BOOKS.
PROFESSOR FLINT'S "HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY."
FIRST NOTICE.] PROFESSOR FLINT has judiciously commenced his rather voluminous book with a statement of the end at which he aims,—namely, "to trace the course of human thought in its endeavour to explain human history, or, in other words, to give an account of the rise and progress of reflection and speculation on the development of humanity." We deem our author's frequent use of the terms "progress," " development," and " evolution " (of which last word he seems remarkably fond), will appear of doubtful propriety to many readers, for, independent of the fact that " progress " has now become the watchword of a political party, to which objection, however, we do not attach much importance, both it and " development " are liable to the charge of vagueness, while "evolution " may lead an author or his readers into the swamps and quicksands of metaphysics. We think the pro- gramme of the work rather too ambitions, and should consider any writer a philosophic historian who narrates important facts with the accuracy attained to by judicious criticism of the evidence, explains the causes and consequences so far as
they can be ascertained, and hence draws lessons of moral, political, or military prudence which may be useful to future generations. The Professor states in the introduction that he has his own theory on the proper mode in which philo- sophic history should be written and studied, but that he deems it both just and expedient to reserve it until he has completed the no less useful task of criticising and com- • The History of the Philosophy of History. By Robert Flint, Professor in the University of Edinburgh. London and Edinburgh : Blackwood and Sons. menting on the writers who have preceded him. This inten- tion is creditable to his judgment and candour, for the ground must be cleared before a new structure can be erected, and we think it probable that Mr. Flint's views may supersede those of many previous thinkers. We can, in the meantime, perceive that he holds that the events of history are closely connected together, and follow each other in a natural sequence, so as to make history what Droysen calls das Nacheinander des Gewor- d,enen, or the orderly succession of events ; that this arrange- ment depends partly on physical causes, and partly on national character,—the latter, most probably, referable to heredity, though some other causes might, we think, be found by investigation ; and that, though there is a science of history and a philosophy of history, yet they are not a mere science and a mere philosophy, but must stand side by side and support each other, or else they cannot be said to exist at all, at least for any useful purpose. The object of science is to ascertain the facts by the use of judicious criticism and a competent acquaintance with the laws of evidence ; that of philosophy to ascertain the causes, trace the consequences, and hence to draw inferences which may extend the domain of thought, and prove conducive to the advancement of humanity. We consider our author's style rather ponderous ; but in dealing with a subject of so much importance, treated in so careful and thorough a manner, it would be hypercritical and even unjust to quarrel with sesquipedalian diction.
Since, to avail ourselves of a very just remark of the Professor, most of our conversation is of the narrative kind, it seems evident that a man possessed of even a moderate degree of thinking power, on being informed of any remarkable occurrence, will naturally desire to know the cause of it, whether any important result has arisen from it, and, if so, of what nature, and thus the majority of mankind would seem to philosophise regarding matters of fact, and to impart not merely the events, but their conclusions there- from, to those with whom they converse. Hence, while agreeing with our author that Aristotle is the first thinker who seems to have had a clear idea of the connection that might be usefully formed between philosophic specu- lation and the narration of facts, we still conceive that every thinking student of history philosophises in some degree ; and, while admitting that the philosophy of his- tory did not obtain the attention it so well deserves until the commencement of last century, we think that passages can be found, even in very ancient writers, proving the application of philosophic thought to well-known facts. Homer, who is generally supposed to have lived not earlier than the third generation after the Trojan War, and must have learned the particulars of that expedition from oral tradition, or perhaps the recitations of earlier rhapsodists, as he also was acquainted with the Argonantic adventures, the Theban tragedies, and other noteworthy events, has philo- sophised on them so far that he tells us that one ruler is better than a multiplicity of rulers. This maxim, which in- curred the censure of the French rhetorical stripling Etienne de la Boetie, who maintained that the government of many must be a very bad thing because it multiplied the rule of one which is also bad, may be termed the first-fruit of political speculation applied to historical facts, and, early as is its date, the question has not been settled yet. This would almost lead ns to a belief in the inutility of philosophic specu- lation as applied to history with the hope of instruction in political wisdom. Sophocles, who had before his mind a much larger collection of facts, informs us that the insolence of a democracy engenders a military despotism,—a statement proved correct by almost every page of European history. A genuinely philosophic view of history cannot be expected from the amiable but somewhat credulous Herodotus, though the arguments he has put into the mouths of the Persian nobles when discussing the relative merits of monarchy, aris- tocracy, and democracy, seem to show that he was not alto- gether incapable of political thought. But we must admit the claim of Thucydides to be considered not only a historian, but a philosopher, judging from the speeches of his composi- tion to be found in his work, which manifest not only deep thought in the writer, but imperatively demand it from the student ; and we may say the same of Polybius, who entered on the right path when he discerned that " the motive forces of human nature are the great factors of history." Sallust and Tacitus may be deemed to have possessed some share of philosophical acumen through their admirable portraiture of the characters of public men, while the orations to be found in the writings of the former contain, in a brief compass, almost all the political questions that have been discussed even down to the present day, and one of them, that of Catiline to his fellow-traitors, might be found available on Tower Hill or Trafalgar Square. We hold, therefore, that the philosophy of history, germinated in the days of Greece and Rome, re- mained dormant during the Middle Ages, sent forth its branches and buds after the revival of learning, and finally has blossomed and borne an abundant crop, for good or for evil, during the last and the present century.
