INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.
Nrsee no reason to doubt that Lord Salisbury was stating what is an actual fact when he expressed, as he did on Monday night, his conviction that the chances of a general scheme of International Arbitration are even more remote now than they were some years ago. Unless we are willing to shut our eyes to the present condition of affairs in Europe, it is impossible to deny that the nations grow less rather than
more prepared to listen to reason and right in the settlement of their disputes with each other. Mr. Justice Butt'a speech at the thirteenth Conference for the Codification of the Law of Nations, in which he stated that "the vast proportions which the standing armies of the European States had assumed, adverse as they might at first sight appear to be to their peaceful aspirations, would, before very long, be found to make for rather than against them," and in which he commented on the growing tendency among nations to refer matters to arbitration, is held by those who regard the Prime Minister's view as too pessimistic to suggest instead grounds on which we have a right to believe in the possibility of International Arbitration.
Yet, in truth, if we look closely at Mr. Justice Butt's words, it cannot be said that they give any ground for such hope. Mr. Richard, in a paper read before the same Conference, has calculated that the armies of Europe on the peace footing alone number 3,000,000 men, while on a war footing they nearly
reach the enormous total of 11,000,000. If we could suppose that the Powers which raise these armies do 110 simply in order to defend themselves, it might be possible to fancy that they could some day be got to agree to arbitration and disarmament. Unfortunately, the facts show that most of the great armies are raised and maintained quite as much on other grounds. No doubt defence is one object, but it is not the only or the greatest. The smaller Powers, like Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland, may raise armies to keep themselves from being destroyed, but among the greater Powers the motives are not so simple. Russia, for instance, maintains her armaments from a variety of reasons. The traditions of the Romanoff dynasty teach its head that it is his duty to spread and consolidate in every possible way the rule of the Russian Czar. Next may be reckoned the ideal of the Panslavists, an ideal passionately entertained by immense numbers of Russians, which makes it a sacred duty to unite the whole Slavonic people, and to wrest Constantinople from the Turks. To carry out either of these purposes a great military organisation is necessary. Till, therefore, they are abandoned, it is useless to think of a voluntary Russian disarmament. In Austria, the forces that tend towards the maintenance of a great army are not less potent, though perhaps less obvious. There, not only are there strong dynastic traditions in favour of enlarging the borders of the State, but the extraordinarily diverse nature of the peoples ruled over by the House of Hapsburg makes it seem impera- tive to the statesmen who desire to prevent the dissolution of the Empire that the bond of a great army should be main-
tained. In France, a feeling different again from that of either Russia or Austria influences Frenchmen to maintain their Army in full efficiench—the feeling of revenge. The intense and passionate desire that animates many Frenchmen of all parties and shades of opinion is the desire to humble Germany and reinstate France in her old position in Europe. This is not the spirit which makes dis- armament possible. In Germany, if the old Prussian desire of conquest which made Frederick the Great sometimes act like a political brigand has died out, a spirit just as inimical to the suppression of armaments has taken its place. In the German Empire, not only are the interests of the military class of paramount consideration among the soldiers, but the idea of German unity and German greatness are in the mind of the people bound up with the Army. The Army has become an idol to the whole nation, and to propose disarmament would sound to a patriotic German the wildest and most treason- able of schemes. We thus see that among the Great Powers the armies are maintained for purposes quite other than those of defence, and for purposes which are absolutely inconsistent with any idea of international arbitration. When armies are kept up only in order to protect a nation's territory, arbitration may do instead of fighting. When they are kept up, as they are now, for purposes which arbitration could not possibly accomplish, Lord Salisbury cannot be called too pessi- mistic in banishing "international arbitration" to the times of our grandchildren. Again if we look at the sort of quarrels between nations in which it is sought to apply the principle of arbitration, it is obvious that the practical utility of the scheme is very small. Nations will submit quarrels in which they are not very deeply concerned, quarrels which are not worth fighting about, to arbitration ; but on points of vital interest they will make no such concession, Take a present instance, that of the Bulgarian Question. There, Russia, whatever may be the merits, is not the object of attack ; but is, on account of her own political schemes, taking certain action. She believes that the future of her influence in the Balkans depends upon her preventing particular schemes of government from being carried out in Bulgaria, and she therefore interferes there both openly and secretly. A point may, however, be reached at which her action will bring Russia into actual conflict with Bulgaria and with Austria. Is it conceivable that either Power, Tinder these circumstances, would accept International Arbitration ? Austria might be glad enough for the Concert of Europe to warn Russia from violating Bulgarian territory, and for any assistance the other Powers might give her in resisting her neighbour's advance, but that would be some- thing very different from International Arbitration. You can no more deal thus with a question of wanton aggression or the exercise of legitimate influence, whichever it may be, than yen can in private life refer a burglary to arbitration.
But though we find it impossible to think that there is any chance that, as Europe is at present organised, International Arbitration would not fail as a substitute for great armies and great wars, it is possible that some more regular scheme may be devised for referring small but irritating questions such as those connected with boundaries, fisheries, and the lesser disputes arising from breaches of treaty obligations, to a regular Court of Arbitration. Nations are fortunately growing lose and less touchy on questions of diplomatic etiquette, and the more a matter of course it becomes to refer such points to arbitration, the easier it will be. We must not suppose, how- ever, that in getting a more efficient and expeditious means for making such settlements as these, any great progress. would be made towards an age of universal peace. Petty dis- putes of this kind are the excuses for wars, not their real reasons. Nations go to war through race-hatred, because they envy each other's territories or riches, because there is some internal pressure. To have taken away the smaller excuses by means of an International Board of Arbitration would do some good in a humble way, but not the great good which our benevolent dreamers are so sanguine of effecting. A nation bent on fighting may prefer an excuse, but if one is not to be found, it will make war all the same.
Still, convinced as we are of the impracticability of any immediate scheme of arbitration, we must not forget one pro- ject of the kind which seems to us full of promise of practical utility, though far more modest in its aim. It is that England and the United States should resolve to refer all matters whatever in dispute between them to arbitration, and that a popular movement favourable to that solution of our inter- national difficulties should be cordially promoted on both sides of the Atlantic. Here is an object practicable—indeed, fairly within reach—which would contribute snore than any ambitious scheme such as is often projected, to further the ends of our too sanguine philanthropists. It is, we hope, now nearly impossible that the arbitrament of the sword should be appealed to between the English race on this and on that side of the Atlantic Ocean and the two peoples, if they will, may easily make it quite impossible.
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