historians of war. The regretted physical breakdown which has since com- pelled Captain Beoke to retire from active service has given him leisure to expand that summary into a detailed and com- prehensive study of the generalship displayed by Napoleon and his opponents in the decisive campaign fought just a century ago. These fascinating volumes undoubtedly form the moat important contribution to military history which has been published for many years by any English writer. Their only fault is to be found in a tendency to "fee writing," and a habit of reiterating favourite ideas and phrases, against which Captain Beebe will do well to guard in his next book. With this exception, we have nothing but praise for his work; for although he betrays a somewhat overmastering admiration for Napoleon, and a tendency to underrate the high qualities of Wellington, we do not think that be has allowed himself to be thereby misled into a false interpretation of the facts. He is tSas.P Wetsgoo.o..h13.1.11ettleta. P...Ett]ks. 2 roles With 11 Maps. certainly right in Me conviction that previous English writers have devoted too little attention to Napoleon's generalship and his handling of the Armee a. Nord, and that they felled in particular to attach its true significance to the plan of campaign, for manwuvring in two wings and a reserve, which had been the keynote of all Napoleon's great battles from Austerlitz onward°. The French disaster at Waterloo was largely attributable to the defective manner in which this plan was carried out. Napoleon was no longer the "God of War" who had flamed into glory at Marengo and Austerlitz; thoughhe was by no means broken down, his physical strength and power of endurance were notably impaired. Having made the initial mistake of selecting incompetent commanders like Ney and Grouchy to carry out vital parts of his scheme, he was no longer sufficiently full of vitality to repair their errors. Further, he had seriously underestimated the tenacity of the British troops, whom for the first time he met in person. At the present moment we cannot refrain from quoting the testimony to their merits which, though written a century ago, is equally applicable to their actions of the last five months. General von Muffling, the Prussian officer who was attached to Wellington's Staff at Waterloo, wrote as follows " For a battle there is not perhaps in Europe an army equal to the British; that is to say none whose discipline and whole military tendency is so purely and exclusively calculated for giving battle. The British soldier is vigorous, well-fed, by nature both: brave and intrepid, trained to the most rigorous discipline, and admirably well-armed. The infantry resist the attacks of cavalry with great confidence, and when taken in flank or rear, British troops are less disconcerted than any other European army." Captain Bocke adds another interesting testimonial :— " The eyewitness account of one of our moat gallant foes, Marshal Bugeaud, shows clearly the great effect produced on their enemies' minds by the disciplined silence that enshrouded our gallant troops whilst awaiting attack, and also the impression made on their assailants by the unequalled unconcern and phlegm exhibited by tho British infantry in battle; as well as the imposing spectacle of that long red wall which lay athwart a French attack, and thus barred a further advance Naturally their opponents were upset by the outward impassiveness of the British, and the lack of notice which they took of their foes, as the latter drew near with noisy shouts. All realized that the fire, so long withheld, would be murderous when delivered; and that the storm so long preparing would be overwhelming when it did burst The moral effect of studied calm over wild disorder Bank deep into the souls of the assailants. Nor were they wrong, for, as General Troche stated, the fire delivered by the English was considered by Marshal Brigeand to be more effective than any which the French troops at that era were called on to face ; and the General recalled the deadly skill our archers bad with the longbow. General Troehu ascribed this fire-power to a characteristic that distinguishes our race: mental calmness and complete self-posses- sion in all times of strife. Further, Marshal Hugeand has left it on record that 'the British infantry are the best in the world;' however, he was careful to add this significant statement 'Bat fortunately there are not many of them.'
From 1815 to 1915, history is repeating itself. It was again the miscalculation of British power and the magnificent tenacity and coolness of British troops that foiled the Prussian plan, as it bad foiled Napoleon's.
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