SIDING WITH INDIA
The blows suffered by the Indian subcontinent since independence have been stunning, cumulative and overwhelming. Chaos, deprivation, natural disaster, famine and, now, incipient war existing on India's borders with East Pakistan together make this its most critical time. With Mrs Indira Gandhi in London this week, it is of great importance for British statesmen to remember the long catalogue of misery in which modern Indian history consists; to anticipate that the worst of the present disaster has yet to be seen; and to appreciate the great fortitude and skill with which Mrs Gandhi and her people have handled the situation. We have become for so long accustomed to regarding the Indian problem as insoluble — and have sometimes even gone so far as to fear if not to predict the break-up of the Indian federation — that it may require a special effort of will and imagination to base future policy on an understanding of the situation as it is, and on recognition of the Indian will to tackle it and survive.
In this Indian sub-continental situation the considerations of international power politics and of humanity are inextricably mixed. It is inevitable : it is a reality so blatant that it is folly either to deny it or to decry it. The will of the present government of Pakistan to restore its sundered state is powerful, and incalculable. Likewise, the will of the Bangla Desh insurgents to create a new nation on the periphery of Central Asia is also both powerful and incalculable. The question that faces Britain — as it must face any power sentimentally or politically involved in the foreign policy problems of the region and in the matter of relief of human suffering — is how all these factors are to be built into a policy that will procure both political stability and relief of famine, for no lesser policy will do.
There can be no gainsaying the substantial nature of the British contribu tion to relief. Of course it is not enough; and it is perfectly possible that we should be able to do more. But our con tribution, in material and human aid, has been substantial. The question that now faces the government is whether adjustments or changes in overall policy, or alterations in the machinery of relief itself, can achieve more than is being achieved now, to procure either a hope of political stability, or a distinct amelioration of the condition of the Pakistani refugees. It is inappropriate that a country like this one, with wideranging interests in the area, a long and intimate involvement with the people of the sub-continent, and a great humanitarian tradition, should merely content itself with shovelling food and medicine in the general direction of the afflicted areas, and at the same time be unwilling to make the effort involved in an imaginative and intellectual appreciation and re-appraisal of the whole situation.
Our general position in foreign policy matters is to recognize the government in control of a given country, and be prepared to deal with it. Where no government appears to be wholly in control — as in East Pakistan — we tend to recognize and accept the status quo ante. Though usually wise, this general attitude often leads to inactivity, and this tendency is particularly strongly set in the present situation, where both countries involved are members of the Commonwealth and where, therefore, British policy is especially inclined and prevailed upon to be inoffensive and indecisive.
The issue having become a quarrel between Indian and Pakistan, Britain must decide whether the policy of neutrality can be maintained, or whether we ought to be prepared to follow the lead of one of the countries involved, at the expense of alienating the other. If a decision for action is taken, then it must be a decision to support and comfort India. It is India which bears a burden that ought to lie on the world's conscience; it is India's stability which is most threatened by the refugee influx; and it is the political coherence and influence of India which offers the best hope of future peace and order in central Asia itself, particularly among the smaller powers above the North-West Frontier. If there is to be a departure from amiable and inoffensive indecision, therefore, it must be a departure on the side of India. The question that must be discussed in detail with Mrs Gandhi is what she requires from us in this regard.
Should such a political decision be taken, then from it other decisions and other actions would flow. The history of relief in East Pakistan since the first disasters has been one in which lack of intimacy between governments has bedevilled humanitarian work. If there are to be any effective moves in the near future they will depend on the creation of such intimacy. Even so, new machinery will be required to give a fresh and dramatic impetus to relief work. The creation of such machinery will itself require new and perhaps radical departures. In the nature of the situation, and given their supine record in the matter, nothing can be hoped for from the United Nations; and it is therefore to be regretted that the Foreign Secretary has gone on record as saying that the only hope of substantial and well-organised relief is through the activation of the mandarins of Turtle Bay. What is to be done must be done between governments. What will be done depends on political will and political decisions. What can be done and how it is to be done — or whether anything is to be done at all — will depend on the conversations to be held between the British government and the Prime Minister of India. No more potentially fateful or consequential talks have been held between Britain and India since independence. They will be useless unless the British government uses the occasion of Mrs Gandhi's visit to shed its ancient sentiments favouring Pakistan, and makes it abundantly clear in word and deed that we are no longer able to main' tam n a neutral posture vis-à-vis India and Pakistan but have now decided to side with India.
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