THE / U1URE OF MOROCCO.
THE full account of recent events in Morocco which has been supplied by the able correspondent of the Central News, makes it clear that Sir Charles Euan-Smith has acted wisely as well as courageously in the conduct of the negotiations with the Sultan. At first sight, it seemed possible that Sir Charles, or, at any rate, those who in- structed him, had been unnecessarily aggressive, and that our Envoy had been attempting to imitate on a smaller stage the ways of Lord Stratford de Radcliffe. It has been asked :—' What need was there to stir the question at all, and to make another point of friction with France ? To strained relations with the French over Egypt, why add strained relations over Morocco The matter should have been let alone, and our object should have been to main- tain the status quo as long as possible, for the very good reason that the status quo did not bring us into difficulties with France, while any infringement of it was bound to do so.' No doubt this sounds plausible enough, but, as a matter of fact, Sir Charles Euan-Smith could not have acted otherwise than he did. Not only the con- ditions under which European trade is carried on, but the condition of the Moorish Empire itself, in which re- bellion, famine, and bankruptcy are combining to bring to ruin what is not already ruined, made it absolutely neces- sary that a new and more workable manner of regulating the intercourse between Europe and Morocco should be agreed upon. Under these circumstances, Sir Charles Euan- Smith proposed that the Powers should join in demanding and. obtaining a series of concessions from the Sultan which would not only benefit all the Powers equally, but would enrich the Sultan and consolidate his power. It was to the interest of every Power to agree to this, and, in fact, they did all agree, except the French, who preferred in- flicting a humiliation upon England to benefiting their own countrymen. What Sir Charles Euan-Smith proposed in principle, was to break down the barriers that have made Morocco the China of the West, and to throw open her trade to all corners. The Sultan was, of course, to be allowed to impose duties, but these were to be arranged on a reasonable principle. The manner in which the present arrangements work may be illustrated by the following instance. The Sultan levies both export and import duties on grain, and these are imposed just as much upon native corn as on foreign. For example, there is a scarcity of grain, say, on the eastern coast of Morocco, and plenty of it on the western. The natural thing would, of course, be to bring the grain by ship from the western ports to the eastern. Before this could be done, however, a heavy export and a heavy import duty would have to be paid. But these duties are high enough to strangle the trade alto- gether, and it has often happened that there has been a famine in one part of the Empire which could perfectly well have been relieved from the surplus crop in another part, but which has not been relieved because of this monstrous system of imposing both export and import dues even on grain meant for home consumption. Morocco is a country literally without wheeled vehicles—there are no roads to draw them on—and thus everything has to be carried on the backs of camels. It has, however, a very extended sea- board well suited to a coasting trade. Yet this cannot be used owing to the financial policy of the Sultan. The method of levying the Customs dues is even worse than the dues themselves. The Sultan, for some reason or other, gives one of his subjects a licence to collect the Customs dues on a particular piece of the coast for a month or two. The holder of the licence next sells his authority to tax, to a Jew or other capitalist. Naturally enough, this purchaser's only object is to make the most of his concession while it lasts, and he accordingly enforces his licence with the utmost severity. -Under these circum- stances, how can it be said that it was another instance of English selfishness and perfidy for Sir Charles Euan- Smith to insist upon the freeing of the coasting trade ? The measure was one solely intended to benefit the Moors. It was the same with the other provisions of the draft- treaty in regard to commerce. Had they been accepted, the Sultan's power would have very greatly increased, for he would soon have been in possession of a large and certain source of revenue. In Morocco, as elsewhere, money is power, and the Sultan, once in the possession of a sound and increasing revenue, would have been far more master in his own dominions than he is at present. One of the most plausible of the objections to Sir Charles Euan-Smith's draft-treaty has been made in regard to the leave given under it to the Powers to appoint Consuls at Fez. It is asserted that the Sultan and his Ministers demurred to this provision, on the ground that it would introduce into the capital the protégé system which has worked so badly on the coast. England, they say, may not abuse the system, but there are plenty of other Powers among the twenty who are represented in Morocco who will abuse it, much to the detriment of the Sultan's authority. For example, the Sultan's financial difficulties have obliged him to make an assessment upon the rich merchants of Fez, and to require them to contribute to his needs in proportion to their wealth. If the Consuls and the protégé system are established in Fez, it is certain that one by one these taxpayers would, by means of bribes, obtain protection from one or other of the Consuls,—be declared naturalised subjects of this or that Power. But protection includes freedom from all native taxation. Hence, to introduce the foreign Consuls into Fez, would be to deprive the Sultan of his only tax- paying subjects. This, again, sounds plausible enough ; but for all that, there is a complete answer. Sir Charles Euan-Smith doubtless saw these difficulties, and we under- stand that he accordingly offered to give up the most objectionable features of the protégé system, and to sub- stitute in their stead a system of mixed tribunals. No doubt it will be said that he could only bind England by this ; but, in truth, that was quite enough. The other Powers would have been obliged to follow suit, for as long as they did not, England would have secured a political advantage with the Moorish Government of no ordinary importance. The Sultan hates the protégé system, and the relinquishment of its worst features by one Power could have been made the lever for obtaining their abandonment by the rest. The remaining clauses of the draft-treaty were occupied with making safe the position of Europeans in Morocco, with securing a police force and a water-supply for Tangier, with the abolition of the slave-trade, and with the reform of the Moorish prisons, veritable torture-chambers in which the prisoners suffer miseries beyond belief. In a word, there was nothing in the treaty which the Sultan need. have objected to, and without doubt, had it been signed and executed, the Empire of Morocco would have been in a far better position than it now is.
