Moscow Prepares for the Clash

CHINA -

From DEV MURARKA

MOSCOW rri HE Soviet Union is just as alarmed and dis-

1 mayed by the `Great Cultural Revolution' in China as everybody else. But the Russian alarm is greater because they consider the Chinese developments to be specifically directed against the Soviet Union. Internal repercussions in China apart, what really worries them is that from now on they have to take the possibility of an armed conflict with China very seriously.

They note that a major part of the present cam- paign in China is directed against the Soviet Union as if to wipe out every trace of any re- lationship or friendship in the past. This is why they believe that the young ones are being in- doctrinated and the intelligentsia is being pushed into the cold.

The Soviet analysts think that Lin Piao's ascendency above all is neither accidental nor of small consequence. They consider it as a de- liberate step by Mao Tse-tung to prepare China for a war, possibly against America but more likely against the Soviet Union. Because of this the army has been given the leadership of the `Cultural Revolution.' Even the rise of Lin Piao is of lesser significance than the fact that for the first time in the history of a Communist state the army is taking precedence over the party. This is unlikely to be a temporary phenomenon.

This aspect of the `Cultural Revolution,' there- fore, is considered to be a factor of enormous political and ideological significance. There is little doubt here that the destruction of the party apparatus has become the prime goal of the Chinese army leaders. Hence the encouragement given by them to the Red Guards to attack party offices and officers, to attack institutions con- trolled by the party and even whole organisations like the Young Communists. It is a misnomer to call it a purge because it is on a scale which staggers even the Russians, who cannot find a parallel in their own history, although events during the Stalin period were bloody enough. It is the prolonged mass hysteria being generated by the Chinese which is considered to be the most destructive and dangerous in the long run.

On the whole, the Soviet outlook about the future in China is very pessimistic. The signs of resistance which have been noted are not being taken too seriously. It is felt that while the resis- tance is genuine enough and may have surprised even the Chinese leaders, it cannot remain un- broken for long.

It is clear, however, that even the Soviet analysts are baffled by the course of events in China. They are still in the process of making up their minds. What the Soviet press has done so far is to expose with tremendous skill and at great length all the evils of the Chinese revolu- tion. In itself it simply means that the Soviet public is being prepared to face any eventuality. But the decision to do so was not taken lightly. The long silence about China was broken only because a point of no return had been reached.

It came with the eleventh session of the eighth central committee of the Communist party of China. It was held last August. The resolution adopted there condemning the Soviet party and leadership was considered by the Soviet leaders to end all possibilities of any rapprochement with China. It was realised that Mao was bent upon an irrevocable break. Once this conclusion was drawn the Soviet reply was not long in coming, and during the first two weeks of September the Soviet press exposed the Chinese most systematically, as had never been done before.

The Russians. however, cannot rest content with this. They feel that the Chinese must be completely isolated and made harmless before they strike in any decisive manner. That they are still capable of great mischief was proved once again in Mongolia. According to reports reaching Moscow recently the Chinese offered the Outer Mongolians unity with Inner Mongolia and freedom for Inner Mongolia. In effect it meant promoting an independent all-Mongolian state. The only price they demanded was, of course, a Mongolian alliance against the Soviet Union.

The offer was turned down flat by the Mon- golians for obvious reasons. The chief one was that since the Maoist takeover in Peking the two million Mongols of Inner Mongolia have been swamped by about ten million Chinese. Even with one million of their own population combined with other Mongols the Mongolians will be a permanent minority in their own country. As it is, the sentiment for Mongol unity is no longer a very live or practical concept. Had the Chinese manoeuvre succeeded, however, it would have been a terrible blow to the Russians, who value the strategic importance of Mongolia as a buffer state very highly.

Incidents like these have made it imperative for the Soviet Union to take some definite measures against the Chinese. These will not come about immediately, because the Russians do not want to act alone or in haste. First of all they are still waiting to see how the denouement of the 'Cultural Revolution' takes place. Only then (hay can draw their final conclusions. Secondly, their first step is towards consultation on a wide scale within the Communist movement.

These have begun. Only a few days ago the East German and the Mongolian leaders were in Moscow. Mr Brezhnev is visiting the Bul- garians. There is now genuine pressure from some East European countries and West European Communist parties to act to restrain the Chinese and their example. Even more encouraging from the Soviet viewpoint are recent signs of a change in the attitude of North Korea. until recently one of the most vociferous supporters of Peking. It appears that a stage is being set for a world Communist meeting which will denounce Peking.

It is not difficult to imagine what the indict- ment of China will be. In fact the North Koreans have already provided a very rough draft of the nature of the indictment in their recent article de- nouncing Trotskyism. It is a euphemism for Maoism. The most serious criticism of China, however, would be that by allowing the army to take precedence and he supreme over the party the Chinese have forfeited the right to call them- selves Marxists. Pravda was saying as much when, recently, it pointed out that there was no working- class participation in the 'Cultural Revolution.'

The Russians are certainly relieved that the Chinese have presented them with an opportunity to isolate China and somewhat eased the problems of their foreign policy for the time being. But if ideologically China is considered beyond the pale it has also become a bigger security problem. For this the Russians arc well prepared, militarily as well as politically. Militarily the Soviet and Mongolian borders with China are among the best guarded.

Politically the Russians are equally well pre- pared. China's allies have been more or less

weaned away and others are in the process of disowning China. In Asia and in the Far East, particularly, the Russians have acquired allies on whose support—moral, if not material—they can count. For the lime being, therefore, they see no future for China except to withdraw in her own isolation. No one here believes that the isolation will affect the Chinese attitude one way or the other. Pravda, though, has made the point that some people in China have been worried about the isolation of their country and for all their worries they got the full Red Guard treatment.

Relations between neighbours, however, rarely come to a full stop even if the pauses are long. The Russians are under no illusion that even after the cultural revolution has- run its course, even after China has been excluded from the community of the Communist nations, they will not have to deal with China. Their hope lies in the fact that Mao is playing politics beyond his death, and not even he can ensure control of events then. For all we know in the political river of China this may be Mao's last long swim and after him the current will slowly resume its even flow. Even the Russians allow for the im- possible where China is concerned.