THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE
[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] SIR,—In commenting on the debates in Parliamett Ofi- the Palestine Report you, in common with almost every one who ` has discussed the subject, find little virtue in partition' but observe that no better alternative is forthcoming. Sir Arnold Wilson, on another page of the same issue, adopts in effect- the same pessimistic outlook. But can this conclusion rightly be .reached until, for instance, Lord Samuel's alternative has been examined ? The kernel of Lord Samuel's proposal is complete autonomy for both Jews and Arabs in many of the most important matters that touch them closest, without any control of Jew over Arab or of Arab over Jew. If such an autonomy could be granted, would not the legitimate grievances of both sides be largely met, and might not the removal of the risk of domination in this wide field, one that touches every inhabitant of Palestine very closely, relax the tension in other fields and render co-operation there easier ? Partition has come as a great menace to all to whom Palestine is more than a Jewish Palestine or an Arab Palestine, and since the appearance of the Report a more accommodating and reasonable spirit has shown itself in Palestine and outside among responsible and repre- sentative Arabs and Jews. Partition carries with it such terrible risks that every alternative that has any promise should be tried first. After all, any other plin, if it fails, can be followed by another, but there is only one way of withdrawing sovereign independence from a people and no friend of Palestine or of any of its inhabitants will wish that to be pursued.
Since I am writing to you I should like to refer to 'the antici- pation in your leading article of July 16th in which you indi-: cate one satisfactory consequence, in your Opinion, of partition —namely, a reduction of the British forces, presumably to the figures of 1926 or 1927. But will partition, if, as seems prob- able, it is bitterly oppbsed by lai-ger sections of both populations, lead to this satisfactory result ? Britain will have to hold a number of isolated cities and also a militarily indefensible corridor. It is not suggested that neighbouring Powers will invade these territories, but they will be continuously open to raids and a relatively large force will be necessary to protect them. Then there are the new Arab and Jewish States, for which legally Britain may have no responsibility, but can she stand by in the event, by nomeans an improbability, of hostili- ties breaking out between them ? As it is the Royal Commis- sion has recommended a perpetual British armed guard between the Arab town of Jaffa and the Jewish one of Tel Aviv, and also between Jaffa and her Jewish suburb on the south. There are also the minorities in both territories for whom there are to be safeguards. If a safeguard is necessary can there, in view of experienees in Europe and elsewhere; be any real one except a British force close at hand ? Hitherto Palestine and Trans- jordan have cost the British Exchequer nothing, except a small grant-in-aid to Transjordan. Even -last year the cost of the army was paid' out of Palestine funds. But the expense of administering three States must be far larger than of one, especially with the somewhat parsimonious British Treasury behind it. The new British mandatory territory will certainly need a grant in aid : it is very doubtful whether the proposed grant of a lump sum to the Arab State will obviate the need for annual payments in the future. The suggestion of a grant from the Jewish State can hardly be considered serious. It seems more than probable that Palestine after partition will cost the. British Treasury far more than Transjordan alone has cost 32 Teignmouth Road, N.W. 2.
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