SHALL THE KAISER BE TRIED? T IME has a notoriously dulling
effect, and though it is difficult to judge in such a matter, we should say that the British people arc much more conscious now than they were immediately after the Armistice of the trouble and inconvenience which might be involved in bringing the Kaiser to trial. For our part, we arc not at all inclined to have the edge taken off our conviction that the Kaiser ought to be tried. It is stated that many of the worst offenders among the German military and naval officers are to be tried, although the list has been greatly reduced ; but such a trial would surely be deprived of reality if the Kaiser himself, who was the Supreme War Lord over them all, were to go free./Unhapply the whole business has become wrapped in an atmosphere of suspicion and insincerity. It is suggested that Mr. Lloyd George never really wanted to have the Kaiser tried because he thought the risks would be greater than the advantages, and that when he made promises he was only presenting an appetizing bait to the British electorate. It is hinted, therefore, that the Allies will be glad if Holland steadily maintains her present refusal to hand over the Kaiser. All this is unfortunate ; if we were governed in the right way such humiliating suspicions could not thrive. The truth, however, remains that if there was good reason for trying the Kaiser more than a year ago, there is not a whit less reason now.
The purpose in trying the Kaiser would not be vengeance or vindictiveness in any form. Such motives, if we were guilty of them, would disgrace us even more than they would injure the Kaiser. The whole purpose should be to teach such a lesson to the world and to all would-be disturbers of the peace that it could never be forgotten.
Everybody would be compelled to say in future : "Sec what happened to the man who out of arrogant ambition and sinister intrigue sent to their death millions of innocent men and ruined many other millions who survived." A judgment against the Kaiser would undoubtedly have the merit of conveying to the world this solemn and portentous lesson. But we must not of course assume that the Kaiser is personally guilty till a scrupulously fair trial has proved that he is. It might be shown that though he was nomin- ally responsible since he bore the title • of Supreme War Lord, he had been pushed into every act of wickedness by some force stronger than his own power of resistance. At all events, the guilt would be fixed somewhere. The lesson would not be lost. Unfortunately it looks as though the delay in bringing the Kaiser to trial has been so lengthy that it is now almost useless to expect that the Dutch will give him up. Doubt of the determination of the Allies has during the past year infected the Dutch Government, and it would be contrary to all the present indications if they decided to yield. In that case it would not be a practical policy to coerce Holland. It is not to be thought of that we should go to war with her or blockade her. We should simply have to admit that once more the condemna- tion "Too late" had reacted upon Mr. Lloyd George himself. Nevertheless a praktical solution would still be possible. The Kaiser could be tried in his absence. If the Kaiser were found guilty by a Court acting with scrupulous judicial fairness, and judgment were delivered for every one to read, it would be put on record and known once for all that no ruler of a country, whether he be an Emperor or a President or a Commissary or a Constitu- tional Prime Minister, can break the laws of humanity or a Treaty without incurring punishment. What an impression that would produce ! The humblest person would understand that the law of civilization is no respecter of even the proudest. It would be known that the Kaiser had escaped the just penalty of his deeds not because he deserved to do so, but simply because owing to the defi- ciencies or technicalities of international law it was im- possible to secure possession of his person. It would be a tremendous fact in itself to have it on judicial record, and not as a mere assertion of propaganda or as the pronounce- ment of historians supposed to be prejudiced, that there is a vast and recognized difference between dean dealing and unclean dealing. It would for ever afterwards be accepted that the German principle that if you have war you are justified in making it as bestial as possible must bring on the guilty not only the loathing of mankind but the severest plinishment. The -right policy for the Allies to have pursued would have been to make the control of the Kaiser's movements one of the terms of peace. It ought to have been arranged that if he ever left Holland he would be instantly seized. Of course virtually the same result might be achieved even now by a trial. If the Kaiser were found guilty and condemned, he would know that he could stir out of Holland only at his own peril. In only one way that we can see has the long hesitation of the Allies been useful. In the interval it has become• plain that the Kaiser is weakened in health and depressed in spirit beyond the hope of recovery, and that he is there- fore incapable of drawing the sword again and leading a• popular cause. Of course Holland is so near to the European seed-beds of intrigue that the Kaiser's presence there looks dangerous ; he is rather in the position which the French émigrés occupied at Coblenz ; but there is happily no