BRIBERY AND THE JUDGES.
DO the public—the serious, well-principled, politically- minded, morally disposed public—really wish to put a stop to Bribery at Elections ? That they appear to wish it we all know. No one ever speaks on the subject in Parliament or at political meetings without lamenting the extent to which bribery prevails, and the disastrous impunity with which it is practised,—by the opposite party. It is where the connection between end and means comes in that we are puzzled. The very same people who are continually proclaiming how much they wish bribery to be checked never seem to wish any means to be taken to check it, meaning by this any specific means. They are quite willing to say generally that means should be taken ; but the means to which they entertain no .objection have yet to be discovered. It is really time that this curious discrepancy between words and deeds should come to an end. Bribery may not be so bad a thing as we are accus- tomed to think it, or being a very bad thing it may be as completely beyond the reach of the criminal law as seduction is. Bat if so, let us acknowledge the fact, and give up the pretence of legislating against it. Nobody now puts up warn- ings against man-traps and spring-guns, and if the statutes against bribery are no longer of any value, it would be well to repeal them. The supposed feeling of the Legislature against bribery might be consulted by the distribution during election time of placards, framed on the pattern of those we see in the Parks :—" Candidates are requested not to corrupt the newly- enfranchised voters ;" or, "It is hoped that all parties will respect purity of election." In this way, Parliament would at least make itself less ridiculous than it does now ; the cost of election petitions would be saved to the defeated candidates, and the country would be the richer by the expenses of the Election Judges.
This is one thing that might be done. Another plan would be to make the existing laws effectual, if that is possible ; and if not, to make new laws that shall be more effectual. As there is not the slightest chance that Parliament will openly and avowedly give up the fight against bribery, the choice really lies between these two alternatives, if a choice is made at all. What is most to be feared is that no choice will be made, and that agents will go on giving bribes and voters taking them, until the growth of the electorate, and the gradual ex- clusion of candidates who refuse or are not rich enough to bribe, make the mischief too vast to be dealt with. It used to be thought that the extinction of small boroughs and the introduction of secret voting would between them drive bribery to the wall. When there were only large constituencies, the process would be too costly, while secret voting would make it useless. Neither of these expectations has been in the least justified by experience. The increased size of the constituencies works in two ways. It lessens the sums paid per he id to the voter, and it distributes bribery irregularly over different parts of the constituency. A voter may now have to put up with 103., where formerly he would have held out for £5; or in one district in a town the election may be fairly pure, while in another it is notoriously corrupt. As regards the Ballot, those who expected it to check bribery did not sufficiently distinguish between its effect on coercion and its effect on cor- ruption. Coercion has been very hardly hit by the Ballot.
But then the temper produced in the voter by coercion is altogether different from that produced in him by corruption.
When he has been forced to promise his vote, he is irritated with the man or the party by whom the pressure has been brought to bear, and if he thinks he can break his promise with safety, he is very likely to do so. But the man who has been bribed is in a different mood. So far as he has any feeling about the candidates at all, it is a feeling of good-will to the one from whom he has received money. He has every motive, therefore, to go and vote for him. Gratitude bids him do so ; regard for his word bids him do so; even prospective self-in- terest bids him do so, because if there ceases to be any connec- tion between bribery and success, the custom of corruption may die out. This, indeed, is the root of the difference between corruption and coercion. In the one ease, the voter does not wish a change ; in the other, he does wish it. In the one case, the voter is in his heart opposed to the law ; in the other, he is in his heart favourable to it. To secure secrecy is, in the one
ease, to have the voter working against you just as much as before ; in the other case, it is to have the voter working for
you. The sooner people put out of their heads the notion that any of the natural forces now working in politics will help to check bribery, the sooner they will see facts as they are. The natural forces now working in politics are much more likely to increase it.
Of the two alternatives just suggested, the making the existing laws effectual, if that be possible, and the making of new laws that shall be more effectual, the first is by far the most important. We do not for a moment say that the existing laws can be made effectual ; before this can be affirmed or denied there must be a much more deliberate and sustained effort to put them into execution than has yet been made. What we say is, that until it has been ascertained by experi- ment whether they are effectual or not, it is quite useless to make any new laws. To make the punishment of bribery more severe, or the process of enforcing the penalty more rapid, would have no result whatever, so long as those who are guilty of bribery know perfectly well that it is a hundred to one if the law is ever put into action against them. Suppose that when the Ecclesiastical Titles Act was in existence, some simple-minded person had argued that inasmuch as Roman Catholic Bishops still went on using territorial titles, it was necessary to increase the penalties they incurred by doing so, it would have been pointed out to him that, as a matter of fact, the existing penalties had never been inflicted, and that, so long as nobody cared to see this done, it would be useless to make empty threats still emptier. It is just the same with the laws against bribery. They may be too weak for the work they have to do, but before any opinion can be formed on that point they must be seen at work. When the authorities can honestly say that there is not a single weapon placed in their hands for the suppression of bribery which they have not used to the utmost, then, but not till then, it will be time to grace the Statute-book with fresh measures.
There is one method of putting the existing law into action which seems to have been strangely neglected in the proceed-
ings following on the recent General Election. The Judges have for the most part contented themselves with reporting that the Members whose seats they have declared vacant have by their agents been guilty of bribery, and in some cases they have added that there is reason to believe that corrupt practices have extensively prevailed. But they have not stated who the agents were by whom the members have been guilty of bribery. Now, it is plain that they must know who these agents are, since, without this, there would be no bringing home the bribery to the member. Why, then, are not their names invariably given in the Judge's Report, and why are they not invariably prosecuted by the Govern- ment? It is of no avail to say that, now there is a Public Prosecutor, any one can put him in motion, and there is conse- quently no need for the Government to interfere. What is everybody's business is, and will always remain, nobody's busi- ness; and where the character and composition of the House of Commons are at stake, it is the duty of the Government to see that everything that can be done to maintain and improve them is done. Even if failures to obtain a conviction were frequent, it would still be worth while to bring every accused person to trial. The annoyance and expense of a criminal trial is considerable, however it ends, and it may fairly be hoped that if the people who concern themselves in elections knew that if they were dis- covered to have given bribes, they would certainly be named in the Judge's Report ; and that, if named in a Judge's Report, they would certainly be prosecuted, they would be a good deal more careful not to give the law a chance to get hold of them. The first step towards this re- form must be taken by the Election Judges. If they will in future make a point of naming every person about whose complicity in corrupt acts they feel reasonably certain, they will do a far greater service to the public than by sorrowing over the hard fate of an unseated Member, or suggesting that the law should be relaxed in the one particular in which it is effectual at all.
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