We have sometimes heard it said that the French are gifted in a wonderful degree with the inventive faculty, but that from a deficiency in perseverance, they too often allow their inventions to be taken up and utilised by other races. They certainly may claim the credit of having invented a standing army nearly a century before any other nation, and of having fostered the infant growth of philosophic history in the writings of Philippe de Comines. Having stood high in the confidence of two rulers of very dissimilar characters— Charles the Bold of Burgundy and Louis XI. of France— having been employed by them in very intricate negotiations, and being a contemporary of two other Sovereigns of un- paralleled sagacity, he was well qualified to judge of the reasonings of public men, as well as of the causes and probable consequences of important events, and first dis- cerned the important difference between public and private character, pointing out how a bad man may prove a good King, so far at least as restraining the tyranny of the ruling caste, preserving tranquillity at home and abroad, and advancing the emolumentary resources of his people are concerned. But we do not agree with our author when he holds that Comines' frequent references to a superintending providence show that he was deficient in just views of philosophic history, for when sagacity and experience fail to account for any remarkable catastrophe, we fail to see to what other agency human thought can have recourse.
If we select any especial author as being the first who took a sound and comprehensive view of the Philosophy of History (though, as we have said previously, we hold that every thoughtful student philosophises more or less) we would agree with the Professor in fixing upon Bodin, who wrote at a period of great religious, political, and social change, both in France and several other European nations. His chief work, the Republic (a title used, no doubt, in the strictly Latin sense, and by no means akin to a democracy), stands in the interval between the Politics of Aristotle and the Spirit of Laws of Montesquieu, and it is to be regretted that we have not a new edition of it with a commentary illustrating it from the speculations of later writers. He protested against the servile respect for Roman law so much in vogue in his day, holding that there was a natural and universal law which could be ascertained only by the careful study of the history of all nations, and also maintained, in opposition to the pessimism of his time, that the progress of humanity was not of deterioration, but of amelioration. In our opinion, some periods of history have exhibited strong indications of improvement, while others have as clearly manifested a rapid descent in vice, folly, and ignorance, so that Bishop Butler was amply justified in his idea that nations, like individuals, may be afflicted with insanity. The Anarchist war of the present day is in no respect more just or rational than the bellum inexpiabile which the mer- cenary soldiers of Carthage waged against their fraudulent em- ployers ; indeed, we are confident that these outlawed revolters appear before the tribunal of history with much cleaner hands than many "free and enlightened citizen-patriots." Progress too, like liberty and many other things generally deemed de- sirable, is not a good per se, its benefits depending totally on the direction it takes and the road it travels. One of the writers criticised by Professor Flint calculates six kinds of revolutions, all of which have much to be said in their favour and much also against them, and we, too, can count seven kinds of progress of which only one can be beneficial to a community. The popularity of Henry IV., the able though unscrupulous and cruel statesmanship of Richelieu, and the theatrical, self-asserting despotism of Louis XIV., caused an eclipse of free discussion on questions of political and philo- sophic history for nearly a century, and though other de- partments of science and literature made great advances, yet, in our author's expressive language, " the Muse of history became a court lady." The only substitutes we find (and these are very insufficient), are memoirs, a department of literature in which France has been pre-eminent, and collec- tions of documents; the former the work of men of action; the latter we owe to the laborious researches of the Benedictine monks, some of whom exhibited a noteworthy sagacity in criticism of evidence. Though the inaccuracy of Mezeray and the bold scepticism of La Mothe le Vayer might have brought discredit on historical studies, yet it was the Dictionnaire Critique of Bayle that obtained an irresistible influence on French students and French society. But his system can by no means be deemed philosophical, for it was simply a belief that there can be no belief. Descartes might have been a philosophic historian, but seems to have despised that study, and certainly his opinion that a code of laws created by a single legislator must be decidedly superior to a legal system which has grown up through the lapse of generations, perhaps of centuries, is refuted by the consistent testimony of all history. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether any single individual ever possessed the ability to compose a complete system of jurisprudence.
We agree in the main with Professor Flint in his praises and censures of Bossuet, which evince sound and moderate critical judgment. Bossuet, however, held that all the events of history formed a well-forged chain in order to work out the success of his own religions system. Our author is therefore judicious in his verdict that he might have done much for philosophic history, had it not been for his purely theological aim. Perhaps we may connect the marked advance in philo- sophic history which manifested itself in the last century, with several fanciful works which appeared during the weak and profligate reign of Louis XV., of which the Mintague of Fenelon is the best known. Strange to say, though the study of Greek had been neglected in France for a considerable time, yet an affectation of Greek manners and sentiments had sprung up, for which Professor Flint, while noticing it, does not account, but which we would refer to the reading of Amyot's translation of Plutarch, which was published a little after the Refo'rmation, and is believed to have much developed the copiousness of the French language. To pass over Freret, to whom the Professor very justly assigns a high degree of merit for industry of research and breadth of view, and Daniel and Velly, in whose favour little can be said, we may fairly say that the spirit of the century and the dawn of a new era in the study of history appeared in Montes- quieu, Turgot, and Voltaire. The first of these, with all his learning and ability, fell short of being fully a philosophic historian, through looking on laws as isolated facts and not discerning their relation to each other, as well as in neglecting to compare different nations or different stages of social advancement. His popularity in England has probably been owing, in part at least, to his praises of the British Constitu- tion, which he really deemed favourable to political freedom only, but not to political virtue, honour, or equality. His works, we hold, are essential to the library of the student of history, politics, or practical philosophy.
Previous page
