THE AMU. UDE OF AUSTRIA.
WEEMLord Derby intimated the other day that at least ObnIe European Power would resist, probably even at the cost of war, "the substitution of a Sclavonic for a Turkish State," every one was aware that he alluded to Austria. And there isno doubt that, in reality, the English policy has been more influenced by that of Austria than by that of any other Power. Unless we are greatly mistaken, no foreign statesman has more influence with Lord Derby than Herr von Beust ; and probably enough Lord Beaconsfield, who in old times used to exhibit a profound confidence in the policy and the military power of Austria, has recurred to his former frame of mind, justifying it by the consideration that as Germany is neutral, or even dis- posed to favour the Austrian policy, the Government of Vienna is still of sufficient account in the Eastern Question to make it quite safe for England to stand by it. And certainly Austria ever since the beginning of the year has been the one great European Power which has vehemently and tenaciously re- sisted any serious alteration in the status quo. The Andrassy Note, the Berlin Memorandum, both of them in effect Austrian measures, were mere stop-gaps to prevent any disturbance of the equilibrium as long as possible, and especially to prevent any accession to the number of Slavonic Powers. The refusal to occupy Bosnia was dictated by a precisely similar motive. The increase of the number of Slavonic Powers is hateful to Hungary, but the increase in the number of the Slavonic con- stituents of Austro-Hungary is hardly less hateful. It may be admitted that if Austria were to occupy Bosnia, the Hungarian Ministry would be able to exercise a certain amount of influ- ence in keeping down Bosnia. Still the number of Slavonic constituents of Austria, and the weight of the Slavonic element in the Austrian Army, are already so consider- able, that any course which would carry the centre of gravity of Austria still further towards the Slavonic side, is, above all things, odious to the Hungarian Ministry. The policy of Austria has, therefore, been from the first a dog-in- the-manger policy. She will not annex any part of the Sla- vonic dependencies, because that would tend to make her still more of a Slavonic Power. She will not allow their inde- pendence, because that would tend to increase the number of the external attractions on the Slavonic elements of her own State. Again, we have reason to know that, as regards the conduct of the war itself, Austria's action has been anything bat that of true neutrality. She has interfered especially with Monte- negro, of whose influence among the small Slavonic States she is very jealous, and she has interfered so as greatly to cripple the campaign of Prince Nikita. If it be true that amongst the terms of peace proposed by the Powers the rectification of the Montenegrin frontier in a sense favourable to Montenegro— so, for instance, as to give her a port on the Adriatic—has been included, it must have been in spite of the most pertinacious resistanee on the part of Austria to that proposal, which she bitterly dislikes and resents. Worse still, when the Prince of Montenegro reached Nevesinje, on the way to Mostar, we have reason to believe that Austria sent a peremptory message to the Prince to 'warn him that he would not be allowed to hold that place, and that if he took it, he would be driven out by the Austrian army. The fear of this intervention has crippled the whole course of the Montenegrin operations, otherwise so brilliantly conducted ; though we are inclined to think that the Prince has made a serious mistake in not forcing Austria to show her hand, and then yielding to her force majeure. For though the policy of Austria from beginning to end has been purely selfish, and dictated by no regard at all to the welfare of the Slavonic populations outside her own border, that has 41 not yet been made conspicuous to all Europe; • and to have made it conspicuous to all Europe would have produced a great effect in diminishing the diplomatic weight of Austria in Europe. Austria has wished to keep up the status quo, and especially not to weaken the power of Turkey, not from any large Euro- pean policy, but solely because any conceivable disturbance of the status quo must have brought new political influence to the Slavonic States, and new political influence to the Slavonic States is just what the Hungarian statesmen who now control the foreign policy of Austria, most vehemently dread. They desire as eagerly to make the Magyar influence predominate in the Slavonic constituents of Austria, as Russia does to make the Russian influence predominate in the Polish constituents of Russia. And everything that tends either to fortify the Slavonic element in Austria, or to stimulate Slavonic pride and self- esteem in the neighbourhood of Austria, militates, of course, against their plans.
We greatly fear that England has been made too much the instrument of these selfish Austrian pretensions. We know perfectly well, from Mr. Disraeli's avowals in Par- liament, that all the pressure we could put on Sends to prevent her from coming to the aid of Bosnia and Herze- govina was applied before the war broke out. Then clearly we were playing the Austrian game. And now, again, Lord Derby seems to be supporting her selfish protest against giving anything like real independence to these Slavonic States,—not, of course, that England objects on principle ; Lord Derby has repeatedly assured us that she does not,—but that she parades all the practical difficulties in the way, and lets every other European Power see that she is at one practically with Austria in the matter, though she professes to be quite disinterested in her support of that selfish and crooked policy. And then we are assured osten- tatiously that if we adopted the cause of the independence of the Slavonic States, we should certainly stand alone, and probably have one active foe ; and this, though Count Schouvaloff sounded Lord Derby in the spring on a plan for establishing a real autonomy, and was put off by Lord Derby's reference to the practical difficulties in the way. Of course, when we have given no European Power the least hope of our support- ing the political independence of the Slavonic States, it is no wonder that none of them have promised to support us. makes all the difference in the world to the views of the statesmen of such an empire as Russia, or even Germany, whether they could or could not hope for the cordial aid of the British Government in any proposed policy, and they would never again make advances which had once been coldly repulsed. On the other hand, it is all very well for Austria to make a great show of active hostility to any such plan, so long as she knows that no other Power is seriously urging it. We suspect the hints of her armed opposition would soon become exceedingly dubious and hesitating, if she saw the least prospect of a real autonomy being efficiently urged by a disinterested European Power. Austria has been the dog in the manger of the recent diplomatic position just because she has found Great • Britain willing to back her up in that mean and miserable attitude. If Great Britain had taken a nobler line, Austria would have been compelled to adopt one at least leas ignoble.
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