THE CRISIS CAUSED BY MOROCCO.
THE situation in Morocco, complicated and difficult as it is, will not inevitably disturb the peace which the European Powers are, for the moment at any rate, so anxious to preserve. The few Europeans in the interior are retiring to the coast as rapidly as they can. The ports can be protected by men-of-war, and a partial suspension of trade can be endured for a time without ruin to those primarily interested. For any serious operations the right of initiative rests with France, both by Treaty and by the geographical necessities of the position ; and the statesmen of France have evidently decided that the time for action on a great scale is not opportune. They are sorely tempted, no doubt, for of recent years French politicians, whether Royalist, Imperialist, or Republican, have aspired to the com- plete control of North. Africa,—that is, to the possession of a complete and magnificent dependent Empire, and to that dominant position in the Mediterranean of which France has always, not unnaturally, dreamed The present moment, however, though it seems to give them such a chance, is clearly not held to be opportune. There is no overwhelming necessity, and the conquest of Morocco is made more rather than less difficult by the anarchy into which the unhappy Empire appears at last to have fallen. The Moors, whose astonishing courage is revealed in every skirmish, are convinced that the" peaceful penetration" of their Empire is but a euphemism for its subjugation, and are obviously prepared to proclaim a " Jehad," or Holy War,—that is, to appeal to all Moham- medans to assist in defending the independence of a Mussulman State always reverenced by the Moslem as the seat of a dynasty which descends from the Prophet him- self. Even if the French dependencies did not rise in in- surrection at the summons—and that remains a permanent danger, for it has always been the plan of the Senoussi sect who fill the military monasteries of the hinterland—the Moors would be assisted by. all the braver and more fanatical spirits in territories which, including their own, are now occupied by a population of at least fifteen millions. Needing scarcely any commissariat, fighting when their cartridges are exhausted with the sabre and the spear, and able to march tIto miles for one of any European force, the Moors would tax the strength of an army of a hundred thousand white men, and if they fought guerilla fashion might, in that climate and over those vast plains and mountains, so wear it down that a complete European victory might be unattainable. Moreover, even if victory were attained, it must be followed by occupation ; and, in the doubtful condition of Continental Europe, the graver and more competent Frenchmen are unwilling to pledge either their reorganised Army or their heavily pressed Treasury to so exhausting and tedious an enterprise. They believe in the help of Great Britain in certain contingencies, but they are accustomed to distrust the value of that help in any great contest by land, and they would prefer to wait until circumstances are more favourable, or at least until Russia could afford them an amount of assistance, diplomatic or material, which could not for the present be expected. They consequently prefer peace, and when France prefers peace, peace usually reigns.
We do not think that any careful observer will dispute this conclusion ; but unfortunately it does not quite cover the whole ground. By creed, by race, and by tradition the Moors are an Asiatic people, and an unconquered Asiatic people when harassed too far by internal difficul- ties or oppression always seeks relief in one way. It does not proclaim a Republic or accept a new Constitution, but secures a change either in the dynasty or in the immediate occupant of the absolute throne. By all accounts the Moors are now trying this old and often successful expedient. They have persuaded or compelled Mulai Hafid, eldest of the Shereefian house, whom they believe to be a brave and able man, to proclaim himself Sultan. That personage is well aware, whether he has acted voluntarily or under com- pulsion, that he must succeed or he will be put to death, and has accordingly ordered Abd-ul-Aziz, the present Emperor, his own younger brother, to quit the throne, and retire to Mecca on a large, though probably irregularly paid, pension. Abd-ul-Aziz, a weak man given to toys like motor- cars and musical boxes, and to an over-numerous harem, has incurred the loathing contempt of the majority of his subjects, and in the absence of Kaid Maclean cannot rely even upon his guard. He will, therefore, probably either be assassinated, or will retire through Algeria to that refuge for all Mussulmans whom circumstances have defeated, and who are convinced that they ought to reseek in the Holy City the forfeited favour of the Almighty. Once enthroned at Fez, Mulai Hafid may, if he possesses the qualities attributed to him, rebuild the Empire, protect Europeans, and thus give to his people and to Europe a truce for a generation ; but he might also take another line, and though it is, in our opinion, not likely that he will do so, the possibility is worth con- sideration. He is a Mussulman pur sm./. The party which is supporting him is "fanatical "—that is, holds it its duty to exterminate, or, at all events, subjugate, all infidels—and he might be willing or compelled to carry out the " Jehad " to the bitter end. It is conceivable, therefore, that he might proclaim war on the French as the most dangerous of infidels, and if he could force them to fight in the open, might inflict on them some considerable reverse. Should this happen, all Northern Africa would be in flames. In other words, the peace which all men are now seeking would be broken or suspended, and the immediate future would once more become too doubtful for human calculation. This is the real danger, and we should say that, on the whole, the most hopeful method of preventing it is for France, should the new Sultan make a strong position for himself, to accept him as the de facto Sovereign, provided, of course, that his rise to power is marked by no atrocities such as will make it impossible for a civilised Power to have dealings with him. There is great respect in every Mussulma,n country for a. Sovereign who succeeds; there is great, though secret, fear of the " devilish " power of Europe ; and the Moors, in dread of their own Sultan, and in hope of comparative quiet and prosperity, may wait, as they have done through generations, the will of the Lord, who, though He is certain to give them ultimate victory, has, as they clearly perceive, revealed neither the time nor the instruments at which and through whom it will be accomplished. The hope of a quiet Morocco is a Sultan who can govern as well as reign.
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