The cause of the Sultan's failure to keep his word was, we have little doubt, the influence of the French. The word had been passed from Paris that everything was to be done to impede and render abortive the English nego- tiations, and the French Envoy, the Count d'A.ubigny, was not likely to be slow in such work. He incurred, it is said, severe official displeasure for having, while in Egypt, consented to the conversion scheme—an English proposal, and therefore to be opposed, no matter what its effect—and, naturally enough, he was not anxious to incur again a similar censure for lack of zeal in blocking the path of England. That any personal blame attaches to him, we do not assert for a moment. Like other officials, he had to obey orders, and. these were to put a spoke in the English wheel, no matter what the indirect effect on French interests. Strangely enough, the well-informed correspondent of the Central News, while dwelling on French ill-will in the matter, declares that French influence in Morocco is at this moment exceedingly small. At firstsight, this seems a somewhat contradictory view, but we expect that the reconciling facts are the following. The French have little direct power ; that is, the Sultan leans upon them very little—how could he, after their action in regardto the Touat Oasis, their intrigues with the Shereef of Wazan, and their encouragement of Hammam ?—but owing to the Sultan's fears of French aggression, they have a great deal of indirect influence. The correspondent of the Central News, in his letter, published on Wednesday, gives a very curious account of an interview between Sir Charles Euan- Smith and the Sultan, in which the latter's attitude towards France is very clearly shown. The Sultan is possessed of the belief that some day or other the French, whose territories, it must be remembered, shut him in on the east, will jump the ditch and take his best provinces from him. It is because of these fears that the Sultan is building a new palace at Tafilet, on the further, i.e., the southern, slope of the Atlas. To this place the treasures of the Empire are being removed, and here the Sultan believes that he may some day have to reign, the coast-lands of the North having fallen a prey to the Infidel. Naturally enough, however, he dreads to precipitate this result, and greatly fears the Power that holds Algiers. France can touch him where no other Power can. Fez is only two hundred miles from the French frontier, and the trouble at the Touat Oasis has shown him how France, if she liked, could eat the artichoke leaf by leaf. The practical working of this dread of France is shown in a remark made by the Sultan to Sir Charles Euan-Smith : "Morocco is like a beautiful girl. She has many ardent suitors. She finds her safety from their number." Here is the situation in a nutshell. The English suitor must not be treated too well, for fear of the French suitor's anger. To say, under these circumstances, that French influence has not been exerted against us, as the Daily News seems to say, is to misrepresent the situation. It is perhaps unfair to blame the French too severely, or to call them treacherous; but it is pretty clear that they stopped the treaty by declaring that they should regard it as a sus- picious piece of favour to the English suitor. Before leaving the subject of Morocco, it is interesting to note the principles of English policy laid down by Sir Charles Euan-Smith. No doubt he described his remarks as a purely personal expression of opinion ; but they will be found, we believe, to represent pretty accurately the necessary policy of England. "What," said the Sultan, with insistence, "will be the attitude of England when the dismemberment of my Empire comes, as the wise men of Europe say it is coming ? When the Powers divide up Morocco, what will England do ? " "Should," said Sir Charles, "through any fault of your own, the dismember- ment of your Empire enter into practical politics, England, I believe, will never permit any other Power to take Tangier, or occupy any other portion of the surrounding country on the coast or the 'Hinterland' in such a manner as in any way to affect the strategic importance of Gibraltar and Tangier, or to affect or straiten their avenues of supply and sustenance." "This, of course," Sir Charles added, "is merely a personal opinion as to what may happen under circumstances which, as I have said, I think are very remote." "But," continued the English Envoy, "there is a way in which your Majesty can prevent the subject of the dismemberment of your Empire being even mooted, and that is by throwing open your doors. Morocco is a mediseval morass, as you know. Let your people retain their religion and the customs of their fathers, but join in the progress of the world, negotiate treaties with England and with other European Powers. It will enrich you, and will, I believe, prove the salvation of your country and the strengthening and support of your dynasty. The day that the commercial relations of Morocco are satisfactory and profitable, as they would soon become to the civilised Powers, they will all be united in assisting you to main- tain the status quo should any Power set covetous eyes upon any portion of your territory." It should also be noted that in these curious abstract speculations, Sir Charles, instead of taking an anti-French line, frankly advised the Sultan to yield to France in regard to the Touat Oasis and the other frontier claims. Again and again, we are told, Sir Charles advised the Sultan to maintain good relations with France, which was a. great North African Power. "He advanced for argument that even supposing the French Minister could do nothing to strengthen the French pretensions to Touat, yet he (Sir Charles) thought, in view of the blood and treasure France had spent in the conquest of Algeria, even if her terri- torial claims to Touat were not substantial, that for reasons of State she would be perfectly justified in seizing the land of Bon Amena. 'This province,' said Sir Charles, directly borders on, if it does not offer to France the best connecting link between, her North African and West African possessions, and be- sides, the most important caravan routes from Lake Chad and from Timbuctoo pass through this country. Should, owing to the vicinity of such autocratic chiefs as Amena, the routes be threatened or become unsafe, I for my part (of course, this is also only a personal opinion) would think France quite justified in seizing the whole country, and I cannot but advise you, unofficially, to avoid by every means in your power getting into an entangle- ment with your Western neighbours about this question, and to make every concession compatible with the integrity of your Empire.'" That was prudent and reasonable advice, and on these lines a compromise in Morocco ought ultimately to be arrived at between France and England.
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