THE PROSPECT OF A DISSOLUTION.
SHREWD Conservative Members will tell you with one voice that nothing is less probable than a Dissolution in the autumn,—and as shrewd Conservative Members will cer- tainly have some right to feel aggrieved if there is any needless trifling with their feelings on this very tender subject, the natural inference is that, for the present at least, the Government have at least come to no decision to dissolve this year, and are still talking in sympathy with the excellent worldly maxim, "Never do to-day what you can manage to put off till to-morrow." Nevertheless, we venture to hold to our opinion that what the Government have not yet determined to do, and what, probably, many members of it, so far as they consider the subject at all, sincerely believe that they will not do, will yet be done, and done for reasons too urgent to be over- ruled by the natural love of procrastination in politicians of all shades, in relation to all disagreeable operations,—rind the overweening passion for it of which Conservatives, as such, may naturally make their boast. In all probability, the matter has not as yet been under the official consideration of the Government at all. There is no advantage—in- deed, great disadvantage—in deciding on the expediency of an action before the conditions for deciding it are fully known ; and clearly, this is just one of those actions of which it is impossible to know the conditions fully till the time is ripe. Before judging of the expediency of a Dissolution, you must have the fullest means at your disposal for knowing, first, what the immediate attitude of the public feeling is ; and next, whether any feasible delay is likely to improve the attitude of the public feeling, or to promote a change for the worse. Now, the conditions for solving either of these problems cannot possibly be ripe till Parliament is prorogued, till it is known what the aspect of public affairs then is, and what the effect of another autumn and winter's delay on that aspect is likely to be. It is at least wise in the Government to put off till to-morrow a decision which not only need not be taken to-day, but could not be taken to-day with as much confidence as if it were put off till to-morrow. None the less we are now in a very fair position for forecasting with some approach to confidence what the decision, when it comes, is likely to be.
Of course the great consideration of all, as regards the political content or discontent of the Constituencies, is the money question. Will the Constituencies be in a more amiable frame of mind with the Government in relation to finance and trade in October, 1879, or in April, 1880,—for beyond April, 1880, it will be hardly possible to delay the Disso- lution? Will they be more in charity with the Govern- ment when the various little bills,—and especially the South-African bill,—are sent in, or while they have still reason to hope that rumour exaggerates the probable draught on the voters' purse ? We should have thought there could be no doubt about the matter. The next Budget must confessedly be a day of reckoning for cowardly delays. Even if there had been no rapid accumulation of burdens in South Africa, Sir Stafford Northcote's arrangements this year would clearly have made next year unplea- sant. With these rapid accumulations, the day of reckon- ing must be a very unpleasant one indeed. Let Sir Garnet Wolseley do his very best,—let him succeed as well as the most sanguine expectations could venture to sug- gest,—and there must still be a melancholy balance of £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 over and above the preposterously small allowance which Sir Stafford Northcote made for this South-African war in his Budget speech. Indeed, if the total cost of it does not exceed that of the Abys- sinia war,—does not exceed £9,000,000 in all,—Sir Garnet Wolseley will effect wonders. Moreover, unless the bill be very much larger than this, there will be no credit account of glory and conquest to set off against this unpleasant deficit. If peace is made soon, and on easy terms, there will still be a long bill, and little but a record of disaster. If a more showy peace is conquered, at the point of the sword, the record of disaster may be wiped out by success, but the cost will be frightfully enhanced. We hold, then, that this consideration alone is surely decisive. To go to the nation with a Budget as much worse than last year's, as last year's was worse than the first year's Budget of the present Govern- ment, would not be a wise proceeding. Clearly it would be far better to go to the nation before the bills come in, while it is still possible to disbelieve in fresh taxes and to forget fresh debts. And so far as questions of commercial fears or hopes enter into the matter, the result would probably be the same. If there be any recovery showing itself before next spring, it can now hardly be sufficient to balance the effect of a new winter of low wages, exhausted savings, and diminished pro- duction. But the best authorities seem to anticipate no tan- gible beginning of recovery before the spring, possibly even a continuous decline. And in that case assuredly an appeal to the country in the spring of 1880 will produce even more melancholy results than an appeal in the present autumn.
That is the main consideration, but there are others sufficiently serious. A Government which has sown good seed may well be glad to wait till there is at least a foretaste of the harvest, but a Government which has sown nothing but empty threats does not particularly care to wait till the crop of disappointments and mis- understandings is beginning to ripen. The supposed strong point of this Government has been its foreign policy. But what has it to hope for by delay in relation to foreign affairs ? Whatever has been gained in Afghanistan, is most con- spicuous now. By waiting, the Government will only bring to light the great cost of what they have gained,—the great cares and sacrifices it involves,—but not any new glory, or any new profit. What is to be waited for in relation to Turkey ? Only further discomfiture, and a fuller explosion of unfounded hopes. In Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Greece ? Nothing but the unpopularity England has earned by espousing the cause of Turkey against them. What shall we hope in Egypt ? More mortification and bitterer dis- appointment, when the coupons on the bonds are not paid, and the snubs to the English Government are renewed. What shall we hope for from France ? Apparently, nothing but new reproaches on our failure to back the French Ministry up as well in Egypt as in Greece. So far as we can see, the Government will do well to make the most it can, as soon as it can, of the peace extorted from Afghanistan, for that is the only point on the horizon which Englishmen can be induced to think a bright one, and that will not seem bright long.
Now, as to home affairs, what can be less remunera- tive than waiting ? Will the tenant-farmers, so often mocked by hope deferred, recover their loyalty to the Government during the winter, in anticipation of some more satisfactory Tenant-Right Bill, or some better County- Government Bill ? Will the Irish, as they test the mettle of their Volunteers, become more disposed to throw up their caps for Mr. Lowther and a Government which turns the cold shoulder to the demands of their Bishops and priests ? Will the Dissenters soften, as they think of the repudiated Burials Bill ? Will the Churchmen rally to the authors of the Public Worship Act? Where is there a gleam of gratitude or of hope which would grow, and not rather fade, by longer waiting? So far as we can see, while financial considerations plead loudly and per- tinaciously for an early Dissolution, there is not a political promise in the past, nor a seed cast into the ground, from which the Government could hope any good result, if they waited till the spring. Whatever, therefore, the present in- tention may be, we suspect that as Parliament draws towards its separation for the long vacation, the expectation of a Dissolution will grow more and more definite in the breasts of those who have the power to translate their judgment into deeds.
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