A game of Chinese chequers
Jonathan Mirsky
A GREAT WALL: SIX PRESIDENTS AND CHINA, AN INVESTIGATIVE HISTORY by Patrick Tyler Public Affairs, New York, $16, pp. 512 In this this astonishing — and dismaying survey of America's China policy down to the micro-level, the most lowering scene takes place in 1978 on the official plane bringing Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, back to Washington from a critical meeting in Bei- jing with Deng Xiaoping. Brzezinski hated the State Department, whose representa- tive, Richard Holbrooke, was also on the plane, as was one of Brzezinski's aides, Michel Oksenberg. Oksenberg was under instructions not to show Holbrooke the transcripts of the negotiations with Deng. Holbrooke, enraged, stormed down the aisle and seized Oksenberg by the collar.`If you don't give me those memcons [memoranda of conver- sations] after we get back, I will destroy you,' Holbrooke yelled. Oksenberg then seized Holbrooke by his collar and yelled back, 'If I give you those memcons after we get back and you violate our trust, I will destroy you.'
In one of his fascinating footnotes Tyler claims that he interviewed many of those present at the scuffle. Of course the vignette is merely ludicrous. Truly repellent are the conversations between Mao, Nixon, and Kissinger in 1972. Many millions had died because of Mao's policies. The Ameri- cans are, nonetheless, on their figurative knees in a way which makes Monica Lewin- sky seem restrained. Mao gestures at Kissinger, whom he recognises from past conversations as a great toady. 'He is a doctor of philosophy.' Kissinger replies, 'I used to assign the Chairman's collected writings to my classes at Harvard.' Mao observes that his writings are worth noth- ing. Nixon, a life-long communist-hater, slimes in: 'The Chairman's writings moved a nation and have changed the world.' Mao tells Nixon, 'I voted for you during the election.' Humbly, Nixon replies, 'When the Chairman says he voted for me, he voted for the lesser of two evils.' Mao says, `I am comparatively happy when these peo- ple of the Right come to power.' (That year Zhou Enlai said in my presence, 'I prefer rightwingers because we know where we are with them; I will vote for Nixon, not McGovern.' ) Mr Tyler, once the Beijing Bureau Chief for the New York Times and now posted to Moscow, has masterfully digested a mountain of documents, including those notorious memcons and transcripts, and bolstered his story with 200 interviews. I happen not to agree with his thesis that the US has broken 'solemn promises' to Bei- jing that it would show restraint in arming Taiwan. The American promises on this subject are mixed in a farrago of contradic- tory lies. Nor do I agree with Mr Tyler that there is something special about Chinese culture and politics with which Americans must be uniquely patient. But these are contentious questions among China spe- cialists and I respect Mr Tyler's enormous effort and knowledge.
He reviews the years of stalemate between Washington and Beijing after Mao's victory in 1949 and the ensuing witch-hunt against 'who lost China' by zealots such as Joseph McCarthy and Richard Nixon. Yet it was Nixon who saw the opening to China as a political stroke so bold that he forbade anyone to leave Air Force One when he landed in Beijing on 21 February, 1972 until the President, stand- ing alone on the tarmac, had shaken hands with Premier Zhou Enlai. Nixon knew that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had spurned such a handshake during the last high-level Sino-US meeting, at Geneva in 1954, and that Zhou would appreciate this From Nixon to Clinton, Tyler conducts us through a labyrinth of negotiation, espionage, and deceit, almost all of it unknown to most Americans at the time. In 1969, for example, Nixon was 'the first Cold War president to demand a separate [nuclear] capability to attack China'. With- in a few years Nixon had a different secret plan: if China went to war with the Rus- sians, American bombers flying from Chi- nese airfields could 'launch nuclear attacks against Soviet forces'.
For both sides the status of Taiwan — to the Americans an old ally, to the Chinese a lost and insolent province — loomed over everything. Each American envoy who tried to distract China's leaders from their dream of regaining the island by offering grander and grander bribes was astonished when the Chinese jerked the subject back to retaking Taiwan, and by force if neces- sary — still their position.
Henry Kissinger, whom Tyler plainly despises and certainly with reason, lied constantly to Beijing, Moscow, and Taipei that he was making no secret deals with any of them. Tyler records Dr Kissinger directing an aide to show the Chinese top- secret American intelligence data about the Soviet Union and India. Beijing was never fooled; when a CIA man arrived under cover his name was immediately transliterated into Chinese as 'He Who Deceives'. An American diplomat told Tyler, 'They just wanted to let us know that they knew.'
On the night of Tiananmen President Bush rang ex-President Nixon in Califor- nia. What should the US do? 'Don't dis- rupt the relationship,' Nixon counselled. `What's happened has been handled badly and is deplorable, but take a look at the long haul.' Bush havered. Margaret Tutweiler, a top White House official, hav- ing seen the piles of dead on television, said, 'You cannot not respond to these images.' But on 23 June, less than three weeks after the 4 June killings, Bush wrote to Deng, 'Where there are differences between friends, as now, we must find a way to talk them out.' By early December, Brent Scowcroft, Bush's Assistant for National Security Affairs, was in Beijing raising a champagne glass to Premier Li Peng, who had ordered the troops into Tiananmen. President Bush, Scowcroft said, 'still regards Deng as a friend forever'.
Tyler says that the six presidencies were marked by 'false expectations, dashed hopes, and a strong sense of betrayal on both sides'. This is true enough. But the Chinese made the running then and they still do. They periodically give assurances about something or release a long-term political prisoner into American exile. The grateful Americans then do something sub- stantially to China's advantage. Beijing has a bottomless supply of promises and politi- cal prisoners.
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