TOPICS OF THE DAY
THE FALL OF M. THIERS AND ITS RESULTS.
1r THIERS has fallen by the unfaithfulness of nominal ../l• Republicans. We certainly did not apprehend when we wrote last that sixteen avowed though very Conservative Republicans would desert their party to overthrow the head of the Conservative Republicans, and bring into power a motley coalition of Legitimists, Orleanists, and Imperial-
ists. But for the defection from the Republican party of M. Target and his friends, M. Thiers would have had a majority of fourteen against the vote of no confidence, and the Republic would be virtually accepted as the constitu- tion of France. As it is, by a rapid succession of events which verify to the letter all we have repeatedly said of the false policy of the Paris election, the advocates of reaction have been placed in power, and the Gouvernement de Combat has begun. From the day when M. Barodet, the partisan of the Red Republicans in Lyons, was put in nomination for the Department of the Seine against M. de Relmusat, M. Thiers' able and successful Minister of Foreign Affairs, we have insisted with what seems now to have been an apprehension only too well justified by the event, that the result of the extreme candidate's success would almost inevitably be to frighten the hesitating party, the timid Republicans, into the arms of the Right, and lead to the beginning of reaction, just as the election of Eugene Sue for the Department of the Seine in 1850 was the signal of a like reaction, and one which ended most disastrously for the prospects of the Republic. It is true, we did not anticipate that the alarm would take the form of an immediate revolt in the Republican ranks against M. Thiers. We supposed that a Government of the Left Centre, such as he had formed, with all the elements not only of Radical, but even of advanced Liberal opinion omitted from it by the dismissal of M. Jules Simon, would have been quite sufficient to satisfy the most timid of Republicans, and that the critical conflict would take place not on a question of confidence or no confidence in the President and his administration, but on the Conservative guarantees afforded by the projects of organic laws proposed to the Assembly. We were mistaken, because we under-estimated, as English critics habitually under-estimate, the intensity of that con- stant force of 'fear,' by which, as M. Gambetta justly said, the political hopes of France have been so repeatedly blighted. It is difficult for Englishmen to realise the state of mind in which avowed Republicans desert a Government of firm and consistent Republican opinions, fenced in by every caution which an almost pedantic dread of radicalism and socialism could devise, in order to put in their places the nominees of three monarchical factions ; one, the parti pretre ; the second, shift- ing with all the shifts of Orleanist intrigue ; and the third, the devotee of that hybrid system, half democratic, half despotic, which combines all the immoralities involved in the policy of truckling to the mob, with all the immoralities in- volved in the policy of personal tyranny and popular corruption. Yet this was precisely what the party of " independent" Republicans,—they are indeed independent Republicans, Republicans independent of their Republicanism,—of which M. Target is the spokesman, did on Saturday last. They turned the scale against a Conservative Republic, in favour of a coalition of parties agreeing only in demanding a monarchy, and in favouring the suppression of all free discussion in France, bat who, fortunately perhaps for France, cannot agree on any one dynasty, nor indeed on any positive policy, except hatred for the Extreme Left. The event of last Saturday was the fruit of blind panic. It is what the Right had vainly plotted to do, and could not do till they gained allies from the Republican ranks. Those allies have been gained on the same blind principle on which the perpetual oscillation between demo- cracy and despotism has so long been brought about. When French politicians see the popular demands going too far, instead of conceding fairly what is reasonable, and refusing what is not, they begin to denounce "the vile multitude," and scream for help. M. Thiers himself was a chief offender in this respect in 1850, and experience has taught him how ruinous a policy it was. He has had the good sense now to see the true Conservatism implied in giving some legiti- mate satisfaction to the popular wishes ; but some cowardly supporters in the Assembly have not had the wisdom to support him, and the result is that for the present the whole system of Government in France is thrown into the crucible, and that no one knows whether the issue is to be a return to plebiscites and personal government, or to a re'gitne of constitw- tional freedom. It is boasted that the funds have risen 2 per cent.tince the change. They rose twice as much after the coup.
etat in 1851. The funds are not barometers of constitutional confidence. Rather do they represent the vulgar confidence- placed by wealth in the conservative power of the sword.
But much as we regret the issue, and the fatal policy of Radical irritation which, by the choice of such a rival as M. Barodet for the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, led to the- issue, it must not be supposed that we think the temporary triumph of the Reactionaries as fatal to the prospects of Liberal government in France as it at first appears. It is true that we recognise the menace both in that speech of M. Buffet's, in which he persuaded Marshal MacMahon to accept the Presi- dency after M. Thiers' defeat, and in the message to the Assembly, in which the Marshal declared his acceptance of the trust reposed in him, and his intention to administer it in the sense of the Parliamentary majority which offered it. The key-note of both speeches is the emphasis laid on "re-estab- lishing moral order" in the country, i.e., putting down all whom the new Government regards as dangerous. The policy will be, first, to sow monarchically inclined prefects all through France, and next, so to recast the electoral laws as to throw the electoral power, if that be possible, into the hands of the- creatures of the Government.
