BERLIN AND THE WEST
WIMF. it now looks as if some kind of a four- power meeting might emerge from present exchanges between the powers on Berlin, it is not very easy to see what could be discussed, far less agreed on, at such an encounter. Dr. Adenauer very properly would like discussion to prevent the repetition of such acts as the murder of Peter Fechter. Mr. Khrushchev would like it in order to gain concessions which might enable him to eliminate the West Berlin enclave and, thereby, prop up Herr Ulbricht's shaky regime. Between these two opposites stand various degrees of worry on the part of America, Britain and France as to the possible consequences of rising tension in Berlin. The extreme caution which Mr. Khrushchev has so far shown in his dealings with the Berlin question shows that he himself is not immune to such fears.
In face of the Berlin problem we in the West must keep our heads and also our sense of values. To describe the wall, as Mr. R. H. S. Crossman has recently done, as 'a prerequisite for peaceful co-existence' is not merely to throw rather a lurid light on what is meant by 'co-existence,' but also to desert our own democratic ideals the moment they are threatened. We may not be able to do anything about the murders committed by the Volkspolizei, but we should not be prepared to accept them or regard them as anything but out- rages. To desire the continuance of tyranny on the grounds that protests against it may lead us into danger is not compatible with a genuine be- lief in freedom, nor is it, in the long run, the best way of securing our own safety.
On the other hand, we should certainly not sur- render to clarion calls for 'strong' action which go far beyond the bounds both of common sense and reality. The West must consider what it can reasonably do to lessen the tension in Berlin and also the actual objectives of its policy there, which seem to have become a little confused. Un- doubtedly, our first obligation is to the population of West Berlin who have trusted in our inten- tions and who have behaved with admirable sang- froid throughout an extremely trying seventeen years. They must not only be protected from
falling under the sway of Herr Ulbricht, but must also feel themselves to be protected. That is why a UN solution would now be very difficult, and why the West cannot accept Mr. Khrushchev's demand for a withdrawal of allied troops.
, Secondly, there are our commitments to our West German allies. These imply the non-recog- nition of the East German Government and also, more dubiously, a refusal to make final the Oder- Neisse line. This latter point, however, has been conceded so far in practice that it is no longer even a bargaining counter. The ratification of the Oder-Neisse frontier would surprise nobody.
The two questions, therefore, on which a negotiation on Berlin would rest are the allied presence in Berlin to protect the population of West Berlin and the recognition of the Pankow government. And it would seem that, on the first of these points, there is no concession which can be usefully made by the West. There is no half- way house between our troops staying and their going, and their departure at the present time would be received by the West Berlin population as a betrayal. As to recognition of Herr Ulbricht, such a step by .the West would require con- cessions by the Russians in return, which they have so far shown no willingness to make. If we were forced to choose between de facto recog- nition and our position in West Berlin, then we should recognise that the latter is more important than a gesture which, after all, implies no moral approval. But until Mr. Khrushchev has carried out his threat to sign an East German peace treaty, this alternative will not be posed.
It follows that a four-power meeting on Berlin seems likely to produce little more than some un- official agreement to moderate tension on both sides. That, of course, would be something, but it would not solve the main difficulties. What we may hope is that Mr. Khrushchev, having gained the kudos which would accrue to him from the signature of a peace treaty with Pankow, will re- main content with that. Any weakness at the present time on our part could only encourage him to increase his pressure on our position in Berlin,
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