sign that the influence which the emigres undoubtedly had on the affairs of the country they had left can be imitated by the Kaiser. Everything that happens, every publication of a fresh political document, tends to bring the character of the Kaiser further into dislike or contempt. Take for example the long and remarkable series of letters written by the Kaiser to the late Emperor of Russia which have been published in the Morning Post. The genuineness of these letters has been admitted by the Kaiser himself, who has protested against their publication. The letters reveal a theatrical, unstable, and overbearing character, not without generous impulses, but so illogical and contradictory that the Kaiser was evidently one of the last men in the world fitted to have the destiny of millions in their keeping. We see him urging on the Tsar to be false to his French Allies, to make a Treaty with Germany behind their backs, and to keep that Treaty secret ; we see him, again, egging on the Tsar to go to war with Japan, and when the war ended in disaster we find him still offering his advice with the same pre- sumptuous air of confidence. When we compare the warm words of friendship and family affection which the Kaiser uses throughout the correspondence with the evil and dishonourable courses which he recommended to the Tsar, we can only say that the Kaiser in these letters has drawn of himself one of the most perfect full-length portraits in existence of the faux bonhomme. But, after all, in what form is the Kaiser to be tried ? The unrealities of international law have continually been brought forward as a decisive reason against any attempt to try the Kaiser. In our judgment, international law is quite real enough for the purpose. Very similar objections in the different circumstances were raised when it was proposed to try Charles I. There was no law under which a King could be tried by his subjects. Of course not ! But it was retorted that there was quite enough law in the world to condemn him. And so there was. Great Britain and Prussia were very wise in their gener- ation when, after Waterloo, they steered clear of all the rocks and shallows of international law and removed Napoleon to a place of safe keeping as an act of public policy. In our present circumstances such an act is of course impossible. If we had seized the Kaiser, we should have had to seize him as an act of war, long ago. But if the Allies behave henceforth with sincerity and conviction they will make all their arrangements for trying the Kaiser in his absence, even while they continue'to negotiate with Holland on the offchance that the Dutch Government may after all give up their prisoner. The first step should be to hold an inquiry for the purpose of framing an indict- ment. Why should not a small Commission consisting of a single representative of each of the Allies be asked to answer the following questions : (1) Of what crimes and offences, if any, has the Kaiser been guilty under the Hague agreements to which Germany was a party and under the recognized customs of war 1 (2) What should be the constitution of the Court entrusted with the duty of trying the Kaiser on the assumption that the first question has been answered in such a way as to make a trial valid ? The inquiry by a small Commission such ati we propose might be quite brief. We cannot ourselves see the least difficulty in the way of their performing the Grand Jury work of returnin-g or refusing a true bill. The Kaiser as Supreme War Lord was at the least nominally responsible when the grossest cruelties were inflicted upon prisoners—cruelties expressly declared an offence by the Hague Conveneions ; when French and Belgian towns were burnt and ravaged by military orders on the plea of retali- ation—though that plea had been ruled out by the Hague Conventions ; when hostages were shot—though the shooting of hostages is specifically condemned by the Hague Conventions ; when the customs of war were violated by the sinking of unarmed merchant vessels and by killing those who had taken to the boats ; and when poison-gas was introduced—although that, again, was specifically forbidden by the Hague Conventions.
The higher the position of the culprit, the greater, we admit, is the risk of being unjust to him. There must in this case be not even a shadow of a suspicion that the trial is unfair. There must be no judgment by popular passion—though, as we have seen, that danger has dwindled, and a contrary danger has rather asserted itself of forgetting about the Kaiser. There must be no shouts of " Away with him " or " What further need have we of witnesses ? '1 There must be real justice hedged about with all the strictest forms that legal experience has evolved. The Kaiser must be assumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. He must on no account be charged with general and vague offences such as making unnecessary war, but with definite and concrete acts. And it must further be proved that he was actually responsible for, or was an accomplice in, those acts—not just a figurehead whose sanction was used without his knowledge. If the Kaiser should be condemned on such counts as we have mentioned and in such a way as we have described, the impression produced everywhere would be immeasurable and entirely beneficent. The thing is not merely worth doing ; it is the duty of the Allies to do it.
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