But there will be, at first at least, no attempt to. restore a monarchy. Indeed, the existing majority cannot agree on a dynasty. Not only is there a little knot of nominal republicans among that majority, whose votes it would be impossible to predict, but there it another knot, about as large, of Bonapartists, who have far more than their numerical share of influence, in consequence of the number of experienced officials with whom they are connected, and on whom even the Orleanists and Legitimists are dependent for the actual administration of France. M. Thiers was quite justified in saying that it was as true to speak of the Due de Broglie as the protege of the Empire, as it was for the Duo de Broglie to describe him, M. Thiers, as the protege of the Radicals. Without the Imperialist help the Right coula not have succeeded, and the Imperialists have made conditions with their Legitimist and Orleanist allies which give them far more than their proportionate share of practical power. If Monarchy has a chance at all in France, we are by no means sure that the extreme jealousy between the Legitimist and Orleanist parties might not give a better chance to the incongruous scheme of a Legitimist restoration, with remainder secured to the Prince Imperial, than any treaty between the elder and cadet Bourbon branches can secure.
But we heartily hope and believe that none of these rootless dynasties,—dynasties far more closely associated with ignominy of one kind or another than with any emotions of popular gratitude,—have any good chance in France, in spite of recent. events, and we will explain briefly the grounds of that hope. In the first place, we believe Marshal MacMahon, though a. Conservative, a pious Catholic, and a real enemy of the Radical party, to be a sturdy soldier, who will decline to make himself the tool of any dynastic intrigue, and who regards it as his first duty to obey the majority of the Assembly. Now, it is impossible for any one, or even any two, of the Monarchical parties to obtain a majority in the present Assembly, and if that is impossible now, we trust it will become more and more hopeless with every fresh election, and quite out of the question as the result of a dissolution. If Marshal MacMahon were the kind of man from whom a coup d''etat were to be feared, the case would be different,—for force and show together will do almost anything in France. But Marshal MacMahon has, we believe, no very strong dynastic views. He has served Louis Napoleon though he was never much trusted by the late Emperor ; and his own private leanings are understood to be Legitimist. Again, his integrity and honour as a ruler will stand in the way of any plot on behalf of either dynasty. He will doubtless regard his trust as held for the majority of the Assembly, and till that majority agrees upon a dynasty, Marshal Maclfahon'tvill not be a king-maker.
But the policy of the Assembly may be to pass very con- servative electoral laws, and so by the steady help of monarchical prefects to prepare the way for a new Assembly, if possible, even more Conservative and more Monarchical than the present ? No doubt it may—nay, it probably will be— but with what chance of success ? In the first place, the Left will now act with far more unity under its three leaders, Grevy, and Gambetta, than it was possible to do while the Republicans were in power. The defeat of last week
has clearly had already a very sobering effect on the Radicals. They perceive, though they do not yet acknow- ledge, the grave blunder in tactics they made when they refused to give M. de R6musat their support at Paris, and they have very wisely given the watchword of 'moderation' as the key-note of the coming campaign. With unity and moderation they can do much even to resist reactionary pro- posals in relation to the electoral law. The trimmers will be as likely as not to take the same fright at the measures of the Right as they have taken at the wishes of the Left. And even with the trimmers it will be exceedingly difficult to get a majority for reaction. The Imperialists are, it must be remembered, devotees of universal suffrage, and some of them have even openly advocated dissolution, on the very ground that they wish to appeal to universal suffrage in relation to the form of government. This will make it extremely difficult, and we believe impossible to carry restrictive measures conceived in the narrow Orleanist sense, so that the only true engine of reaction will be the administrative engine, the influence of Monarchical prefects. But here the question arises at once,— Monarchical on whose behalf ? The only experienced officials are Bonapartist, but the Bonapartist dynasty has lost all its magic since it acquired an ignoble reputation for folly and failure,—and, besides, the discord at head-quarters will paralyse the Bonapartists. It is said that the abstract question of Monarchy or Republic will be put first to the people, in order to secure the votes of all three Monarchical parties for the first alternative. Even if those votes could be really united, we do not doubt that the Republic would win the day ; but in fact, it would not be so ; the arri&e pense'e as to the special Monarchy in contemplation will as inevitably deter- mine the character of the vote cast and the influence used, as the arriere pensee as to the special husband or wife in con- templation determines the vote of young people as to the abstract question of marriage or celibacy. It has been diffi- cult enough to get the three Monarchical parties to act together in a single political crisis. No power on earth will keep them united, when it is fairly understood to which candidate the Government inclines. Of all these difficulties, the Opposition, now led by so experienced and astute a statesman as M. Thiers, will avail itself with great and probably increasing success. Under the attraction of cohesion caused by common resistance to a great danger, the Republicans will become truly formid- able. They have given the first earnest, in their newly-found mot d'ordre, of patience and moderation,—a principle which may well transfigure them as a political party, and teach them lessons of adversity that will issue in a great victory. We do 'not despond of the French Republicans, because M. Thiers has fallen from power.
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